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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
"An Assessment o f the English Churches' Engagement 
w i t h Europe since 1939." 
The aim of my t h e s i s i s t o o f f e r an assessment 
of the English Churches' engagement w i t h Europe since 1939. My 
f i r s t two chapters set the context f o r the Churches' engagement 
w i t h the European Union by o u t l i n i n g the p r i n c i p a l European 
p o l i t i c a l developments and issues since 1939. 
i n chapters 3 and 4, I assess the key C h r i s t i a n 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s since 1939. Chapter 3 focuses on the t h i n k i n g of 
Bishop B e l l , Archbishop Temple and A.C.F. Beales; as w e l l as 
the c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o the debate made by 'Sword of the S p i r i t ' , 
The Tablet newspaper, and the 1967 B r i t i s h Council of Churches' 
r e p o r t , C h r i s t i a n s and the Common Market. My f o u r t h chapter 
concentrates on the developments i n English e c c l e s i a s t i c a l 
engagement w i t h Europe since 1973. I analyse the o f f i c i a l 
denominational r e p o r t s published since the l a t e 1980's, 
together w i t h other church p u b l i c a t i o n s , such as those 
contained w i t h i n church newspapers, t h e o l o g i c a l j o u r n a l s and 
essays. I also assess the p a r t i c u l a r c o n t r i b u t i o n s made by 
Cardinal Hume, David Edwards and P h i l i p Ludlow. 
I n chapter 5, having h i g h l i g h t e d the d e f i c i e n c y 
of English e c c l e s i a s t i c a l engagement w i t h Europe i n previous 
chapters, my 'diamond model' describes ways i n which i n d i v i d u a l 
C h r i s t i a n s , the Churches as i n s t i t u t i o n s , and theology can play 
a r o l e i n responding t o the s i t u a t i o n . I n p a r t i c u l a r I explore 
the i m p l i c a t i o n s of the d o c t r i n e of the priesthood of a l l 
b e l i e v e r s as i t may r e l a t e t o Europe; as w e l l as the need t o 
r e - a f f i r m a theology of Community f o r Europe. I t i s my argument 
t h a t a m u l t i - f a c e t e d approach needs t o be employed i f the 
Churches are e f f e c t i v e l y t o engage w i t h Europe i n the f u t u r e . 
This i n e v i t a b l y means t h a t f a r greater personnel, f i n a n c i a l , 
and t h e o l o g i c a l resources must be given by the Churches, i f 
Europe i s t o be taken s e r i o u s l y i n the f u t u r e . I t remains t o be 
seen whether the English Churches are s u f f i c i e n t l y committed... 
David H i n c h l i f f e , U n i v e r s i t y of Durham Page i 
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INTRODUCTION 
P r i o r t o the commencement of my t r a i n i n g 
f o r the p r e s b y t e r a l m i n i s t r y of the Methodist Church, I was 
asked whether, as p a r t o f my t r a i n i n g , I would consider 
researching f o r the degree of Master of A r t s . I said I would! 
One of my main p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t s has been the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between C h r i s t i a n f a i t h and C h r i s t i a n p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n . A 
c e n t r a l p o l i t i c a l issues o f the present age f o r B r i t a i n has 
been the United Kingdom's r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the European Union 
and the wider Europe. Does the Church have any c o n t r i b u t i o n t o 
make t o t h i s debate? 
I had expected t h a t my research would 
enable me t o o f f e r a c r i t i q u e of how the English denominations 
had h i t h e r t o engaged w i t h Europe. I n f a c t , a t an e a r l y stage of 
my s t u d i e s , i t became m a n i f e s t l y c l e a r t h a t the English 
Churches have o f t e n been s i l e n t about Europe, and have only 
engaged w i t h Europe i n an extremely l i m i t e d way. As I s h a l l 
show, a p e r s i s t e n t and sustainable c r i t i c i s m of the English 
Churches i s the charge t h a t they do not understand how Europe 
works, and t h e r e f o r e are unable t o engage e f f e c t i v e l y w i t h 
Europe a t any l e v e l . As a consequence, my research has been 
d i r e c t e d i n t o three p a r t s , r e f l e c t e d i n the f o l l o w i n g chapters. 
Chapters 1 and 2 are p r i n c i p a l l y concerned 
w i t h g i v i n g an account of how the European Union has come 
about, how i t s s t r u c t u r e s work, and how the u n i t e d Kingdom has 
engaged w i t h these s t r u c t u r e s . Chapter 1 examines the pe r i o d 
from 1939-1972; chapter 2 examines the pe r i o d from 1973, when 
B r i t a i n became a f u l l member of the European Communities (EC) 
and now the European union (EU). This i s an attempt t o respond 
t o the Churches' perceived ignorance about Europe. 
i n chapters 3 and 4 I have described the 
var y i n g c o n t r i b u t i o n s which English Church leaders and 
denominational a u t h o r i t i e s have made t o the debate about 
Europe. Following the same p a t t e r n as chapters 1 and 2, chapter 
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3 gives an account of the p e r i o d from 1939-1972; and chapter 4, 
from 1973 u n t i l the present day. As I w i l l show, th e r e are 
p a r a l l e l s between how the B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l establishment and 
the Churches have been i n t e r e s t e d i n Europe. Although the 
p a r a l l e l i s not absolute, i t w i l l be seen t h a t Church i n t e r e s t 
has been g r e a t e s t , when Europe has been a s i g n i f i c a n t domestic 
p o l i t i c a l issue. I t w i l l a lso be seen, however, t h a t , 
p r a c t i c a l l y since the end of the Second World war, there has 
been l i t t l e t h e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n about Europe coming from the 
Churches, u n t i l the present decade; and even now there i s 
precious l i t t l e . 
I t i s my b e l i e f throughout t h i s t h e s i s t h a t 
the English Churches need t o take Europe - and i n p a r t i c u l a r 
the European union - s e r i o u s l y and engage w i t h i t p r a c t i c a l l y 
and t h e o l o g i c a l l y . Chapter 5 i s , t h e r e f o r e , my own r e f l e c t i o n 
on the ways i n which t h i s might more s u c c e s s f u l l y happen i n the 
f u t u r e . 
Throughout my research, I have used a 
v a r i e t y of m a t e r i a l - where p o s s i b l e , from source, i n chapters 
1 and 2 l have used government documents from the Public Record 
O f f i c e ; biographies, autobiographies and speeches of the c h i e f 
B r i t i s h p r o t a g o n i s t s i n the p o l i t i c a l drama; and, f o r an a l y s i s 
and discussion, a number of h i s t o r i e s of post-war European 
i n t e g r a t i o n , as w e l l as newspaper a r t i c l e s and j o u r n a l s , i n 
chapter 3 I have concentrated on the leading C h r i s t i a n 
t h i n k e r s ' c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the debate about Europe's f u t u r e 
( t h e r e being no formal denominational r e p o r t s t o study except 
the 1967 B r i t i s h Council of Churches' r e p o r t , 'Christians and 
the Common Market'). I am indebted t o the Westminster Diocesan 
Archives f o r the access they gave me t o Roman C a t h o l i c 
m a t e r i a l , and e s p e c i a l l y m a t e r i a l r e l a t i n g t o Sword of the 
S p i r i t , of which, r e g r e t t a b l y , t h e r e i s l i t t l e w r i t t e n . For the 
bulk of chapter 4, I have been able t o study the in c r e a s i n g 
number o f r e p o r t s f l o w i n g from the denominations since 1989, 
and al s o the v a r i e t y of m a t e r i a l r e l a t i n g t o Europe which some 
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of the denominations are using t o s t i r up the debate. The 
substance of chapter 5 has a r i s e n from a number of valuable and 
i l l u m i n a t i n g conversations I was able t o have w i t h B r i t i s h 
C h r i s t i a n Euro-HP's, as w e l l as members of the European 
Ecumenical Commission f o r Church and Society. I am very 
g r a t e f u l t o Stephen Hughes, MEP f o r Durham, who enabled me t o 
use h i s o f f i c e , and gain access t o Parliament and MEP's a l i k e 
d u r i n g my research v i s i t t o Strasbourg and Brussels i n 1996. 
Because other p a r t s of the UK have 
d i f f e r e n t denominational s t r u c t u r e s , and f o r the sake of 
c l a r i t y and consistency, as w e l l as f o r ease of access t o 
source m a t e r i a l , I have confined my e x p l o r a t i o n t o England. I t 
was my hope t h a t I could examine the many ingenious ways i n 
which the denominations engaged w i t h Europe. C l e a r l y , t h a t 
research w i l l remain u n t i l t he Churches have done f a r more 
work! S i g n i f i c a n t l y , as w i l l be seen, much of the 
e c c l e s i a s t i c a l m a t e r i a l I have used has been aimed i n recent 
years a t the leaders of the denominations. Much more m a t e r i a l 
and work needs t o be aimed a t 'ordinary' church members - f o r , 
as I s h a l l argue, i n d i v i d u a l C h r i s t i a n s have an important r o l e 
t o p lay. I n t h i s t h e s i s , i n e v i t a b l y I w i l l h i g h l i g h t the 
d e f i c i e n c i e s o f the Churches. However, much i s s t a r t i n g t o be 
done, and the f u t u r e o f Europe i s beginning t o be addressed by 
the Churches. Much, nevertheless, has y e t t o be done. I t i s my 
hope t h i s work w i l l c o n t r i b u t e t o the debate. 
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CHAPTER 1: GROWING EUROPEAN UNITY: 1939 - 1972 
(A) FROM WAR TO COMMUNITY: 1939-1958 
Although i t may be tempting, when o f f e r i n g 
an o u t l i n e of recent developments i n European p o l i t i c a l and 
economic i n t e g r a t i o n simply t o begin where many do, at the 
end of the Second world war, t h a t would, I b e l i e v e , be a 
mistake. As we s h a l l see, important developments which can 
r i g h t l y be seen t o be c r u c i a l f o r Europe, and i n p a r t i c u l a r f o r 
Western Europe, have t h e i r o r i g i n s a t the heart of t h a t war. I n 
the f i r s t of our periods, 1939-1958, I s h a l l o u t l i n e the seeds 
sown which l e d t o the Europe of the present day. I t w i l l be 
seen t h a t t h i s p e r i o d contains a s t a r t l i n g r e v e r s a l i n 
B r i t a i n ' s r e l a t i o n s w i t h the r e s t of Europe. At the outset o f 
t h i s p e riod B r i t a i n was seen as the hope not j u s t f o r a f r e e 
Europe but a f r e e world. By 1958, B r i t a i n was i n c r e a s i n g l y on 
the margins of i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s , and both p h y s i c a l l y and 
i d e o l o g i c a l l y on the periphery of European developments. So how 
di d t h i s r a p i d r e v e r s a l occur? 
With A u s t r i a and Germany u n i t e d , 
Czechoslovakia annexed, Poland smashed, Denmark, Norway, 
Holland and Belgium invaded, and the collapse of France 
appearing t o be imminent, i t seemed l i k e l y t h a t the defeat o f 
Great B r i t a i n would be next. A high degree of u n i t y had been 
achieved on the European c o n t i n e n t , but i t was a Europe u n i t e d , 
not by the popular w i l l of i t s many diverse peoples, but by 
t h e i r subjugation a t the hands of Nazi Germany. Yet even i n 
May 1940, when France faced d i s a s t e r and B r i t a i n ' s crushing 
seemed i n e v i t a b l e , the beginnings of a f r e e and more u n i t e d 
continent may w e l l be viewed. 
Upon the outbreak of war, the B r i t i s h and 
French governments set up the j o i n t Supreme War Council. The 
B r i t i s h Expeditionary Force was sent t o France and placed under 
France's Commander, Gamelin. Together the French and B r i t i s h 
governments launched t h e i r a b o r t i v e and wholly d i s a s t r o u s 
a t t a c k upon the German invasion forces i n Norway. This 
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u l t i m a t e l y l e d t o the collapse of Daladier's government, and 
the commencement of Paul Reynaud's b r i e f premiership of France. 
upon Reynaud's accession t o France's 
premiership on 21st March, 1940, "Almost h i s f i r s t act was t o 
conclude w i t h the B r i t i s h an agreement... t o make war and peace 
i n common."(1). On 1st March 1940 Chamberlain agreed i n 
p r i n c i p l e t o the c r e a t i o n of an Anglo-French union, but i t was 
not u n t i l C h u r c h i l l had replaced Chamberlain as Prime M i n i s t e r 
and the collapse of France seemed i n e v i t a b l e , t h a t the proposal 
d r a f t e d by S i r Roger v a n s i t t a r t , Jean Monnet and General de 
Gaulle was f o r m a l l y put t o the B r i t i s h Cabinet ( 2 ) . Meanwhile 
steps were being taken towards clo s e r Anglo-French p a r t n e r s h i p . 
At the meeting of the Supreme War Council of 28th March 1940, 
i t was agreed t h a t the Council should meet f a r more f r e q u e n t l y , 
and t h a t the p o s s i b i l i t y o f i t having a permanent j o i n t 
s e c r e t a r i a t should be explored, i n h i s memorandum t o the 
Cabinet Lord H a l i f a x , the Foreign Secretary, noted the 
p o t e n t i a l post-war i m p l i c a t i o n s of the Council: "The Supreme 
War Council may not impossibly grow i n t o a regular p a r t of the 
p o l i t i c a l machinery i n the two c o u n t r i e s . . . I t would continue 
t o meet under another name a f t e r the war, and would deal w i t h 
a l l matters of common concern t o the two countries and not 
merely w i t h m i l i t a r y questions." (3) 
Undoubtedly, though, the peak of Anglo-
French p a r t n e r s h i p or unionism came i n France's worst hour, 
when the proposal f o r Anglo-French Union was put t o Cabinet, 
France seemed about t o collapse, i n h i s h i s t o r y of the Second 
World War, C h u r c h i l l observed of t h a t Cabinet meeting t h a t 
"Grief f o r our a l l y i n her agony, and d e s i r e t o do anything i n 
human power t o a i d her, was the p r e v a i l i n g mood."(4) Thus, i n 
t h i s s p i r i t , the Cabinet accepted the proposal before them f o r 
F r a n c o - B r i t i s h union, which included common c i t i z e n s h i p , j o i n t 
organs f o r defence, as w e l l as common p o l i c i e s f o r areas such 
as f o r e i g n , f i n a n c i a l and economic a f f a i r s ( 5 ) . I t s main aim, 
though, as C h u r c h i l l acknowledged, was t o give "M. Reynaud some 
new f a c t of a v i v i d and s t i m u l a t i n g nature w i t h which t o c a r r y 
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a m a j o r i t y of h i s Cabinet i n t o a move t o A f r i c a and a 
continuance o f the war." The proposal was not w e l l received by 
the c r i s i s - e n v e l o p e d French Cabinet, i t was accused of being a 
plan t o make France a B r i t i s h dominion and t o s t e a l her 
colonies. Weygand t o l d Marshal Petain t h a t he b e l i e v e d t h a t 
B r i t a i n , l i k e France, was doomed. Petain t a r t l y declared of the 
plan t h a t a union w i t h B r i t a i n was l i k e " f u s i o n w i t h a 
corpse"(6) t o which Reynaud r e p l i e d t h a t " I p r e f e r t o 
c o l l a b o r a t e w i t h my a l l i e s r a t h e r than w i t h my enemies." Thus 
the plan was consigned t o h i s t o r y , and w i t h i t , Reynaud's 
government. The next day, De Gaulle f l e d t o B r i t a i n , on 22nd of 
June Marshal Petain concluded the a r m i s t i c e w i t h H i t l e r . 
Derek urwin contends t h a t the plan "had 
not been a serious proposal t h a t might serve as a core f o r some 
d i s t a n t f u t u r e , but a s t r a t e g y . . . t h a t might persuade a 
wavering French government t o continue as a b e l l i g e r e n t i n the 
war against Nazi Germany."(7). I accept t h a t t h i s may w e l l be 
the case. I t i s , though, s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t so much e f f o r t was 
put i n t o developing closer t i e s . A f t e r a l l , there was no 
necessity f o r Lord H a l i f a x t o h i g h l i g h t the Council's post-war 
p o t e n t i a l , which went beyond mere m i l i t a r y matters. Although 
the serious i n t e n t of the Government regarding Anglo-French 
union and co-operation i s debatable, i t i s nevertheless, 
worthy of note f o r a number of reasons. F i r s t l y , the necessity 
of the s i t u a t i o n threw France and B r i t a i n together. Partnership 
or union seemed t o be a v i a b l e response i n the face of a common 
foe f o r both governments. And secondly, c e n t r a l t o i t were 
three men who would not only be c r i t i c a l l y involved i n t h e 
prosecution of the war, but who would be c e n t r a l t o the type of 
Europe t h a t would emerge a f t e r the war: Winston C h u r c h i l l , Jean 
Monnet and Charles de Gaulle. 
A f t e r the collapse of France B r i t a i n was 
alone i n the f i g h t against Nazism u n t i l 22nd of June 1941, 
when H i t l e r ' s main t h r u s t i n the European war turned eastwards 
w i t h the invasion of Soviet Russia. By the end of the year the 
second world war of the t w e n t i e t h century was an awful r e a l i t y ; 
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the United s t a t e s had been attacked by the Japanese a t Pearl 
Harbour on 7th December 1941, and H i t l e r amazingly declared war 
on America. B r i t a i n was no longer alone, but i t would s t i l l be 
3£ years before the European war would come t o an end. 
H i s t o r i a n s have noted t h a t the war was not 
merely a f i g h t against Nazism or Japanese imperialism, i t a lso 
had the e f f e c t of being a c a t a l y s t , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n B r i t a i n , 
f o r s o c i a l change. Hastings has commented t h a t "As H i t l e r ' s 
bombs ploughed i n t o the worst of slum p r o p e r t i e s they helped 
create the w i l l t o b u i l d a new and less unequal s o c i e t y . " ( 8 ) 
A.J.P.Taylor observed t h a t "Men t a l k e d of r e c o n s t r u c t i o n as 
they had done duri n g the F i r s t World war. This time they were 
determined not t o be cheated, and t h e r e f o r e demanded the 
f o r m u l a t i o n of p r a c t i c a l schemes w h i l e the war was on."(9) The 
Beveridge Report which l e d t o u n i v e r s a l s o c i a l s e c u r i t y , and 
the Education Act of 1944 were i n t h e i r own r i g h t 
r e v o l u t i o n a r y . As we s h a l l observe l a t e r , i n the immediate 
post-war years much of t h i s reforming zeal would be channelled 
i n t o the various programmes f o r n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n , such as the 
ra i l w a y s , c o a l , and s t e e l , and the c r e a t i o n of the National 
Health Service. But i t would be a mistake t o suggest t h a t the 
hope f o r permanent change was simply confined t o B r i t a i n . 
Throughout war-torn Europe th e r e was a 
search f o r what was t o come i n i t s place. I t was obvious t h a t 
the p u n i t i v e settlement of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s towards 
Germany a f t e r world War One had been a f a i l u r e . I t had not 
solved the c r i s i s , even i f i t gave vent t o the anger towards 
Germany. Furthermore, the League of Nations had f a i l e d t o 
ensure world peace, i t had, a f t e r a l l , been cast aside by 
H i t l e r and rendered i n e f f e c t i v e by Mussolini ( 1 0 ) . I n 
W i s t r i c h ' s judgement, "The f a i l u r e of the League of Nations t o 
maintain i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace was l a r g e l y due t o n a t i o n a l 
sovereignty remaining u n f e t t e r e d and from the lack of sanctions 
t o secure compliance w i t h League decisions."(11) I f t h i s was 
so, then the question remained: what type of f u t u r e f o r Europe? 
Whi l s t i n p r i s o n camp i n I t a l y , A l t i e r o 
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S p i n e l l i penned and smuggled out of p r i s o n what became known as 
the "Ventotene Manifesto" which o u t l i n e d a v i s i o n f o r a post-
war union i n Europe based on a f e d e r a l s t r u c t u r e of government. 
Soon the Manifesto's ideas were adopted by the I t a l i a n 
Resistance, and e v e n t u a l l y l e d t o a major conference i n J u l y 
1944 i n Geneva. The document which was endorsed by a l l the 
st a t e s represented, w i t h the exception of Norway and Denmark, 
c a l l e d f o r a supranational government f o r Europe, r a t h e r than 
the pre-war i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of independent n a t i o n -
s t a t e s . I t was envisaged t h a t the new governmental s t r u c t u r e 
should have a w r i t t e n c o n s t i t u t i o n , i n which the emerging l e g a l 
a u t h o r i t y would have the sole r i g h t of judgement. Moreover, the 
new s t r u c t u r e would only allow a s i n g l e European army, w i t h no 
other armed forces being p e r m i t t e d (12). 
Whilst t h i s framework was undoubtedly 
s i g n i f i c a n t , i t s a s p i r a t i o n s were by no means unique dur i n g the 
war. The Eastern European governments-in-exile of Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Greece i n 1941 made a 
d e c l a r a t i o n of s o l i d a r i t y between them. This was followed i n 
January 1942 w i t h the s i g n i n g of a confederal Treaty between 
Czechoslovakia and Poland. 
Thinking about the shape of post-war 
Europe was not simply r e s t r i c t e d t o mainland c o n t i n e n t a l 
Europeans e i t h e r . I t was, as I s h a l l show i n chapter 3, also 
much i n the minds of English church leaders. Equally, a t t e n t i o n 
was given t o i t by B r i t i s h p o l i t i c i a n s , not l e a s t of whom was 
Winston C h u r c h i l l . I n response t o a memorandum c i r c u l a t e d t o 
the Cabinet i n October 1942 which o u t l i n e d a proposal f o r a 
world power s t r u c t u r e ( 13), C h u r c h i l l wrote on 21st October 
1942 a note which, he recognised p r i m a r i l y concerned the 
f u t u r e of Europe. He hoped f o r a more u n i t e d Europe under a 
Council of Europe. He also hoped f o r a Europe i n which b a r r i e r s 
were removed, and t r a v e l made easier. Moreover, the European 
economy as a whole should be studie d , and the needs of each of 
the European st a t e s should be taken i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n ( 14). 
Soon a f t e r t h i s , i n March 1943, i n one of h i s famous 
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broadcasts, C h u r c h i l l c a l l e d f o r the c r e a t i o n of a Council of 
Europe i n which even the defeated Germany, or some form of i t , 
could take p a r t - a proposal he echoed a t the Teheran 
conference of 1944 (15). As w i t h the l a t e r Geneva document of 
1944, C h u r c h i l l c a l l e d f o r a l e g a l framework t o work through 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l disputes, w i t h the earnest hope of preventing 
"renewed aggression and the pr e p a r a t i o n of f u t u r e wars."(16) I 
s h a l l r e t u r n t o C h u r c h i l l ' s p o s i t i o n on European issues below. 
I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t o note here, however, t h a t even i n the midst 
of the war, C h u r c h i l l was developing a keen i n t e r e s t i n how a 
post-war Europe might develop - a theme which was t o occupy a 
good deal of h i s t h i n k i n g , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the years 
immediately f o l l o w i n g the war. 
I n summary, then, we can observe t h a t 
t h e r e was a wide-spread hope which ran throughout war-torn 
Europe, t h a t what followed the war must of necessity be b e t t e r 
than t h a t which preceded i t . I t seemed t o many t h a t the o l d 
ways of independent n a t i o n - s t a t e s had had t h e i r day. The 
s t r u c t u r e s of the past had not l e d t o the perpe t u a t i o n of 
peaceful co-existence, nor had they provided the means f o r 
s e t t l i n g disputes. With the end of war, "Many people... thought 
and argued t h a t Europe could s t a r t a fresh, w i t h a d i f f e r e n t 
p o l i t i c a l and economic order t h a t r e j e c t e d the t i r e d d o c t r i n e s 
of n a t i o n a l i s m , p o l i t i c a l sovereignty and economic autarky upon 
which the o l d s t a t e system of the continent had been b u i l t . I n 
i t s place they wanted some ki n d of p o l i t i c a l union or 
f e d e r a t i o n t h a t would e f f e c t i v e l y put i n t o p r a c t i c e the o l d 
symbolic concept of the harmony of European nations."(17) At 
the close of war, as urwin f u r t h e r commented, "Standing alone 
against H i t l e r and serving as a f l o a t i n g f o r t r e s s and supply 
base, B r i t a i n was the symbol of Resistance and the f u t u r e . A l l 
t h a t was needed was f o r B r i t a i n t o take the lead."(18) So then, 
how d i d t h i s a s p i r a t i o n f o r a 'new' Europe begin t o take shape? 
The Europe t h a t e x i s t e d a t the end of the 
Second World War was a Europe s t i l l i n c r i s i s , even though 
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H i t l e r and the Nazis had been conquered. Germany had been 
crushed, and was now under A l l i e d c o n t r o l . P h y s i c a l l y , much of 
i t had been destroyed by the invasion f i g h t i n g and the 
r e l e n t l e s s A l l i e d bombing. Liberated Europe was also t r y i n g t o 
come t o terms w i t h i t s new freedom, where much had been 
destroyed. P o l i t i c a l l y , Europe had changed s i g n i f i c a n t l y . 
Eastern Europe was l a r g e l y occupied by the Soviet Armies - a 
r e a l i t y t h a t was t o i n f l u e n c e European development f o r the best 
p a r t of the next 50 years, i n western European c o u n t r i e s , new 
forms of government had t o be created a f t e r 6 years of tyranny, 
i n B r i t a i n , the p o l i t i c a l map had been changed. C h u r c h i l l ' s 
c o a l i t i o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n had been swept away by an avalanche of 
support f o r Labour, headed by C h u r c h i l l ' s c o a l i t i o n deputy, 
Clement A t t l e e . Economically, Europe was i n c r i s i s , because 
much of i t s i n d u s t r y and a g r i c u l t u r e had been destroyed. 
Although B r i t a i n had not been invaded, i t too faced economic 
c r i s i s because i t had used i t s immense f i n a n c i a l wealth f o r the 
prosecution of the war. Now America was the dominant n a t i o n 
p o l i t i c a l l y and economically. As Urwin remarks, the leaders of 
the U.S.A. "had come t o accept t h a t i t had, even i f only f o r 
the sake of i t s own s e c u r i t y and p r o s p e r i t y , g l o b a l 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s which could not be evaded."(19) How then, i n 
the l i g h t of t h i s new post-war r e a l i t y , d i d a more p o l i t i c a l l y 
u n i t e d Europe begin t o take shape? 
C h u r c h i l l described h i s p o l i c y i n a short 
dictum: " I n war: r e s o l u t i o n ; i n defeat: defiance; i n v i c t o r y : 
magnanimity; i n peace: good w i l l . " (20) I t seems t o me t h a t 
t h i s i s a f a i r summary of C h u r c h i l l ' s outlook, and i t had 
p a r t i c u l a r relevance f o r Europe's f u t u r e . C h u r c h i l l r e a l i s e d 
t h a t i f Europe was t o a r i s e and f i n d s t a b i l i t y , then i t was 
necessary t h a t Germany should f i n d a new and acceptable r o l e , 
r a t h e r than endure the t o t a l h u m i l i a t i o n and subjugation t h a t 
Lord V a n s i t t a r t had c a l l e d f o r i n a debate on post-war A l l i e d 
p o l i c y i n 1944 ( 2 1 ) . Moreover, as he pointed out i n h i s 1946 
Zurich speech, France and Germany "must take the lead together" 
f o r r e b u i l d i n g Germany (22). This theme was echoed i n the 
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debate on the King's speech of 1948, when he spoke of h i s hope 
t h a t France would s t r e t c h out her hand " t o her enemy of a 
thousand years and, i n the moment of absolute German 
p r o s t r a t i o n , b r i n g them back t o the c i r c l e of Christendom and 
the f a m i l y of Europe." (23) Whilst the Zurich speech c e r t a i n l y 
i n s p i r e d those i n t e r e s t e d i n closer European development, the 
speech al s o spoke of C h u r c h i l l ' s understanding of B r i t a i n ' s 
r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Europe. E s s e n t i a l l y , B r i t a i n was t o be a 
sponsor of Europe, an i n t e r e s t e d p a r t y , but f o r a l l t h a t , 
outside i t . As Ernest W i s t r i c h commented, "To him the B r i t i s h 
Empire and Commonwealth came f i r s t and the r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h 
Europe only i n some form of close but e x t e r n a l 
association."(24) For C h u r c h i l l , the Commonwealth was the 
primary i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . European p o l i c y had t o be 
seen i n r e l a t i o n t o t h a t (25). 
As much as C h u r c h i l l i n s p i r e d pro-
Europeans t o f u r t h e r endeavours, p r a c t i c a l necessity also 
forced European governments i n t o closer co-operation. By 1947 
the economies of Europe were s t i l l unstable, and so was i t s 
p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l w e l l - b e i n g . As America came t o r e a l i s e i t s 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i n supporting a s t a b l e Europe, George Marshall 
proposed i n June 1947 the 'European Recovery Programme' (which 
came t o be known more p o p u l a r l y as the 'Marshall Plan") i n 
which f i n a n c i a l a i d would be made a v a i l a b l e t o European 
cou n t r i e s t h a t desired t o receive i t . However, the c o n d i t i o n 
was t h a t a sum should be a l l o c a t e d t o Europe as a whole. The 
p a r t i c i p a t i n g governments were t o be j o i n t l y responsible i n 
admin i s t e r i n g and d i s t r i b u t i n g the a i d . Although the Soviet 
Union was o f f e r e d a share i n the programme, i t and i t s 
s a t e l l i t e s refused t o take p a r t . Nevertheless 16 European 
countries formed i n A p r i l 1948 the 'Organisation f o r European 
Economic Cooperation 1 t o d i s t r i b u t e the European Recovery 
Programme Fund, and t o work on the l i b e r a l i s a t i o n of trade i n 
Europe. As an o r g a n i s a t i o n i t had no supranational powers - i t 
worked s o l e l y by inter-governmental co-operation. I t d i d , 
though, have important i m p l i c a t i o n s , f o r "the t r u e value of the 
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O.E.E.C. l a y i n the foundations i t e s t a b l i s h e d for the future, 
not l e a s t i n the f o s t e r i n g of new modes of t h i n k i n g . I t 
o u t l i v e d by f a r the three-year period of Marshall Aid..."(26) 
A l l i e d t o i t s post-war economic weakness, 
Europe was a l s o m i l i t a r i l y weak, e s p e c i a l l y i n the face of the 
emerging 'cold war' with the S o v i e t union. The m i l i t a r y 
p a r a l l e l to the Marshall Plan was the A t l a n t i c Pact of A p r i l 
1949 which l e d to the formation of the North A t l a n t i c T reaty 
Organisation. Together with the Marshall Plan " i t helped to 
c r e a t e a more p o s i t i v e environment of co-operation and a 
v a l u a b l e l e a r n i n g experience."(27) 
As w e l l as the p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t of 
Marshall Aid f o r European cooperation, 1948 a l s o witnessed the 
holding of the f i r s t 'Congress of Europe' which met i n The 
Hague. Around 750 delegates r e p r e s e n t i n g most of the European 
nations attended the May Congress. As C h u r c h i l l remarked i n h i s 
chairman's address t o the Congress, i t was "a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e 
grouping of the most e s s e n t i a l elements i n the p o l i t i c a l , 
i n d u s t r i a l , c u l t u r a l and s p i r i t u a l l i f e of Europe."(28) 
S i g n i f i c a n t l y , though, there was no strong delegation 
r e p r e s e n t i n g the B r i t i s h Labour Government - a glimmer of the 
' o f f i c i a l ' B r i t i s h view of European a f f a i r s . As C h u r c h i l l a l s o 
s a i d i n h i s speech, i n a sentiment t h a t could h a r d l y be l e s s 
a p p l i c a b l e today, "No-one can suppose t h a t Europe can be u n i t e d 
i n any party or s e c t i o n a l b a s i s . . . I t must be a l l f o r a l l . 
Europe can only be u n i t e d by the h e a r t - f e l t wish and vehement 
expression of the g r e a t m a j o r i t y of a l l the peoples i n a l l the 
p a r t i e s i n a l l the freedom-loving c o u n t r i e s , no matter where 
they may dwell or how they vote." So what were the hopes and 
e f f e c t s of the Congress? 
At a simple l e v e l the Congress showed by 
i t s widely r e p r e s e n t a t i v e nature, t h a t European development was 
held to be important. For the key p r o t a g o n i s t s of the war, i t 
was a l s o p o l i t i c a l l y important. The attendance of Germany 
showed a measure of r e h a b i l i t a t i o n , and a t a c i t acceptance t h a t 
Germany did have a r o l e i n the world. For humiliated I t a l y , the 
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Congress o f f e r e d an opportunity f o r gr e a t e r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n 
Europe with the attendant hope of gr e a t e r domestic p o l i t i c a l 
s t a b i l i t y . And for France, i t held out the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
renewing i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r e s t i g e once more. By c o n t r a s t , as 
we s h a l l begin to see, " i t was a t t h i s point t h a t B r i t i s h 
l e a d e r s h i p began to disappear from the u n i t y movement."(29) 
One of the p r a c t i c a l and f a r reaching 
e f f e c t s of the Congress was the renewed impetus i t gave to the 
Europeans who wished f o r s t i l l c l o s e r co-operation. T h i s found 
an important measure of expression i n the si g n i n g of the Treaty 
of Westminster on 5th May 1949, which created the "Council of 
Europe". The Council was to have two p r i n c i p a l 'arms'. I t was 
to have a c o n s u l t a t i v e assembly made up of delegates sent by 
n a t i o n a l parliaments. I t was a l s o to have a committee of 
m i n i s t e r s . The C o n s u l t a t i v e Assembly f i r s t met i n Strasbourg 
i n August 1949. I t s main f u n c t i o n was as a forum f o r c r o s s -
European debate, r a t h e r than as a l e g i s l a t u r e . The Committee of 
M i n i s t e r s was the body i n which power a c t u a l l y r e s i d e d . 
However, although the Committee of M i n i s t e r s held the power 
granted by the Treaty, i t could s t i l l only f u n c t i o n as an 
advisory body to the governments represented. A f t e r 1952 t h i s 
committee was down-graded t o having permanent r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , 
with m i n i s t e r s only attending key meetings. By i t s nature, the 
Committee was f a r more c o n s e r v a t i v e than the Assembly, which 
f e l t i t s e l f f r e e r to think out wider i s s u e s , l a r g e l y because i t 
didn't have to s a t i s f y an e l e c t o r a t e . As Paul Reynaud s a i d 
b i t t e r l y , "'... The Council of Europe c o n s i s t s of two bodies, 
one of them for Europe, the other a g a i n s t i t . . . ' " ( 3 0 ) 
Although, as I s h a l l argue i n chapter 5, 
the Council of Europe has made an important c o n t r i b u t i o n to 
l i f e i n post-war Europe, i t s main s i g n i f i c a n c e i n these e a r l y 
post-war years was t h a t the Council was the f i r s t p o l i t i c a l 
body of n a t i o n a l governments which was charged with looking a t 
European questions founded by Treaty. Consequently, although i t 
had no supr a n a t i o n a l powers, i t d i d provide a meeting point f o r 
a l a r g e number of the nations which compose the continent of 
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Europe. As Urwin r i g h t l y puts i t , i t was "an important 
milestone on the road to the c l o s e r a s s o c i a t i o n of the European 
Community."(31) 
Whilst the Council of Europe was wholly an 
inter-governmental body i t was not long before the i s s u e of 
supranational ism came to the fore, i n a dramatic p r e s s 
conference on 9th May 1950, the French Foreign m i n i s t e r , Robert 
Schuman proposed t h a t the c o a l and s t e e l production of both 
France and Germany should be pooled, and t h a t other i n t e r e s t e d 
a l l i e s could j o i n . As John Gillingham s a i d : "His message was as 
dramatic as i t was simple: France was w i l l i n g to s a c r i f i c e 
n a t i o n a l sovereignty f o r the common good, and thus i n v i t e d her 
neighbours to j o i n a venture t h a t would end a n c i e n t r i v a l r y , 
prevent war, and lead to a b r i g h t e r f u t u r e . " ( 3 2 ) T h e o r e t i c a l l y 
t h a t may have been the case, but as Stephen George argues, i t 
i s questionable as to whether there was any i n t e n t i o n of 
allo w i n g B r i t a i n to j o i n ( 3 3 ) . A f t e r a l l , the French had f o r e -
warned the USA of i t s proposal, but not B r i t a i n . More 
c r u c i a l l y , on 1 s t June Schuman gave an ultimatum to a l l 
i n t e r e s t e d governments: the p r i n c i p l e of s u p r a n a t i o n a l i t y was 
non-negotiable, and a l l c o u n t r i e s who wished t o apply had to do 
so by 8pm the f o l l o w i n g day. 
Both f a c t o r s v i r t u a l l y ensured t h a t 
B r i t a i n would not j o i n . The c o a l and s t e e l i n d u s t r i e s had been 
n a t i o n a l i s e d , and, with a reduced Labour m a j o r i t y a f t e r the 
February 1950 e l e c t i o n s , i t would be u n l i k e l y to get the 
necessary votes. As the meeting of the Cabinet of 22nd June 
1950 recognised, " I t would be impossible f o r the government to 
accept such a scheme i f i t was based on the assumption t h a t 
c o a l and s t e e l production would s h o r t l y be s u r p l u s to 
requirement and was designed p r i m a r i l y to r e s t r i c t production 
i n the i n t e r e s t s of the producers." (34) What was even more 
unacceptable was Schuman's ultimatum on the i s s u e of 
s u p r a n a t i o n a l i t y . There was general agreement i n the Cabinet, 
h e l d 5£ hours before the deadline's expiry, t h a t "No B r i t i s h 
Government could be expected to accept such a commitment 
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without having had any opportunity to a s s e s s the consequences 
which i t might involve f o r our key i n d u s t r i e s , our export trade 
and our l e v e l of employment."(35) C o n t r a s t i n g with Holland, 
who accepted i n p r i n c i p l e the concept of s u p r a n a t i o n a l i t y 
w h i l s t r e s e r v i n g i t s r i g h t not to p a r t i c i p a t e i n any s t r u c t u r e s 
i t f e l t to be harmful a f t e r n e g o t i a t i o n , the Cabinet agreed not 
t o j o i n the proposed Coal and S t e e l Community on Schuman's 
terms. 
I n a sense the Schuman plan b r i n g s i n t o 
c l e a r focus some of the dilemmas B r i t a i n has had i n regard t o 
Europe. As I have noted on page 7 much of the post-war 
reforming z e a l i n B r i t a i n had gone i n t o n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n , 
whereas the i s s u e s of a new Europe were f a r more keenly 
explored on mainland Europe. T h i s made i t very d i f f i c u l t f o r 
the government, p a r t i c u l a r l y a Labour one, to p a r t i c i p a t e i n 
s t r u c t u r e s which might be perceived as a t h r e a t to t h a t 
reformation. Perhaps more s i g n i f i c a n t , though, i s B r i t a i n ' s way 
of exploring new p o s s i b i l i t i e s . I t would not s i g n up even i n 
p r i n c i p l e to s t r u c t u r e s t h a t were not f u l l y considered. I n many 
ways t h i s approach i s f u l l y understandable. On the face of i t , 
i t seems to be s e n s i b l e caution. But what i t a l s o served to do 
was to i s o l a t e B r i t a i n ' s i n f l u e n c e from European development. 
You cannot i n f l u e n c e a v i s i o n i f you are not prepared to dream 
dreams. So f a r , B r i t a i n appears not to have been v i s i o n a r y i n 
European a f f a i r s but r e a c t i o n a r y . B r i t a i n ' s r o l e and i n f l u e n c e 
had a l l but vanished i n 5 y e a r s . I n 1945 i t s l e a d e r s h i p was 
there f o r the t a k i n g . I t had m a n i f e s t l y f a i l e d to do so. 
Consequently, B r i t a i n has not had a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n 
European l e a d e r s h i p s i n c e . So then, how important was the 
European Coal and S t e e l Community (ECSC) to the development of 
post-war Europe? 
A f t e r 9 months of n e g o t i a t i o n the T r e a t y 
of P a r i s was signed on 18th A p r i l 1951. i n order to implement 
the pooling of c o a l and s t e e l production and trade, the t r e a t y 
sought to dismantle t a r i f f s and trade r e s t r i c t i o n s , thus 
c r e a t i n g a common market. Furthermore, to turn the theory i n t o 
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e f f e c t , the T r e a t y of P a r i s s e t up a 5-part s t r u c t u r e . The 
'High Authority' of nine commissioners, headed by Jean Monnet 
u n t i l 1955, could recommend p o l i c y and make binding d e c i s i o n s 
upon ECSC members by m a j o r i t y voting. The High Authority, 
however, had t o share i t s e x e c u t i v e powers with the Council of 
M i n i s t e r s who could l i m i t the A u t h o r i t y ' s s u p r a n a t i o n a l powers. 
A Common Assembly was a l s o created, but i t s p r i n c i p a l powers 
lay i n i t s r i g h t to censure the High Authority and to c a l l 
them to r e s i g n en masse. I t was not, however, i n any sense a 
l e g i s l a t i v e assembly. A C o n s u l t a t i v e Assembly was a l s o s e t up 
to a d v i s e the High Authority on i s s u e s w i t h i n the competence of 
the Community. And f i n a l l y a Court of J u s t i c e was e s t a b l i s h e d 
to a d j u d i c a t e on i s s u e s brought before i t . i t s judgements were 
binding. What, then, were the e f f e c t s of the ECSC? 
Perhaps most important of a l l were the 
precedents the ECSC s e t . I t was the f i r s t o r g a n i s a t i o n , roughly 
i n accordance with the ventotene Manifesto and Geneva 
d e c l a r a t i o n (see p.8), made up of nations who v o l u n t a r i l y 
ceded n a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y to a s u p r a n a t i o n a l body whose 
d e c i s i o n s were binding upon them. Further, those d e c i s i o n s were 
backed up by the enforcement of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l law court. 
I n view of i t s aims, i t was only 
p a r t i a l l y s u c c e s s f u l . By 1958 the production and volume of 
trade had r i s e n and r e s t r i c t i v e trade d i s c r i m i n a t i o n had been 
reduced ( 3 6 ) , and yet i n c o n t r a s t Gillingham observed t h a t the 
ECSC had f a i l e d to break up French and German c a r t e l s ( 3 7 ) . 
Much of the High A u t h o r i t y ' s e f f o r t s were a l s o d i r e c t e d towards 
wrangling with n a t i o n a l governments. Nevertheless, as Urwin 
r e f l e c t s , "No matter how inadequately, i t was a working 
European operation... to which non-members had to pay 
regard."(38) I t a l s o provided a model upon which to work, when 
a wider community was being explored i n subsequent y e a r s which 
u l t i m a t e l y l e d to the c r e a t i o n of the European Economic 
Community. 
The a r c h i t e c t of the Schuman Plan, Jean 
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Monnet envisaged a ' s e c t o r a l approach' to European 
i n t e g r a t i o n , c o a l and s t e e l being the f i r s t such s e c t o r s . I n 
the f ace of the Korean war Monnet urged France's new Prime 
M i n i s t e r , Ren6 Pleven, to propose t h a t defence be examined i n a 
'Schuman-like' scheme. A l l the European members of NATO were 
i n v i t e d to enter i n t o n e g o t i a t i o n s though, as with the ECSC, 
B r i t a i n d e c l i n e d t o enter the process. Subsequent n e g o t i a t i o n s 
le d to the formation of the European Defence Community (EDC) i n 
May 1952, jo i n e d by the s i x members of the ECSC. The EDC 
proposed the formation of a European Army. But as W i s t r i c h 
noted, "the c r e a t i o n of the EDC posed the problem of adequate 
democratic and p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l . " ( 3 9 ) . i n March 1953 a d r a f t 
t r e a t y for a European P o l i t i c a l Union was published. I t was not 
w e l l r e c e i v e d , and the t r e a t y f o r the c r e a t i o n of the EDC a l s o 
f a i l e d to be r a t i f i e d . By the end of 1954 both the proposed 
Defence and P o l i t i c a l Communities were dead. I n 1955, however, 
Anthony Eden announced t h a t the B r i t i s h Government was happy 
for the 1948 Treaty of B r u s s e l s , which agreed socio-economic, 
c u l t u r a l and m i l i t a r y co-operation between France, the UK and 
the Benelux c o u n t r i e s to be developed; and for west Germany and 
I t a l y to be included. T h i s l e d to the subsequent formation of 
the western European Union (WEU) which has, u n t i l the 1990's 
and the Balkan c r i s i s , been hugely overshadowed by the more 
powerful m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e of NATO. The WEU did, however "serve 
as a conduit, no matter how l i m i t e d , between B r i t a i n and the 
S i x . " ( 4 0 ) 
( B ) B R I T A I N I N THE W I L D E R N E S S : 1958- 1972 
I n the next major period of post-war 
European development, we w i l l begin to see Europe t a k i n g s t i l l 
new d i r e c t i o n s . I n t h i s period the T r e a t i e s of Rome were 
enacted by France, Germany, I t a l y , Belgium, Holland and 
Luxembourg, thus inaugurating a period of c l o s e r European 
i n t e g r a t i o n . We s h a l l a l s o see B r i t a i n seeking t o come to terms 
with t h i s phenomenon, f i r s t by i t s own attempts a t economic co-
operation through EFTA, and subsequently by i t s repeated 
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attempts to j o i n the EEC u n t i l being e v e n t u a l l y s u c c e s s f u l i n 
1973. we s h a l l a l s o see h i g h - l i g h t e d once more the pragmatic, 
ra t h e r than i d e o l o g i c a l approach of B r i t i s h p o l i t i c s as ap p l i e d 
to Europe. 
Although the process of European 
i n t e g r a t i o n appeared to have s u f f e r e d a severe set-back with 
the f a i l u r e of the European Defence Community and European 
P o l i t i c a l union, the process was by no means over, i n 1955 the 
for e i g n m i n i s t e r s of the S i x met i n Messina charged with 
looking f o r new ideas for broader development, r a t h e r than the 
more l i m i t e d s e c t o r a l approach. An intergovernmental group, 
under the chairmanship of Paul Henri Spaak, was given the ta s k 
of exploring the p o s s i b i l i t i e s . T h i s committee met from J u l y 
1955 to March 1956, when the Spaak report was published. T h i s 
formed the b a s i s of intergovernmental n e g o t i a t i o n s which l e d to 
the d r a f t i n g of t r e a t i e s which made p r o v i s i o n f o r the c r e a t i o n 
of 2 new communities: the European Economic Community (EEC) and 
the European Atomic Energy Commission (EURATOM). On 25th March 
1957, the T r e a t i e s of Rome were signed and, a f t e r parliamentary 
r a t i f i c a t i o n by si g n a t o r y s t a t e s , the EEC formally came i n t o 
being i n January 1958. 
The aims of the EEC, though dominated by 
economic language, were broad. Economically, the EEC aimed to 
in c r e a s e s t a b i l i t y and expansion with the concomitant 
a s p i r a t i o n to improve the l i v i n g standards of the c i t i z e n s of 
member s t a t e s . P o l i t i c a l l y , i t aimed to promote c l o s e r 
r e l a t i o n s between member s t a t e s and t h e i r governments. I n order 
to a s s i s t i n br i n g i n g these about 3 funds were e s t a b l i s h e d : 
The European Development Fund, the European S o c i a l Fund and the 
European investment Bank. Although i t was hoped t h a t the 
t r a n s l a t i o n of aims i n t o r e a l i t y should only take a l i m i t e d 
time, the Treaty had no ex p i r y date: i t was i r r e v o c a b l e . 
The s t r u c t u r e s created by the t r e a t y of 
Rome were e s s e n t i a l l y modified forms of those used i n the ECSC. 
The Commission ( c f . the 'High Authority', see p.16 above) was 
charged with a d m i n i s t e r i n g the Treaty. I t could a l s o recommend 
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l e g i s l a t i o n to the Council of M i n i s t e r s . The Commission might 
w e l l be "the guardian and embodiment of the European 
i d e a l " ( 4 1 ) , but as P h i l i p Ludlow observed i n h i s 1994 Beckly 
Lecture, "Under the t r e a t y of Rome, and c o n t r a r y to the 
o r i g i n a l i n t e n t i o n s of those who d r a f t e d the t r e a t y of P a r i s , 
the Council r a t h e r than the Commission i s a t the h e a r t of the 
system"(42) because u n l i k e the High Authority, the Commission 
could not make d e c i s i o n s binding upon member s t a t e s . 
Decision-making power r e s t e d with the 
Council of M i n i s t e r s , and d e c i s i o n s were made through 
n e g o t i a t i o n on an intergovernmental b a s i s . However, a measure 
of the supranational concept of the t r e a t y of P a r i s was kept, 
because once d e c i s i o n s were taken, they were then binding upon 
a l l member s t a t e s . When d e c i s i o n s d i d not r e q u i r e unanimity, 
voting was by q u a l i f i e d m a j o r i t y . Each s t a t e had a number of 
votes a l l o c a t e d roughly i n proportion to population s i z e . For a 
d e c i s i o n to be passed 12 out of the 17 a v a i l a b l e votes had to 
be i n favour, thus ensuring t h a t the s m a l l e r s t a t e s had an 
important r o l e to play i n the process. 
As with the ECSC, c o n s u l t a t i v e committees 
were permitted to advise and represent the views of i n t e r e s t e d 
p a r t i e s . E q u a l l y a parliamentary assembly was s e t up. As with 
the Common Assembly, i t s t i l l had no l e g i s l a t i v e powers, 
though i t could recommend l e g i s l a t i o n . S y m b o l i c a l l y , the 
members s a t i n p o l i t i c a l and not n a t i o n a l groupings. The Court 
of J u s t i c e was f u r t h e r charged with a d j u d i c a t i n g i n d i s p u t e s 
r e l a t i n g to the t r e a t y . A simple m a j o r i t y of the 7 judges was 
needed to make a binding d e c i s i o n (the 7th judge was appointed 
by the Council of M i n i s t e r s ) . So then, how d i d the B r i t i s h 
government respond to the impulse of Messina and the Treaty of 
Rome? 
Although Great B r i t a i n had been i n v i t e d to 
send a de l e g a t i o n to the Messina n e g o t i a t i o n s without having to 
accept any concept i n p r i n c i p l e ( c f . the acceptance of 
s u p r a n a t i o n a l i t y t h a t was re q u i r e d p r i o r to beginning 
n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r the ECSC) i t s response was low key, i f not 
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outwardly contemptuous. B r i t a i n sent a c i v i l s e rvant as an 
observer, and he was subsequently withdrawn i n November 1955. 
As Stephen George has commented, the B r i t i s h wrongly b e l i e v e d 
" t h a t the f a i l u r e of the EDC i n d i c a t e d t h a t the EEC proposal 
would a l s o f a i l . "(43) At the same time, throughout 1955 the 
B r i t i s h government began to t a l k about developing a European 
Free Trade A s s o c i a t i o n to which a l l OEEC c o u n t r i e s could j o i n , 
i n December 1955, t h i s was explained i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l a t the 
NATO Council meeting, i n the l i g h t of the Messina n e g o t i a t i o n s , 
Monnet noted t h a t the proposals were t r e a t e d with deep 
s u s p i c i o n by the S i x ( 4 4 ) . However, when s e r i o u s n e g o t i a t i o n s 
began i n October 1957, 7 months a f t e r the s i g n i n g of the Treaty 
of Rome, the S i x did take p a r t . When De G a u l l e acceded to the 
French presidency France q u i c k l y withdrew; the other EEC 
members followed. The n e g o t i a t i o n s appeared to be i n a s t a t e 
of c o l l a p s e , but they st r u g g l e d on between the other i n t e r e s t e d 
s t a t e s , and i n January 1960, the Stockholm Convention was 
signed by B r i t a i n , A u s t r i a , Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden 
and S w i t z e r l a n d . The European Free Trade A s s o c i a t i o n (EFTA) 
formally came i n t o being i n May 1960, 2 year s a f t e r the 
c r e a t i o n of the EEC. 
The Stockholm Convention provided f o r the 
e l i m i n a t i o n of t a r i f f s on i n d u s t r i a l goods traded between EFTA 
nations by 1970, but u n l i k e the EEC, there was to be no common 
e x t e r n a l t a r i f f . S i g n i f i c a n t l y , from B r i t a i n ' s point of view, 
t h i s meant t h a t t r a d i n g p a t t e r n s with the Commonwealth 
c o u n t r i e s would not be a f f e c t e d . Also, u n l i k e the EEC, any 
member s t a t e could withdraw from membership provided t h a t one 
yea r ' s n o t i c e was given to the r e s t , and, the Stockholm 
Convention crea t e d no supranational body to govern members' 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . Thus i t r e l i e d s o l e l y on co-operation r a t h e r 
than enforcement, and was not envisaged as a precursor to 
c l o s e r p o l i t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n 
i n Roy Jenkins' judgement, the B r i t i s h 
proposal for EFTA was a "halfway house" and "a f o o l i s h attempt 
to organise a weak periphery a g a i n s t a strong core."(45) The 
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net e f f e c t was to f u r t h e r a l i e n a t e the B r i t i s h government from 
the EEC members, and France i n p a r t i c u l a r . Arguably the most 
t e l l i n g judgement on EFTA was that j u s t 20 months a f t e r s i g n i n g 
the Stockholm Convention, the UK and Denmark ap p l i e d to j o i n 
the EEC as f u l l p a r t n e r s . 
So why, then, d i d the Macmillan government 
make such a dramatic s h i f t i n European p o l i c y ? i t seems t h a t 
there were both economic and p o l i t i c a l dimensions which, 
together, proved d e c i s i v e . Although the European Free Trade 
A s s o c i a t i o n had reduced trade t a r i f f s between member c o u n t r i e s , 
i t could not provide an adequate t r a d i n g base fo r B r i t a i n . Most 
of i t s trade was conducted with EEC c o u n t r i e s , r a t h e r than the 
s m a l l e r EFTA member c o u n t r i e s . I f the EEC began to put up trade 
b a r r i e r s a g a i n s t non-member s t a t e s , the e f f e c t s f o r B r i t a i n 
would have been i n c r e a s i n g l y severe. At the same time, t r a d i n g 
p a t t e r n s with Commonwealth nations were changing. Whilst the 
emotional t i e s remained strong, the economic l i n k s were being 
loosened. Even Canada, which, as Foreign O f f i c e papers fo r the 
period of n e g o t i a t i o n s show ( 4 6 ) , feared a c u t e l y the change i n 
trade t h a t B r i t a i n ' s entry i n t o the EEC might bring, would 
according to David Holden only s u f f e r a p o t e n t i a l l o s s of 
around 4% of the t o t a l value of i t s annual exports ( 4 7 ) . 
Another d e c i s i v e f a c t o r which undoubtedly contributed to the 
change i n B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e was the bald f a c t the the EEC had 
worked: i t had brought economic s t a b i l i t y and p r o s p e r i t y to the 
S i x , and the economic growth of the S i x was s u p e r i o r to 
B r i t a i n ' s . For example, between 1953 and 1958, the growth i n 
r e a l terms of B r i t a i n ' s Gross National Product was only 2.2% 
compared with I t a l y ' s 5.2% and West Germany's 6.9% ( 4 8 ) . 
Economically, co-operation seemed to work. 
P o l i t i c a l l y , one very s i g n i f i c a n t reason 
for B r i t a i n ' s changing p o s i t i o n was the trend away from a 
Anglo-American ' s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p " . Observable even i n the 
l a t e 1940' s, i t found i t s f u l l e x p r e s s i o n when P r e s i d e n t 
Kennedy met Macmillan i n A p r i l 1961. The US government hoped 
th a t B r i t a i n would j o i n the EEC and be a counter-balance to the 
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p o l i t i c a l domination of the EEC by France and west Germany 
( 4 9 ) . As Lord Gladwyn acknowledged i n h i s c o n f i d e n t i a l essay 
about de a l i n g with De Gau l l e , 'The Lion and the G i r a f f e ' , "The 
Americans... d e s i r e a ' s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p ' ; but they want i t 
to be with Europe, not with us."(50) Denis Healey argues, 
however, t h a t the change i n c i v i l s e r v i c e a t t i t u d e and the 
subsequent change i n government p o l i c y was a symbol of the 
c o l l a p s e i n the l a t e 1950s, not of the ' s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p ' 
but "of confidence i n t h e i r own i n a b i l i t y t o so l v e B r i t a i n ' s 
problems, r a t h e r than the i n t e l l e c t u a l c o n v i c t i o n t h a t the 
Common Market would help us."(51) 
A f t e r thorough c o n s u l t a t i o n with 
Commonwealth governments i n June and J u l y of 1961, the Cabinet 
meeting of 27th J u l y 1961 confirmed the d e c i s i o n to apply to 
j o i n the EEC " i n order t h a t n e g o t i a t i o n s might be opened with 
the Community with a view to a s c e r t a i n i n g whether s a t i s f a c t o r y 
arrangements could be made t o meet our requirement, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n r e s p e c t of B r i t i s h a g r i c u l t u r e and of the needs 
of the other Commonwealth c o u n t r i e s and the other members of 
the European Free Trade A s s o c i a t i o n " ( 5 2 ) . T h i s p o s i t i o n , 
emphasizing the B r i t i s h d e s i r e to accommodate Commonwealth and 
EFTA i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n the B r i t i s h a p p l i c a t i o n , was r e f l e c t e d i n 
Harold Macmillan's negative-sounding speech to the House of 
Commons on 31st J u l y 1961, p r i o r t o the formal a p p l i c a t i o n 
being made on 10th August. Both the d i s c u s s i o n i n Cabinet and 
Macmillan's speech i l l u s t r a t e s the d i f f i c u l t p o l i t i c a l 
arguments the a p p l i c a t i o n would cause, and i n p a r t i c u l a r , the 
need to balance the needs of the Commonwealth with the 
earnestness of the a p p l i c a t i o n . The government had to convince 
the Commonwealth, B r i t i s h p u b l i c opinion and the EEC, t h a t i t 
meant business. Macmillan was a l s o cautious because of " h i s 
ap p r e c i a t i o n of the problems t h a t h i s own party would have i n 
swallowing the new o r i e n t a t i o n . " ( 5 3 ) Although Monnet 
recognised the p o l i t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the speech ( 5 4 ) , i t 
served to c r e a t e u n c e r t a i n t y with Community governments as to 
the s i n c e r i t y of the B r i t i s h a p p l i c a t i o n . 
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On 10th October 1961, formal n e g o t i a t i o n s 
with the EEC commenced with Edward Heath, the Lord P r i v y S e a l , 
s e t t i n g out B r i t a i n ' s concerns and hopes. During the subsequent 
period of n e g o t i a t i o n s i n t e n s e p u b l i c and p o l i t i c a l lobbying 
took p l a c e . Organisations were formed to promote the v a r i o u s 
p o s i t i o n s , such as the 'Forward B r i t a i n Movement' ( a g a i n s t 
a p p l i c a t i o n ) and the 'Common Market Campaign' (pro-
a p p l i c a t i o n ) . P u b l i c and p o l i t i c a l opinion was d i v i d e d 
throughout, as i t i s today. As a s e c r e t Conservative p a r t y 
a n a l y s i s of p u b l i c opinion p o l l s w r i t t e n on 18th September 1962 
showed 45% of Conservatives interviewed were i n favour of 
j o i n i n g , and 34% a g a i n s t , whereas only 34% of Labour supporters 
were i n favour of membership, with 46% being a g a i n s t ( 5 6 ) . 
S i g n i f i c a n t l y , I a i n Macleod, the Tory party chairman and author 
of the a n a l y s i s , commented t h a t "By f a r the main reason f o r 
opposition... i s a s o r t of p a t r i o t i s m (or i t s negative 
counterpart xenophobia) which extends to both our own 
sovereignty and to our l i n k s w ith the Commonwealth." 
Concluding, Macleod remarked t h a t "The p i c t u r e t h a t emerges i s 
t h a t the country's head i s convinced, the country's h e a r t i s 
opposed." Towards the c l o s e of 1962 the d i f f i c u l t n e g o t i a t i o n s 
seemed to be drawing towards completion. By the end of January 
1963, the government's p o l i c y seemed to be i n shreds. 
As Lord Gladwyn's paper, 'The Lion and the 
G i r a f f e ' ( c i t e d above) makes c l e a r , the c r u c i a l f i g u r e f o r the 
success or f a i l u r e of B r i t a i n ' s a p p l i c a t i o n was France's 
p r e s i d e n t , C h a r l e s De G a u l l e . At a p r e s s conference on 14th 
January 1963, De G a u l l e was asked about B r i t i s h e n t r y . His 
r e p l y was a de facto veto upon the B r i t i s h a p p l i c a t i o n , c i t i n g 
h i s b e l i e f t h a t B r i t a i n had not e f f e c t i v e l y renounced i t s 
Commonwealth or EFTA i n t e r e s t s ( 5 6 ) . But, as Derek urwin 
r i g h t l y p o i n t s out, " h i s d e p i c t i o n of the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n i n 
h i s press statement more a c c u r a t e l y r e f l e c t e d B r i t a i n ' s 
s t a r t i n g point i n the n e g o t i a t i o n s r a t h e r than the c u r r e n t 
s t a t e of p l a y . " ( 5 7 ) So why did De G a u l l e peremptorily scupper 
the n e g o t i a t i o n s when they were nearing r e s o l u t i o n ? 
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I t seems t h a t t h e r e were two c e n t r a l 
reasons. F i r s t l y , De G a u l l e was deeply h o s t i l e to B r i t a i n ' s 
perceived r e l a t i o n s h i p with America. A f t e r a l l , Kennedy had 
s t r o n g l y advised Macmillan to j o i n i n order to provide a check 
on Franco-German power w i t h i n the EEC (See above). T h i s had 
been confirmed, for De Gaulle, by Macmillan's agreement to buy 
P o l a r i s m i s s i l e s from the USA i n December 1962. B r i t a i n i n the 
EEC would be l i t t l e more than America's "Trojan horse". 
Secondly, B r i t a i n ' s a p p l i c a t i o n had a l s o been welcomed by the 
s m a l l e r members of the EEC as a counter-balance to Franco-
German domination. For De Gaulle, B r i t i s h membership could 
undermine the French-led Franco-German a l l i a n c e . 
Despite Macmillan's somewhat absurd t h r e a t 
to De G a u l l e t h a t a f a i l u r e to complete n e g o t i a t i o n s would 
lead B r i t a i n to turn i t s back on Europe i n favour of other 
a l l i a n c e s , such as with the USA, the Commonwealth, even the 
USSR ( 5 8 ) , when the B r i t i s h a p p l i c a t i o n was vetoed, o f f i c i a l 
B r i t i s h p o l i c y toward membership d i d not change s i g n i f i c a n t l y . 
I n s t e a d De G a u l l e was blamed for the f a i l u r e ( 5 9 ) . B r i t a i n then 
had to w a i t . The next B r i t i s h a p p l i c a t i o n would be made by a 
Labour government. 
During the f i r s t Wilson a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
(1964-1966) the i s s u e of r e - a p p l i c a t i o n d i d not r e a l l y emerge. 
Labour had a t i n y parliamentary m a j o r i t y , and s u s t a i n i n g a 
m a j o r i t y f o r a p p l i c a t i o n i n a party d i v i d e d over Europe was an 
i m p o s s i b i l i t y . Indeed, p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y , i t would almost 
c e r t a i n l y have been too soon a f t e r De G a u l l e ' s snub for the 
U.K. to re-apply. However, the i s s u e of r e - a p p l i c a t i o n did 
emerge during the 1966 general e l e c t i o n , and, with an i n c r e a s e d 
Labour majority, a new a p p l i c a t i o n t o j o i n the EEC was made i n 
May 1967. As with the previous Conservative a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 
Harold Wilson had i n i t i a l l y been a g a i n s t membership of the EEC. 
He supported a new a p p l i c a t i o n probably because the p o l i t i c a l 
and economic r e a l i t y of the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n forced the 
d e c i s i o n . However, again a t a p r e s s conference, General De 
G a u l l e u t i l i z e d h i s n a t i o n a l veto, and the B r i t i s h a p p l i c a t i o n 
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f o r membership of the EC (renamed when the s t r u c t u r e s of the 
ECSC, EEC and EURATOM merged i n J u l y 1967) was once more 
rebuffed. The message to B r i t a i n was obvious: B r i t a i n would 
never be permitted to j o i n the EC u n t i l De G a u l l e was no longer 
president of France, i n 1969, Georges Pompidou succeeded De 
Gaulle to the French presidency, and new o p p o r t u n i t i e s began to 
open up for the EC and for B r i t i s h membership a l i k e . 
Before going on to o u t l i n e B r i t a i n ' s new 
a p p l i c a t i o n f o r membership and subsequent a c c e s s i o n to the 
T r e a t i e s of Rome, i t i s worth noting how the Community changed 
during B r i t a i n ' s decade of f r u s t r a t i o n . 
I t i s hard to avoid the conclusion t h a t the 
1960's marked a period of i n c r e a s i n g atrophy f o r the EEC. T h i s 
was i n e x t r i c a b l y l i n k e d to the i d e o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n De Gau l l e 
adopted and pursued during h i s presidency. He envisaged a 
'Europe des Patries' - a Europe of nat i o n s t a t e s - r a t h e r than 
a f e d e r a l and supr a n a t i o n a l Community. He repeatedly proved to 
be a stumbling block to c l o s e r i n t e g r a t i o n . T h i s i s c l e a r l y 
seen i n the French Fouchet Plan of 1961 which sought d e c i s i o n -
making to be by unanimity only. Moreover inter-governmental 
committees would be charged with over-viewing p o l i c y areas such 
as defence, common f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n t e r e s t s , and commerce, 
in s t e a d of the Commission. The Fouchet Plan a l s o c a l l e d f o r a 
European Assembly (not Parliament) with delegates nominated by 
n a t i o n a l parliaments. The Plan was s w i f t l y r e j e c t e d , however. 
As urwin has noted, "While a l l the o b j e c t i o n s to the Fouchet 
Plan were i n t e r - r e l a t e d , the main f a c t o r i n f l u e n c i n g i t s 
r e j e c t i o n was u l t i m a t e l y the f e a r t h a t i t would weaken the Rome 
t r e a t y and whatever p o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s i t implied to the 
advantage of the n a t i o n a l c a p i t a l s , e s p e c i a l l y P a r i s . " ( 6 0 ) 
De G a u l l e ' s r e j e c t i o n of supranationalism 
was f u r t h e r evidenced i n 1965 with a renewed c l a s h w i t h i n the 
Six over the decision-making r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s w i t h i n the 
Community. By now the European Parliament was c a l l i n g f or more 
powers, e s p e c i a l l y over budgetary s c r u t i n y , which had h i t h e r t o 
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been the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of n a t i o n a l governments and 
parliaments. The Commission was c a l l i n g f or in c r e a s e d 
independent r e v e n u e - r a i s i n g powers, which would i n e f f e c t cede 
power from the Council of M i n i s t e r s . A f t e r January 19&6 
d e c i s i o n making would take p l a c e through m a j o r i t y voting r a t h e r 
than the unanimous vote h i t h e r t o r e q u i r e d i n most a r e a s . France 
a l s o wanted the question of the Common A g r i c u l t u r a l P o l i c y t o 
be resolved, though i t refused to budge on the other i s s u e s . 
T h i s l e d to the "Empty C h a i r C r i s i s " when the French de l e g a t i o n 
walked out of the Council of M i n i s t e r s . T h i s was r e s o l v e d by 
the "Luxembourg Compromise", which agreed to the con t i n u a t i o n 
of the r i g h t to veto proposals when the n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t was 
i n question, but as "each s t a t e would be f r e e to define i t s own 
v i t a l n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t , the e f f e c t would be t h a t the Community 
would be s u b j e c t to unanimous agreement."(61) W i s t r i c h went on 
to note t h a t the consequence of the Luxembourg Compromise was 
" i n e f f e c t an agreement to di s a g r e e . The Treaty was l e f t 
i n t a c t , but i n p r a c t i c e no major d e c i s i o n s were taken without 
unanimous agreement."(62) 
The formation and f i n a l i s a t i o n of a Common 
A g r i c u l t u r a l P o l i c y (CAP) a l s o became a prominent i s s u e during 
the 1960's, and indeed has remained so, not l e a s t f o r B r i t a i n , 
as I s h a l l e x p l a i n i n chapter 2. i n 1960 the Mansholt Plan 
o u t l i n e d a t r i a d of p r i n c i p l e s f o r the CAP. The settlement 
should guarantee an adequate l i v i n g f o r farmers, s t a b i l i z e 
European food markets, and guarantee reasonable food p r i c e s f o r 
consumers. A f t e r y e a r s of attempts a t p r i c e s e t t i n g , which came 
a d r i f t i n the 1965 c r i s i s , a modified Mansholt Plan was adopted 
i n 1968. The r e s u l t of the modified Plan was t h a t the CAP would 
impose a l e v y on cheaper imported food. Conversely s t o c k - p i l i n g 
would be allowed where there was over-production. Costs were 
guaranteed by the European A g r i c u l t u r a l Guidance and Guarantee 
Fund. The consequence of such a p o l i c y has been s e r i o u s . "The 
stre n g t h of n a t i o n a l farm l o b b i e s , once they had been persuaded 
of the v i r t u e s of the system, and perceptions by p o l i t i c i a n s of 
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t h e i r p o l i t i c a l s t r e ngth, would keep the CAP i n the t r a d i t i o n 
of protectionism."(63) 
The 1960s a l s o marked a number of important 
developments f o r the EEC's i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . On 22nd 
January 1963 France and west Germany signed a Tr e a t y of 
Fri e n d s h i p , thus, c l o s i n g a dark chapter i n Franco-German 
r e l a t i o n s and s i g n a l l i n g the r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of west Germany. 
Also i n 1963 the f i r s t Yaounde Convention was signed by the EEC 
as a t r a d i n g block, and 18 A f r i c a n s t a t e s . The Convention 
o f f e r e d r e c i p r o c a l p r e f e r e n t i a l t r a d i n g arrangements, though i t 
should be noted t h a t t h i s d id not extend to a g r i c u l t u r e , which 
i s arguably the most important s e c t o r f o r the 18 to trade i n . 
C e r t a i n l y t h i s does not diminish the charge of pr o t e c t i o n i s m 
which l a t e r came to be made a g a i n s t the CAP. I t was not u n t i l 
the agreement of the Second Yaounde^ agreement of 1969 t h a t a 
lower e x t e r n a l t a r i f f f o r t r o p i c a l produce was agreed upon. The 
Yaounde conventions are s i g n i f i c a n t because here the EEC 
r e l a t e d to the outsi d e world as a s i n g l e u n i t r a t h e r than as 
independent s t a t e s , though, as Urwin notes, t h i s was not 
r e f l e c t e d i n votes a t the United Nations! (64) I t a l s o shows i n 
embryonic form, t h a t the EEC does have a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to the 
outsid e world, as I s h a l l argue i n chapter 5. 
The S i x t i e s a l s o saw continued 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l development w i t h i n the EEC. One important 
i n s t i t u t i o n t h a t emerged i n the mid-1960's was COREPER, the 
Council [of M i n i s t e r s ' ] Committee of Permanent R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . 
I t was a group of o f f i c i a l s from each member country, granted 
ambassadorial f u n c t i o n and s t a t u s w i t h i n Europe, which was 
charged with continuing on-going n e g o t i a t i o n s with the 
Commission when the Council wasn't s i t t i n g . I t l i a i s e d weekly 
with the Commission, and so was a l s o a ble to b r i e f m i n i s t e r s . 
Because of i t s permanent nature, i t could a l s o n e g otiate and 
s e t t l e minor i s s u e s without the n e c e s s i t y f o r summits being 
c a l l e d . I t became, i n Urwin's words, "a c r u c i a l and i n f l u e n t i a l 
hinge" (65) between the two ha l v e s of the Community ex e c u t i v e : 
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the Council and Commission. I n J u l y 1967 the o r g a n i s a t i o n of 
the three 3 European communities (Euratom, EEC and ECSC)were 
harmonised i n t o the renamed the European Communities ( E C ) . 
R a d i c a l change was o f f the European agenda 
during De G a u l l e ' s presidency as has been shown, but when he 
l e f t power i n 1969, new p o s s i b i l i t i e s began to be considered. 
T h i s new t h i n k i n g was perhaps most obvious a t The Hague summit 
of December 1969. 
Jean Monnet might w e l l have de c l a r e d over a 
decade before t h a t "'The Common Market i s outward-looking, not 
inward-looking. There i s nothing magic i n the number s i x ' . " ( 6 6 ) 
but i t was not u n t i l The Hague summit t h a t t h i s was a c t u a l i z e d 
by a l l the members and the way for enlargement made c l e a r . The 
r e s u l t of the summit, though, was to be f a r more wide reaching 
than the renewed impetus f o r enlargement alone. Under the 
l e a d e r s h i p of 'Etienne Davignon a committee was s e t up to 
explore methods of c l o s e r p o l i t i c a l cooperation. The p r i n c i p l e 
of European Monetary union by 1980 was a l s o agreed, and a 
committee under the chairmanship of P i e r r e Werner was created 
to explore ways of t u r n i n g the p r i n c i p l e i n t o r e a l i t y . The 
European Parliament was granted f u r t h e r powers to s c r u t i n i z e 
the EC's budget, and the question of f i n a n c i n g the CAP was 
resol v e d . A f t e r the atrophy of a De Gaulle-dominated Community, 
The Hague Summit " c l e a r l y marked the resumption of 
progress."(67) 
As a consequence of t h i s renewed impetus 
the 1970s began with a f l o u r i s h of a c t i v i t y . I n A p r i l 1970 the 
Treaty of Luxembourg was signed, s e t t i n g up the new f i n a n c i a l 
arrangements f o r the EC which had been agreed upon i n the post-
summit n e g o t i a t i o n s . The Treaty provided f o r two forms of 
income. F i r s t l y , the revenues from the Community's a g r i c u l t u r a l 
l e v y and customs d u t i e s were to be handed over to the EC 
d i r e c t . Secondly, because the income from d u t i e s could 
f l u c t u a t e , i t was agreed t h a t from 1975, up to 1% of member 
s t a t e s ' VAT income should be handed to the EC. The Treaty a l s o 
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granted new powers of budgetary s u p e r v i s i o n t o the European 
Parliament. R e f l e c t i n g upon the Treaty, urwin observed t h a t 
"The importance of a l l t h i s was t h a t , by e n l a r g i n g the r o l e of 
the Commission and Parliament, i t i n c r e a s e d the supranational 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s of the EC. (68) 
i n 1970 B r i t a i n a l s o saw the r e t u r n of the 
Conservatives to power. T h i s time, however, the Prime M i n i s t e r 
was Edward Heath who, i n George's opinion, " i s the only Prime 
M i n i s t e r to date to have been f u l l y committed to the idea of 
the EC."(69) Under Macmillan Heath had conducted B r i t a i n ' s 
a b o r t i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s . Now as Prime M i n i s t e r , Heath l e d h i s 
government, along with the governments of I r e l a n d , Denmark and 
Norway, formally to apply once more to j o i n the European 
Community. 
with the B r i t i s h a p p l i c a t i o n to negotiate 
terms of entry to the EC formally submitted i n June 1970, i t 
might have appeared t h a t B r i t a i n was now s e t on s a i l i n g 
c o n f i d e n t l y and smoothly i n t o the European harbour, i n f a c t , 
as the e a r l y y e a r s of the decade began t o unfold, the waters to 
harbour were to be very choppy indeed. I n the 1970's Europe 
moved from being simply a f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e , to a key 
domestic p o l i t i c a l i s s u e as w e l l . 
Although n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r entry began 
s w i f t l y , by the s p r i n g of 1971, they appeared to have reached 
an impasse, over such i s s u e s as the CAP and B r i t i s h 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s to the EC budget. The question of i n t e n t a l s o 
s urfaced again. B r i t a i n became unsure as to whether France was 
about to e x e r c i s e her veto again; France questioned the 
genuineness of B r i t i s h goodwill towards the EC, and to whether 
B r i t a i n wanted to tur n the EC i n t o a r e v i s e d EFTA. I n May 1971, 
Heath met P r e s i d e n t Pompidou, and the good personal r e l a t i o n s 
between them aided the move towards r e s o l u t i o n . P a r t i c u l a r l y , 
i t was agreed t h a t B r i t a i n ' s budgetary c o n t r i b u t i o n s should 
have a phased i n c r e a s e , and any imbalances could be ironed out 
i n the f u t u r e . As George has s a i d , "To gain entry, and then 
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s o r t out any d i f f i c u l t i e s , was the approach taken by the Heath 
government." Of t h i s t a c t i c , George concluded t h a t "This seems, 
even i n r e t r o s p e c t , to have been a s e n s i b l e approach i n the 
conditions of the time."(70) As I s h a l l show i n chapter 2 
however, i t did not r e s o l v e the p o l i t i c a l dilemma t h a t Europe 
caused f o r domestic B r i t i s h p o l i t i c s . Nevertheless, on 22nd 
January 1972, B r i t a i n signed the Treaty of Accession, and on 
1st January 1973, the United Kingdom formally entered the EC as 
a f u l l member. 
CONCLUSIONS 
During the period under review i n t h i s 
chapter, from 1940 u n t i l the end of 1972, we have seen a time 
of unprecedented change i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s t h a t 
e x i s t e d on the continent of Europe. As we s h a l l see i n the 
next chapter, however, t h i s process of f l u i d i t y , of adaptation, 
and r e - a p p r a i s a l i s on-going, both p o l i t i c a l l y and 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y as 'Europe' develops. 
I have attempted to o u t l i n e i n t h i s period 
the ways i n which Europe sought to emerge from the period of 
u n p a r a l l e l e d horror of the Second World war, and how t h a t 
response has v a r i e d and developed. For some s t a t e s , i n s p i r e d by 
Jean Monnet, t h a t response has led to the conclusion t h a t the 
only way to guarantee p r o s p e r i t y and growth, and an absence of 
war, has been through i n t e r n a t i o n a l co-operation and, most 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y , the s h a r i n g of some n a t i o n a l sovereignty. T h i s 
has been seen i n the ' s e c t o r a l ' o r g a n i s a t i o n of the European 
Coal and S t e e l Community, the more comprehensive European 
Economic Community and l a t t e r l y , the European Community. As I 
have a l s o shown, t h i s has not always been a smooth process. 
S e r i o u s questions and c r i s e s have a r i s e n , such as the i s s u e of 
sovereignty, the r o l e of European and n a t i o n a l parliaments, 
the f i n a n c e and machinery of the European I n s t i t u t i o n s and so 
on. i n our period the i n i t i a l impetus was c l e a r l y f o r a 
supr a n a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e , but ended i n a Europe of na t i o n s t a t e s 
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committed to inter-governmental co-operation, we s h a l l see i n 
the next chapter, t h a t these i s s u e s were i n no way f i n a l l y 
r e s o l v e d . Many of these i s s u e s are s t i l l f i e r c e l y debated 
today. 
Despite these s e r i o u s questions, what i s 
eq u a l l y c l e a r i s t h a t economic growth i n the S i x nations of the 
EEC o u t s t r i p p e d other European c o u n t r i e s . We have a l s o , most 
importantly, seen the rapprochcmcnt between France and west 
Germany, and the r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of west Germany i n t o the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l community, which has amply f u l f i l l e d C h u r c h i l l ' s 
dictum quoted on page 10. Moreover, we have seen the 
s t a b i l i s i n g e f f e c t of the EEC i n Western Europe r e p l a c i n g the 
v o l a t i l e s t r u c t u r e s present before the war. However, we have 
a l s o seen the a b i l i t y of the community t o be damaged by the 
obduracy of member governments and t h e i r l e a d e r s , as De Ga u l l e 
demonstrated i n the repeated use of the veto a g a i n s t B r i t i s h 
a p p l i c a t i o n s to j o i n the EEC, and i n the s o - c a l l e d 'Empty C h a i r 
C r i s i s ' . As we s h a l l see i n the next chapter Margaret Thatcher 
has continued t h a t i n h e r i t a n c e . 
T h i s period under review a l s o marked a 
period of tremendous s o u l - s e a r c h i n g i n B r i t a i n . As I have 
explained, B r i t a i n was a t the beginning of t h i s period a t the 
very h e a r t of Europe, with i t s l e a d e r s h i p there for the ta k i n g 
a f t e r the war. However, we have seen B r i t a i n i n i t i a l l y t u r n i t s 
focus away from Europe. At f i r s t , i t saw i t s n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s 
as being best served through n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n r a t h e r than 
s u p r a n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n . i n i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l outlook, i t s h e a r t 
remained f i r m l y wedded t o the Commonwealth and to i t s h i s t o r y ; 
i n m i l i t a r y and c u l t u r a l terms, to the A t l a n t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p so 
enamoured by C h u r c h i l l , Macmillan, and as we s h a l l a l s o see, by 
Callaghan and Thatcher. 
I n f a c t the e f f e c t of such p o l i c i e s have 
not helped B r i t a i n i n the long run. I t postponed the 
reassessment of i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l r61e t h a t B r i t a i n had y e t to 
face. The parlous B r i t i s h economy a f t e r the war did not grow 
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as f a s t as i t might have done had i t taken the development of 
European co-operation s e r i o u s l y , and, i n the end, when 
Macmillan r e a l i s e d where the future of B r i t a i n ' s best i n t e r e s t s 
were, i t was too l a t e to i n f l u e n c e Europe from the o u t s e t . Yet 
i t i s , I b e l i e v e , h i g h l y u n l i k e l y t h a t any other course of 
a c t i o n was p o s s i b l e . The experience of winning the war, of an 
empire, of n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n was too heady a drug to have made 
a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i c i e s p o s s i b l e . I n f a c t i t perhaps needed the 
' q u i n t e s s e n t i a l Englishman', Harold Macmillan, to lead B r i t a i n 
towards the t h r e s h o l d of Community membership, and a f t e r De 
G a u l l e ' s snub, f o r Wilson e q u a l l y p r a g m a t i c a l l y t o lead 
B r i t a i n along t h a t pathway u n t i l the pro-European ideologue, 
Edward Heath, became Prime M i n i s t e r a t the time when the 
demise of De G a u l l e o f f e r e d the opportunity to B r i t a i n and 
others to apply to j o i n the Community. 
The f a c t t h a t B r i t a i n repeatedly ap p l i e d to 
j o i n the EEC purely from pragmatism (with the exception of 
Heath) and not out of an i d e o l o g i c a l commitment which was seen 
i n the l e a d e r s of post-war mainland European p o l i t i c i a n s i s , 
perhaps, the most important p e r s p e c t i v e to remember as we 
continue our h i s t o r i c a l view i n the next chapter. T h i s 
pragmatism has l a r g e l y meant, as the Conservative P a r t y 
opinion p o l l I quoted above showed, t h a t the people - and 
t h e r e f o r e p o l i t i c i a n s - might be i n t e l l e c t u a l l y committed to 
Europe (though Margaret Thatcher may be an important 
exception), but not emotionally committed to Europe. I t i s t h i s 
most of a l l , i n my opinion, t h a t w i l l make B r i t a i n a r e l u c t a n t 
and "Awkward Partner" as George d e s c r i b e d the B r i t i s h , when, 
from 1 s t January 1973 B r i t a i n became a f u l l member of the EC. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BRITAIN IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
I n t h i s chapter, which commences with 
B r i t a i n ' s entry i n t o the European Community, we w i l l see a 
time of great a c t i v i t y and reform of many of Europe's 
i n s t i t u t i o n s . We s h a l l a l s o see major changes i n the nature of 
the Community as a r e s u l t of the S i n g l e European Act (SEA), and 
subsequently, the Treaty of Ma a s t r i c h t which l e d to the 
formation of the European Union (EU). S i g n i f i c a n t l y , I s h a l l 
a l s o show t h a t , d e s p i t e B r i t a i n ' s membership of the EC, B r i t a i n 
a l s o becomes, as the t i t l e of Stephen George's book suggests, 
an "Awkward Partner". As I s h a l l show, throughout t h i s period 
the i s s u e of Europe becomes an i n c r e a s i n g l y d i v i s i v e f a c t o r i n 
domestic B r i t i s h p o l i t i c s which has been d e s t r u c t i v e to both 
the Labour and Conservative p a r t i e s , and which does much to 
e x p l a i n B r i t a i n ' s awkwardness. F i n a l l y , i n t h i s chapter I s h a l l 
r e f l e c t on the p o l i t i c a l i d e o l o g i e s which have shaped p o l i c y 
towards Europe, before drawing any conc l u s i o n s t h a t may be made 
at t h i s stage. 
The f i r s t question to explore, i s the 
continuing u n c e r t a i n t y t h a t remained over B r i t a i n ' s membership 
of the EC even a f t e r i t had j o i n e d . As we s h a l l see, i t was an 
i s s u e which was to cause s e r i o u s d i v i s i o n i n the Labour Party 
i n the 1970's. Moreover, many of the questions r a i s e d i n the 
1970's can obviously f i n d a p a r a l l e l i n the Conservative Party 
of the 1990's. 
A f t e r Labour's e l e c t o r a l defeat i n 1970, 
the p a r t y began a r a p i d swing to the L e f t . As a consequence of 
t h i s realignment, the a p p l i c a t i o n t o j o i n the EC, as w e l l as 
the d e s i r e to c a s t o f f r e s t r a i n t w h i l s t i n opposition, l e d to a 
h i t h e r t o l a t e n t body of anti-European Community sentiment being 
exposed to the f u l l l i g h t of day. For Labour the danger of a 
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deep s p l i t was very r e a l . Many prominent Labour MPs were very 
much "pro-European", such as Roy Jenkins, W i l l i a m Rogers, 
S h i r l e y Williams, and David Owen. Eq u a l l y , there were many 
ardent "anti-Europeans" such as Peter Shore, Michael Foot, and 
i n c r e a s i n g l y trenchant i n h i s views, Tony Benn. Any sharp move 
to one wing or the other could i m p e r i l the whole party. 
The s e r i o u s n e s s of the problem was seen 
c l e a r l y i n the vote a t the end of the s i x day debate on entry 
i n t o the EC. On 28th October 1971, the T o r i e s allowed t h e i r MPs 
a f r e e vote; the Labour Party however imposed a t h r e e - l i n e whip 
for MPs to vote a g a i n s t the government and a g a i n s t the terms of 
entry. Roy Jenkins l a t e r commented t h a t " t h i s was one of the 
d e c i s i v e votes of the century... I saw i t i n the context of the 
f i r s t Reform B i l l , the re p e a l of the Corn Laws... the Munich 
agreement and the May 1940 v o t e s . . . " ( 1 ) When the vote was 
taken, 198 Labour MPs voted with the whip a g a i n s t the 
government, but 69 MPs, i n c l u d i n g Labour's Deputy Leader Roy 
Jenkins, d e f i e d the whip and voted with the government with a 
f u r t h e r 20 pro-European Labour MPs a b s t a i n i n g . Anthony King 
a s s e r t s t h a t " ' R e b e l l i o n ' i s too weak a word f o r what happened 
on October 28. T h i s was c i v i l war."(2) i n f a c t many of the 
r e b e l s , i n c l u d i n g Jenkins, subsequently obeyed the Labour whip 
i n f u t u r e votes, thus ensuring the l e g i s l a t i o n f o r a c c e s s i o n t o 
the EC was only j u s t passed. Nevertheless i t was a portent of 
the trauma t o come. 
The d i v i s i o n t h a t was becoming manifest 
appeared to be l i t t l e s h o r t of h y p o c r i t i c a l : Labour supported 
membership w h i l s t i n government; i n opposition i t was a g a i n s t 
membership. James Callaghan, i n a speech i n Bradford i n 1971, 
suggested the a l t e r n a t i v e idea of r e n e g o t i a t i n g the terms of 
membership, i n 1972 t h i s became party p o l i c y . I t seems t h a t 
t h i s device prevented the Party from being t o r n apart, and i t 
"managed to make sense of Labour's strange stance of approving 
entry i n t o Europe i n p r i n c i p l e but o b j e c t i n g i n p r a c t i c e to the 
Conservatives' terms..."(3) I t a l s o enabled Wilson to p r o j e c t 
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himself as a champion of the B r i t i s h n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t , more so 
than even Heath. But perhaps more importantly, Wilson could 
demonstrate to h i s E u r o - s k e p t i c a l Labour p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s t h a t 
he was not advocating a p o l i c y of 'entry a t any c o s t ' . 
The Labour National E x e c u t i v e Committee, 
now dominated by Benn and the L e f t , then promoted the idea of a 
referendum to co n s u l t the people on the r e s u l t s of 
r e n e g o t i a t i o n s . Although i n i t i a l l y r e s i s t e d , e s p e c i a l l y by pro-
Europeans such as Jenkins, the Shadow Cabinet agreed to adopt 
t h i s p o l i c y i n March 1972. The anti-Europeans s t r o n g l y 
supported t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l novelty i n the b e l i e f t h a t they 
had popular support on t h e i r s i d e . Conversely, pro-Europeans 
opposed a referendum on the grounds t h a t referenda could enable 
extreme popular views to r u l e the day. E q u a l l y , i t was l i k e l y 
t h a t i f a referendum was c a l l e d i n 1972, the pro-Europeans 
would lo s e the vote. When the p o l i c y of holding a referendum 
was adopted, Jenkins, Thomson and Lever resigned from the 
Shadow Cabinet. They were not going to give way to the L e f t 
without a f i g h t . 
When the Labour minority government was 
e l e c t e d i n February 1974, the Part y was i n an i n v i d i o u s 
p o s i t i o n . The pro-European Right were u n y i e l d i n g ; but so too 
were the anti-European L e f t , who now dominated the Party. Even 
on the eve of the con c l u s i o n of ne g o t i a t i o n s a s p e c i a l Labour 
Party Conference i n A p r i l 1975 recorded a vote of 2:1 i n 
support of the NEC's stance a g a i n s t Europe and the government's 
p o l i c y . Consequently, Labour "presented the p u b l i c with the 
unprecedented s p e c t a c l e of a government t a k i n g one stance, and 
the p o l i t i c a l p a r ty under whose auspices i t had been e l e c t e d 
t a k i n g another. "(4) I t was not, however, t o be unique, as the 
machinations of the Conservative Party of the 1990's shows. 
Renegotiations d i d n e v e r t h e l e s s begin i n 
March 1974. The other e i g h t members were sympathetic, r e a l i s i n g 
t h a t B r i t a i n had grounds f o r r e n e g o t i a t i o n , and because 
otherwise there was a r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y of a defeat i n the 
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referendum which would lead to B r i t a i n ' s speedy departure from 
the Community. Revised terms of entry were agreed a t the Dublin 
Summit of March 1975, which included a r e v i s i n g mechanism f o r 
budgetary c o n t r i b u t i o n s , p r o v i s i o n f o r acc e s s f o r Commonwealth 
c o u n t r i e s to EC markets, and improved p r o v i s i o n f o r overseas 
a i d . The r e s u l t was t h a t Wilson and Callaghan could d e c l a r e 
t h a t they had fought a d i f f i c u l t b a t t l e , won improved terms and 
yet i n the end recommend, as the Cabinet came to do, t h a t 
B r i t a i n should accept the r e v i s e d terms and thus s t a y i n the 
Community. As Pimlott noted, the new question was "how to 
maximize the chances of a 'Yes' vote, without doing i r r e p a r a b l e 
damage to the Government and the Part y i n the p r o c e s s . " ( 5 ) 
The Cabinet accepted the re-negotiated 
terms by a ma j o r i t y vote of 16:7 i n favour a t a meeting spread 
over the 16th and 17th of March 1975. T h i s i n i t s e l f was 
important because the Cabinet had been composed by Wilson to 
balance the views on Europe: a 50/50 s p l i t . The ground a t l a s t 
was beginning to move towards s t a y i n g i n the Community. King 
a s s e r t s , "The r e n e g o t i a t i o n s were the r e s u l t of the f a c t i o n a l 
i n - f i g h t i n g w i t h i n the Labour Party, but i n the end they may 
have a c t u a l l y been a necessary condition of B r i t a i n ' s remaining 
a member of the EEC."(6) Roy Jenkins' c o n c l u s i o n was however, 
more c a u s t i c : "That r e n e g o t i a t i o n was a l a r g e l y cosmetic 
e n t e r p r i s e , producing the maximum i l l - w i l l i n Europe with the 
minimum of r e s u l t . . . " ( 7 ) 
With the referendum p r e v i o u s l y agreed by 
Cabinet i n January 1975 i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of the conclusion of 
the n e g o t i a t i o n s , one f u r t h e r procedural novelty was agreed 
upon. During the referendum campaign Cabinet c o l l e c t i v e 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y was to be suspended on the European i s s u e . Once 
the referendum was over, c o l l e c t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y was to be 
resumed on European questions as i n others. When campaigning 
began, prominent Cabinet members j o i n e d o r g a n i s a t i o n s both f o r 
and a g a i n s t membership: Roy Jenkins was e l e c t e d p r e s i d e n t of 
the c r o s s - p a r t y group " B r i t a i n i n Europe"; Tony Benn and Peter 
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Shore were prominent i n the "National Referendum Campaign". 
During the campaign, there was a l a r g e measure of c r o s s - p a r t y 
a l l i a n c e s to put forward t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e c a s e s . For some, 
i n c l u d i n g Roy Jenkins, i t provided a r e l e a s e from the r o u t i n e 
a d v e r s a r i a l p a r t y p o l i t i c a l system, i n the end, the r e s u l t of 
the referendum was d e c i s i v e . 
Of the high turn out of 64.5% of the 
e l e c t o r a t e , 67.2% voted i n favour of continued membership of 
the EEC; only 32.8% voted a g a i n s t ( 8 ) . As King has observed, 66 
of the 68 counties voted i n favour of membership. "The pro-
Europeans' v i c t o r y was nationwide, not merely g e o g r a p h i c a l l y 
but a l s o s o c i a l l y . " ( 9 ) King concluded t h a t "The most important 
s i n g l e consequence of B r i t a i n ' s "Yes" vote... was to p l a c e 
B r i t a i n ' s membership i n the Common Market beyond any doubt. The 
f a c t t h a t the vote was a democratic one, together with the s i z e 
of the pro-European majority, gave B r i t a i n ' s membership i n the 
EEC a l e g i t i m a c y t h a t nothing e l s e could p o s s i b l y have 
done. "(10) For a l l t h a t t h i s seemed d e c i s i v e a t the time, i t 
was not to be the case. I n f a c t , i t only l e d to an a r m i s t i c e i n 
the continuing i d e o l o g i c a l b a t t l e t h a t s t i l l c u ts a c r o s s the 
B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l spectrum. As Jenkins noted with i l l - d i s g u i s e d 
contempt, "Within two y e a r s Tony Benn was campaigning f o r a 
r e v e r s a l of the v e r d i c t of the o r a c l e of d i r e c t democracy, 
about which he had spoken so s a c e r d o t a l l y before i t had given 
him the wrong answer..."(11) 
One of the most p e r s i s t e n t l y r e c u r r i n g , and 
i n c r e a s i n g l y acrimonious i s s u e s with which the Community and 
Union has faced from the 1970's to the present day has been the 
search for c l o s e r f i n a n c i a l i n t e g r a t i o n . As I have a l r e a d y 
noted i n chapter 1, a founding p r i n c i p l e a t the s e t t i n g up of 
the EEC was the i n c r e a s i n g of p r o s p e r i t y of member s t a t e s and 
t h e i r c i t i z e n s . By the end of the 1960's i t seemed d e s i r a b l e to 
head towards economic and monetary union (EMU). T h i s p r i n c i p l e 
was f i r s t a s s e r t e d a t The Hague Summit of 1969, and then 
planned f o r i n the Werner Report of 1970. Envisaging a gradual 
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process towards a f i x e d exchange r a t e and, i f d e s i r a b l e , a 
s i n g l e currency, t h i s l e d to the c r e a t i o n of 'The Snake' - a 
system of currency management. However, the c r e a t i o n of EMU 
soon seemed to be f a t a l l y damaged by e x t e r n a l world p r e s s u r e s , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y the 1972 A r a b - I s r a e l i war, which OPEC used to 
double i t s o i l p r i c e s , c r e a t i n g economic chaos. As I s h a l l , 
e x p l a i n , however, t h i s was an i s s u e which has continued to be 
explored s i n c e then. Moreover, as I s h a l l f u r t h e r show, the 
quest f o r c l o s e r economic and monetary union has r a i s e d 
fundamental questions about the f u t u r e d i r e c t i o n of the EU. 
A major e f f e c t of the 1972-3 o i l c r i s i s was 
i t s s t r a n g u l a t i o n of i n d u s t r i a l n a tions dependent on Arab o i l . 
T h i s had the consequence of plunging counties such as the UK 
i n t o deep r e c e s s i o n , f u r t h e r exacerbating r i s i n g i n f l a t i o n 
and i n c r e a s i n g unemployment which were alr e a d y becoming 
p a r t i c u l a r l y acute i n the UK. B r i t a i n ' s domestic s i t u a t i o n was 
f u r t h e r complicated by i n d u s t r i a l s t r i f e . T h i s c o c k t a i l of high 
unemployment, i n f l a t i o n and i n d u s t r i a l u n rest found t h e i r 
u l t i m a t e m a n i f e s t a t i o n towards the c l o s e of the decade i n the 
'Winter of Discontent' of 1978/9 which u l t i m a t e l y l e d to a 
r a d i c a l Conservative government being e l e c t e d i n the e a r l y 
summer of 1979. 
The d i f f i c u l t i e s of these events d i d not, 
i n the end, destroy the quest f o r economic and monetary union. 
I n January 1977, E u r o - e n t h u s i a s t Roy Jenkins, became P r e s i d e n t 
of the European Commission. By h i s own admission, h i s f i r s t 
months i n o f f i c e were not a s u c c e s s . Moreover the dynamism of 
the Community seemed to have evaporated, with no Franco-German 
l e a d e r s h i p forthcoming e i t h e r . I n f l u e n c e d "by the advice of 
Jean Monnet... to advance along the l i n e of l e a s t r e s i s t a n c e 
provided t h a t i t led i n the r i g h t general d i r e c t i o n " ( 1 2 ) 
Jenkins' panacea was the r e v i v i f i c a t i o n of Economic and 
Monetary Union, relaunched i n F l o r e n c e on 27th October, 1977. 
I n i t i a l l y , most member s t a t e s were not 
e n t h u s i a s t i c . I t was not u n t i l the Copenhagen Summit of 1978, 
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when Helmut Schmidt made proposals along J e n k i n s 1 l i n e s , t h a t 
momentum began to grow. T h i s l e d to the c r e a t i o n of the 
European Monetary System (EMS). Denis Healey was, by t h i s time, 
the B r i t i s h C h a n c e l l o r of the Exchequer. Never a Euro-
e n t h u s i a s t , he was i n i t i a l l y a g n o s t i c towards EMS, but i n the 
end became r e s o l u t e l y opposed. He concluded t h a t " L i k e other 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n s , the European Monetary System 
s u f f e r s from a c r u c i a l d e f e c t . I t can impose agreed d i s c i p l i n e s 
only on i t s weaker members; the strong are able to r e j e c t 
them."(13) B r i t a i n would have been a weaker member. 
There were to be two main elements i n the 
EMS. The f i r s t was the c r e a t i o n of the ECU, the European 
Currency Unit. T h i s was formed from a 'basket of c u r r e n c i e s ' 
with i t s value f i x e d as a percentage of each country's share of 
the Community's GNP, and i t s share of i n t e r n a l trade. The 
second element was the c r e a t i o n of the ERM, the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism, membership of which was o p t i o n a l . T h i s sought to 
reduce currency f l u c t u a t i o n by f i x i n g each currency's exchange 
r a t e i n r e l a t i o n to the ECU. Each member currency then had a 
pre-defined margin w i t h i n which i t could f l u c t u a t e . I f i t 
exceeded i t s l i m i t s , c e n t r a l banks were r e q u i r e d to a c t f o r the 
currency. Together with these two main elements, the European 
investment Bank was a l s o formed, which could o f f e r s u b s i d i z e d 
loans to the poorer member s t a t e s f o r investment. 
As Healey's views (noted above) suggest, 
the B r i t i s h Government's response was l i k e l y to be l e s s than 
e n t h u s i a s t i c . Callaghan had been c o n s i d e r i n g proposals f o r a 
s t e r l i n g / d o l l a r i n i t i a t i v e w ith the IMF when Jenkins and 
Schmidt made t h e i r proposals f o r EMU, thus showing a " t y p i c a l 
d i f f e r e n c e i n gaze between the B r i t i s h and German l e a d e r s . " ( 1 4 ) 
I n the end, however, the Callaghan government d i d agree to a c t 
as i f i t were a member of the ERM, w h i l s t remaining t e c h n i c a l l y 
o u t s i d e i t . Why a c t i n t h i s way? Stephen George suggests t h a t 
Callaghan's a c t i o n s " i n d i c a t e t h a t p o l i t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , 
both domestic and i n t e r n a t i o n a l , were uppermost...; by not 
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j o i n i n g formally the Government quietened the p r o t e s t s from 
w i t h i n the Labour Party and demonstrated i t s continued 
determination not to be drawn i n t o an i n s t i t u t i o n which was 
regarded with s u s p i c i o n by the United S t a t e s ; by adapting i t s 
p o l i c y v o l u n t a r i l y , and a l s o d e c l a r i n g i t s i n t e n t i o n to j o i n 
e v e n t u a l l y i t kept on the r i g h t s i d e of the Germans."(15) 
At the same time, the Conservative P a r t y ' s 
p o s i t i o n appeared e q u a l l y ambivalent. Whilst i t decl a r e d 
membership of the ERM to be a goal, i t only committed i t s e l f to 
looking f o r ways t o j o i n ( 1 6 ) . When the Conservatives came to 
power i n 1979, ( i n p r a c t i c e ) there was no change i n t h i s 
p o l i c y . Only by 1985 did the Foreign O f f i c e and Treasury 
b e l i e v e t h a t "the time was r i g h t " and t h a t the v o l a t i l i t y of 
o i l p r i c e s which i t b e l i e v e d would have rendered membership of 
the ERM impossible had "paled i n t o i n s i g n i f i c a n c e " ( 1 7 ) When a 
meeting of s e n i o r m i n i s t e r s and o f f i c i a l s w i th Prime M i n i s t e r 
Margaret Thatcher took p l a c e on 13th November 1985, 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y , Thatcher i n e f f e c t vetoed the plan, d e s p i t e her 
m i n i s t e r s and o f f i c i a l s supporting i t . For Lord Howe, t h i s "was 
the f i r s t time t h a t any of us had contemplated her e x e r c i s i n g a 
veto of t h i s kind - and a g a i n s t the very p r i n c i p l e of 
government p o l i c y t h a t we had a l l been proclaiming f o r 
ye a r s . " ( 1 8 ) 
Comparing Callaghan and Thatcher's o v e r a l l 
approach to the question of membership of ERM, Jenkins 
concluded t h a t when Thatcher came to power " at l e a s t we 
remained b i p a r t i s a n l y f a i t h f u l to our n a t i o n a l h a b i t of never 
j o i n i n g any European e n t e r p r i s e u n t i l i t was too l a t e to 
i n f l u e n c e i t s shape. Then, when wholly p r e d i c t a b l y , we are 
ev e n t u a l l y forced t o apply f o r membership, we complain b i t t e r l y 
t h a t the shape s u i t s others b e t t e r than i t s u i t s us."(19) I n 
f a c t i t was not to be u n t i l October 1990 t h a t Margaret Thatcher 
agreed to j o i n ; however, membership was only to be temporary, 
f o r , i n September 1992, B r i t a i n s u f f e r e d i t s ignominious e x i t . 
Despite the v a c i l l a t i o n of B r i t i s h p o l i c y 
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towards EMS, the process did not stand s t i l l i n the r e s t of the 
Community. I n 1985 the quest f o r EMS took on added impetus, 
with Economic and Monetary included as a vaguely defined p o l i c y 
o b j e c t i v e i n the the S i n g l e European Act. Moreover, i n 1989, 
the Delors r e p o r t was published which l e d to the Madrid 
European Council of June 1989 c a l l i n g f o r a f u r t h e r 
intergovernmental conference (20) to d i s c u s s economic and 
monetary union. T h i s l e d to the Maastricht T r e a t y . 
The Delors report proposed a three-staged 
process to f u l l economic and monetary union. The f i r s t stage 
c a l l e d f o r the removal of exchange c o n t r o l s . The Madrid Council 
s e t t h i s s t a r t i n g date f o r 1 s t J u l y 1990. 8 of the 12 member 
s t a t e s were to j o i n stage 1 then, with the other 4 working 
towards j o i n i n g . Stage 1 expected t h a t a l l p a r t i c i p a n t 
c u r r e n c i e s would a l s o accept EMU as the u l t i m a t e goal i n 
p r i n c i p l e . I t a l s o o u t l i n e d measures t o a s s i s t economic 
convergence. For B r i t a i n , t h i s process has caused s i g n i f i c a n t 
d i f f i c u l t i e s . Margaret Thatcher s t r i d e n t l y a s s e r t e d t h a t she 
was "of course, opposed root and branch to the whole approach 
of the Delors Report. But I was not i n a p o s i t i o n to prevent 
some kind of a c t i o n being taken upon i t . " ( 2 1 ) 
The second stage, which was to begin on 1st 
January 1994, s e t up the European Monetary I n s t i t u t e i n 
F r a n k f u r t , and by t h i s time a l l c e n t r a l banks, except B r i t a i n ' s 
and Denmark's, who had gained 'opted outs', were to be 
independent of government c o n t r o l . 
The t h i r d stage was the permanent f i x i n g of 
exchange r a t e s and the s u b s t i t u t i o n of n a t i o n a l c u r r e n c i e s with 
the s i n g l e currency. Stage 3 would s e t up the European System 
of C e n t r a l Banks (ESCB), which the European C e n t r a l Bank (ECB) 
and n a t i o n a l c e n t r a l banks would form. I t was a n t i c i p a t e d t h a t 
a d e c i s i o n would be taken a t European Council l e v e l , i n 
c o n s u l t a t i o n with the European Parliament, to f i x the s t a r t i n g 
date, and i f no date was f i x e d by the end of 1997, 1 s t January 
1999 was to be the automatic i n i t i a t i o n of Stage 3. However, 
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the Maastricht n e g o t i a t i o n s gave the B r i t i s h government an 
'opt-out' from Stage 3: i t would j o i n only i f Parliament 
agreed. Those c o u n t r i e s who cannot reach the c r i t e r i a f o r Stage 
3 are thereby excluded from the common currency and i t s 
i n s t i t u t i o n s , though they may subsequently admitted upon review 
by the European C o u n c i l , i n c o n s u l t a t i o n with the ECB, European 
Parliament and the Commission. I t now seems i n c r e a s i n g l y 
u n l i k e l y t h a t most member s t a t e s w i l l be able to reach the 
budget d e f i c i t and debt c r i t e r i a s e t down a t Maastricht which 
w i l l lead to f u l l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n EMU ( 2 2 ) . At the time of 
w r i t i n g , i t i s s t i l l u n c l e a r as to whether the c r i t e r i a w i l l be 
weakened, the time frame extended, or even whether EMU w i l l be 
abandoned. So then, what i s s u e s does t h i s long and complex 
process to EMU r a i s e ? 
One s i g n i f i c a n t i s s u e which EMU r a i s e s i s 
the p e r e n n i a l question of n a t i o n a l sovereignty. The c r e a t i o n of 
EMU, as I have already pointed out, w i l l lead to the 
i r r e v e r s i b l e t r a n s f e r of some n a t i o n a l sovereignty over fi n a n c e 
to an independent European C e n t r a l Bank, i n c l u d i n g the 
a u t h o r i t y t o i s s u e bank notes. For Margaret Thatcher, 
acceptance of Stage 3 of EMU "would be a fundamental and 
c r u c i a l l o s s of sovereignty and would mark a d e c i s i v e s t e p 
towards B r i t a i n ' s submergence i n a European s u p e r s t a t e . " ( 2 3 ) 
One may argue, however, t h a t n a t i o n a l sovereignty i n f i n a n c i a l 
matters i s today r a t h e r more i l l u s o r y than r e a l as f i n a n c i a l 
markets and planning are now seldom s o l e l y determined by the 
economics of the s i n g l e n a t i o n - s t a t e . I t i s a l s o p o s s i b l e to 
argue t h a t the formation of a s i n g l e currency and an 
independent c e n t r a l bank w i l l l e a d to the Europeanisation of 
finance, i n s t e a d of the Germanisation of European f i n a n c e 
caused by the tremendous economic s t r e n g t h of Germany, thus 
"commit(ing) the country [Germany] i r r e v o c a b l y to a western 
a l l i a n c e . " ( 2 4 ) 
How accountable w i l l the new system be? 
When n a t i o n a l f i n a n c e s are c o n t r o l l e d from the n a t i o n a l 
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government, t h a t government must, to a l e s s e r or greate r extent 
budget according to the wishes of i t s people. I f the ECB i s to 
be e n t i r e l y independent, i t s s o l e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and raison 
d'etre i s f i n a n c i a l . The danger i s t h a t i t w i l l then lead to 
the c r e a t i o n of a f i n a n c i a l f o r t r e s s - E u r o p e , and t h a t i t w i l l 
a l s o have no s o c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to the developing world i n 
p a r t i c u l a r . At the moment economic sovereignty i s 
de m o c r a t i c a l l y accountable. However l i m i t e d and flawed t h a t may 
be, I b e l i e v e t h a t t h e r e needs to be a s i m i l a r safeguard f o r a 
European c e n t r a l bank too. 
The c r e a t i o n of a new l a r g e f i n a n c i a l bloc 
r a i s e s a f u r t h e r p h i l o s o p h i c a l question: t h a t of en l a r g i n g the 
EU. As Bainbridge and Teasdale have pointed out: "EMU, i f 
at t a i n e d , would c o n s t i t u t e a deepening w e l l beyond anything 
t h a t a p p l i c a n t s t a t e s from c e n t r a l and E a s t e r n Europe could 
hope to take p a r t i n f o r at l e a s t a generation." (25) The 
obvious danger i s th a t the c r e a t i o n of an economic f o r t r e s s -
union c l o s e d i n e f f e c t , t o those on i t s borders who wish to 
j o i n , could, f a r from s t a b i l i s i n g the post-Communist c o u n t r i e s ' 
p o l i t i c a l systems, p o t e n t i a l l y d e s t a b i l i s e them. 
Economic and monetary union which, made 
from a small number of E U member s t a t e s , w i l l pose problems f o r 
those out s i d e EMU. A S the plan suggests, those s t a t e s which a r e 
not members of EMU w i l l be excluded from the ESCB. As B r i t a i n ' s 
experience has shown, to be on the edge of an i s s u e or system 
makes i t exceedingly d i f f i c u l t , i f not impossible, to i n f l u e n c e 
the f u t u r e development of t h a t system u n t i l you are a member, 
and by then, your opportunity may have a l r e a d y gone. The 
p o t e n t i a l , then, i s f o r a more di v i d e d "two speed" Europe. 
The whole question of EMU, i t s process and 
goals, r a i s e many of the c e n t r a l i s s u e s we have seen throughout 
the post-war p o l i t i c a l developments i n western Europe: 
sovereignty, a c c o u n t a b i l i t y , the r e s t r a i n i n g and l i b e r a t i o n of 
Germany, the question of enlargement, the s o c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
of the Union, i n many ways, though, i t i s very d i f f e r e n t from 
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anything t h a t has preceded i t , not l e a s t the EMS. I t i s 
d i f f e r e n t i n s c a l e . The i n t e r l o c k i n g of the fi n a n c e s of i t s 
member s t a t e s w i l l be f a r g r e a t e r than any other Community 
venture to date, and t h e r e f o r e so w i l l the d i f f i c u l t y of any 
s i n g l e nation e x t r i c a t i n g i t s e l f i n the fu t u r e be. I t i s 
a l s o d i f f e r e n t i n terms of i t s e f f e c t s f o r Europe: the 
p o t e n t i a l f o r a two-speed or multi-speed Europe i s gr e a t e r ; as 
i s a European Union t h a t w i l l probably be f a r more d i f f i c u l t 
for c e n t r a l and e a s t e r n European s t a t e s to j o i n . I f EMU takes 
place, i t s e f f e c t s w i l l be profound, and must be watched 
c a r e f u l l y to ensure i t i s r e s p o n s i b l e , d e m o c r a t i c a l l y 
accountable and open. 
Another core area of the EU's l i f e , which 
r a i s e s important i s s u e s for the fu t u r e d i r e c t i o n of the union, 
i s the European Parliament. Although the Treaty of Rome made 
p r o v i s i o n f o r a democratic parliament, i t s powers have been 
l i m i t e d , indeed i t was not u n t i l 1979 a f t e r years of delay t h a t 
the f i r s t d i r e c t l y e l e c t e d European Parliament was to s i t . 
Despite these d i r e c t e l e c t i o n s , i t i s c l e a r 
t h a t the p o l i c y of many n a t i o n a l governments has been to 
prevent f u r t h e r powers from being granted to the Parliament. 
Even with d i r e c t e l e c t i o n s i n 1979 W i s t r i c h r i g h t l y concluded, 
"The powers of the e l e c t e d Parliament remained unchanged from 
th a t of i t s nominated predecessor... i t was c l e a r t h a t the 
b a t t l e for more powers l a y ahead."(26). D i r e c t e l e c t i o n s d id 
not a t t h i s point enhance the powers of the European 
Parliament. Nevertheless, i n 1979, an i n t e r n a t i o n a l e l e c t o r a t e 
of over 190 m i l l i o n people had the opportunity to vote f o r 
d i r e c t European Parliamentary e l e c t i o n s . Throughout the 
Community 62.5% of the e l e c t o r a t e voted. Only 32.3% voted i n 
the UK. T h i s was only to r i s e to an a l l - t i m e high i n the UK 
European Parliamentary e l e c t i o n s of 1994 to 36.4%! (27) 
Although W i s t r i c h suggests t h a t nothing 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y changed between the nominated parliament and i t s 
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d i r e c t l y e l e c t e d successor, such a view, i n the opinion of 
Teasdale and Bainbridge i s disingenuous, for i n s p i t e of i t s 
l i m i t e d powers, the European Parliament "showed a r e a l 
determination... to use i t s powers to the f u l l and to i n c r e a s e 
them..."(28) Although the Parliament's powers were l i m i t e d , 
they were subsequently i n c r e a s e d by the S i n g l e European Act 
and the Treaty of M a a s t r i c h t . So then, what a r e the powers of 
the European Parliament, and how does i t operate? 
T e c h n i c a l l y , the European Parliament s i t s 
i n perpetual s e s s i o n . T h i s i s t o ensure t h a t , when the 
Parliament i s not s i t t i n g i n plenary s e s s i o n i n Strasbourg ( i t s 
o f f i c i a l s e a t ) , i t can c a r r y on i t s b u s i n e s s , i n p r a c t i c e i t i s 
usual f o r the Parliament to meet i n Strasbourg f o r the minimum 
time allowed by the agreement of the Edinburgh Summit of 1992, 
12 times a year (though, t h i s has f r e q u e n t l y been u n i l a t e r a l l y 
reduced by the P a r l i a m e n t ) . The Parliament f o l l o w s a monthly 
c y c l e : a 1 week plenary s e s s i o n i n Strasbourg, 2 weeks of 
committee work u s u a l l y i n B r u s s e l s , and a week f r e e of 
committee work. U s u a l l y i n the 3 weeks away from Strasbourg, 
mini s e s s i o n s of the parliament may be held i n B r u s s e l s . 
Today, the Parliament i s made up of 626 
MEP's e l e c t e d under t h e i r own country's e l e c t o r a l system. 
Members s i t i n a s e m i c i r c l e , and are grouped by party r a t h e r 
than by n a t i o n a l i t y , thus, f o r example, B r i t i s h Labour MEP's 
belong to the European S o c i a l i s t Group (P E S ) . Much of the 
Parliament's work i s conducted by the 20 standing committees of 
the Parliament. These committees then produce r e p o r t s which are 
subsequently debated i n plenary s e s s i o n and voted on as 
appropriate. The Treaty of Maastricht a l s o accorded the 
Parliament the r i g h t to i n i t i a t e committees of i n q u i r y i f 
deemed necessary. At the monthly plenary s e s s i o n , questions can 
be made to the Commission and Council of M i n i s t e r s , i n a d d i t i o n 
to the time a l l o t t e d f o r t o p i c a l debates. 
I n my judgement, the tone of the European 
Parliament i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from t h a t found i n 
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Westminster. Debates are n o t i c e a b l e f o r t h e i r general l a c k of 
p a r t y - p o l i t i c a l h i s t r i o n i c s . T h i s can be explained p r o c e d u r a l l y 
and c u l t u r a l l y . 
P r o c e d u r a l l y , the r e p o r t s are agreed by the 
c r o s s - p a r t y committees which prepare them. Consequently, the 
report i s s u b s t a n t i a l l y an agreed document, with u s u a l l y only 
minor amendments being made. Also, r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the 
p o l i t i c a l groups respond to the report, and f u r t h e r speaking 
time i s a l l o c a t e d on a p a r t y - p r o p o r t i o n a l b a s i s . I n p r a c t i c e 
speakers often have no more t h a t 1 or 2 minutes i n which to 
speak, thus r e q u i r i n g b r e v i t y and c l a r i t y of p o i n t s r a t h e r than 
debating hyperbole. 
C u l t u r a l l y , the emphasis of the European 
Parliament i s consensus-seeking, as compared with the 
a d v e r s a r i a l nature of B r i t i s h p a rty p o l i t i c s . As Helen Wallace 
has noted, t h i s r e f l e c t s the f a c t t h a t " i n many member s t a t e s 
c r o s s - p a r t y p o s i t i o n s are constructed, often through formal 
c o a l i t i o n s and s t r u c t u r e d dialogue with s o c i a l p a r t n e r s . . . i n 
these cases i t i s perhaps accurate to d e s c r i b e what emerges as 
a ' n a t i o n a l ' approach o r i e n t a t e d towards shared 'national 
i n t e r e s t s . " ( 2 9 ) Furthermore, i t can be argued t h a t i f the 
European Parliament i s to be taken s e r i o u s l y , then a l a r g e 
measure of unanimity i s r e q u i r e d . I t seems to me to be an open 
question as to whether such a high degree of consensus-seeking 
would continue i n the event of the Parliament obtaining f u l l 
l e g i s l a t i v e powers. A f u r t h e r point worthy of note i s t h a t i t 
i s often d i f f i c u l t to t e l l which country a member i s from when 
she or he i s speaking. There i s a more broadly 'European' tone 
to the debates r a t h e r than debates r e f l e c t i n g any n a t i o n a l 
d i v i s i o n . So then, what are the a c t u a l powers of the European 
Parliament? 
U n t i l the advent of the S i n g l e European Act 
(SEA), i t was, t e c h n i c a l l y , s t i l l the 'European Parliamentary 
Assembly'. Consequently, because i t does not have f u l l 
l e g i s l a t i v e powers, i t has had to acquire them gr a d u a l l y , as 
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granted by the v a r i o u s T r e a t i e s and agreements. 
The most s i g n i f i c a n t development i n the 
powers of the European Parliament has been over the Community 
budget, i n 1975 the Parliament was granted the f i n a l say i n how 
non-compulsory expenditure was a l l o c a t e d , w i t h i n agreed l i m i t s 
(although the Council remained the f i n a l a u t h o r i t y f o r 
a l l o c a t i n g compulsory spending). The Parliament a l s o has the 
power to r e j e c t any proposed budget by an absolute m a j o r i t y . 
T h i s i t e x e r c i s e d i n 1979 and 1984. Since those t u r b u l e n t days, 
a c o n c i l i a t i o n committee was formed, so t h a t the budget could 
be d i s c u s s e d i n a committee r e p r e s e n t i n g both the Parliament 
and C o u n c i l . T h i s has been c r u c i a l i n avoiding f u r t h e r 
budgetary c r i s e s . Today, the European Parliament and the 
Council together form the 'Jo i n t Budgetary Authority' of the 
EU. 
i n 1983 the S t u t t g a r t D e c l a r a t i o n granted 
the European Parliament the r i g h t to s c r u t i n i s e the Commission 
and Council by submitting w r i t t e n and o r a l questions to them. 
At the plenary s e s s i o n s , each day has a question time, f o r MEPs 
to a c t i n t h i s way. 
The Parliament's l e g i s l a t i v e powers have 
h i s t o r i c a l l y been l i m i t e d . Nevertheless, during t h i s period 
under review, the Parliament's powers have i n c r e a s e d . U n t i l the 
SEA, the Parliament was r e s t r i c t e d to g i v i n g i t s 'opinions' on 
l e g i s l a t i o n . However, the Council and the Commission could 
ignore the recommendations of the Parliament i f they so chose. 
The SEA granted the parliament the r i g h t to two readings of 
d r a f t l e g i s l a t i o n , f i r s t l y t o s c r u t i n i s e the i n i t i a l 
l e g i s l a t i o n , then to amend or agree the common p o s i t i o n a r r i v e d 
at a f t e r the f i r s t reading. A l t e r n a t i v e l y , a t the second 
reading, the Parliament could r e j e c t the l e g i s l a t i o n i n i t s 
e n t i r e t y . The SEA was a l s o s i g n i f i c a n t i n grantin g the 
Parliament the r i g h t to give i t s asse n t to A s s o c i a t i o n 
Agreements, and Accession T r e a t i e s . As one commentator 
remarked, "The o v e r a l l e f f e c t of these changes was to make the 
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parliament something of an upper house, e n t i t l e d to s c r u t i n i z e , 
question, delay and sometimes amend."(30) 
The Treaty of Maastricht has f u r t h e r 
enhanced the Parliament's powers. Of these new powers, as 
Teasdale and Bainbridge have observed, "the most important i s 
the c o - d e c i s i o n precedure"(31). Modelled on the processes of 
the J o i n t Budgetary Authority, a c o n c i l i a t i o n committee can be 
formed by the Council and Parliament to negotiate d i r e c t l y . 
However, i f agreement cannot be reached, the Parliament has the 
r i g h t of veto. The Maas t r i c h t Treaty a l s o granted the 
Parliament the power to veto the appointment of the Pr e s i d e n t 
of the European Commission - a power i t attempted to use when 
Jacques Santer was nominated p r e s i d e n t . Moreover, the 
Parliament has the r i g h t to be consulted over other 
appointments to the Commission. The Parliament may a l s o appoint 
Parliamentary Ombudsmen too. 
To summarise then. The European Parliament 
has been given s i g n i f i c a n t l y enhanced powers s i n c e 1973, 
e s p e c i a l l y i n r e l a t i o n to the Union's budget and the s c r u t i n y 
of l e g i s l a t i o n . I t now a l s o has a say i n Commission 
appointments, as w e l l as an in c r e a s e d r i g h t to question both 
the Council and Commission. Nevertheless, i t i s s t i l l not a 
f u l l l e g i s l a t i v e assembly. I t s powers are s t i l l r e s t r i c t e d by 
those granted by Treaty, i . e . by member governments. Such a 
truncated form of Parliament r a i s e s i n t e r e s t i n g questions. 
One of the p r i n c i p l e c r i t i c i s m s of the 
European Union i s i t s 'democratic d e f i c i t ' . I n other words, 
the a s s e r t i o n i s th a t the i n s t i t u t i o n s of the EU are not 
t r a n s p a r e n t l y democratic e i t h e r i n t h e i r operation or t h e i r 
a c c o u n t a b i l i t y . For the commentator, John Cole, "Not j u s t the 
European Commission but, more importantly, the Council of 
M i n i s t e r s ought to be d e m o c r a t i c a l l y c o n t r o l l e d . Otherwise a 
Europe which was garnering more power each year would be r u l e d 
not by democracy but by diplomacy..."(32) Unlike the B r i t i s h 
C h a p t e r 2 Page 50 
s i t u a t i o n , where the exec u t i v e i s formed from the l e g i s l a t u r e ' s 
r u l i n g party, the European Commission and Council of M i n i s t e r s 
are not formed from the European Parliament. The Commission i s 
appointed, and the Council of M i n i s t e r s i s composed of n a t i o n a l 
m i n i s t e r s with p a r t i c u l a r p o r t f o l i o s from member governments. 
C r u c i a l l y , the European Parliament's powers of s c r u t i n y are 
l i m i t e d . As I have shown, questions may be asked and 
l e g i s l a t i o n may be explored, but i n p r a c t i c e , the Council of 
M i n i s t e r s a r e accountable only to t h e i r n a t i o n a l parliaments. 
W i s t r i c h f o r e s e e s a f u r t h e r weakening of 
t h i s l i m i t e d democratic o v e r s i g h t : "Once m a j o r i t y v o t i n g 
a p p l i e s , e s p e c i a l l y behind c l o s e d doors, no i n d i v i d u a l m i n i s t e r 
can be held p e r s o n a l l y accountable. And the c o l l e c t i v e 
d e c i s i o n s of the Council cannot be subjugated to s c r u t i n y by 
the i n d i v i d u a l twelve n a t i o n a l parliaments - to whom the 
Council i s not c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e . " ( 3 3 ) Thus, 
although the in c r e a s e d use of q u a l i f i e d m a j o r i t y voting i n 
Council d e c i s i o n making may l u b r i c a t e the d e c i s i o n t a k i n g , 
n a t i o n a l parliaments cannot s c r u t i n i s e i n the same way as 
before. Although the Treaty of Maastricht attempted to address 
t h i s democratic d e f i c i t by extending the powers of c o - d e c i s i o n 
for the European parliament, as Bainbridge and Teasdale a l s o 
point out, the Treaty " e s t a b l i s h e d important new area s of Union 
a c t i v i t y - the Common Foreign and S e c u r i t y P o l i c y and J u s t i c e 
and Home A f f a i r s - with only very modest p r o v i s i o n f o r 
parliamentary involvement, n a t i o n a l or European."(34) 
Who then c o n t r o l s the exec u t i v e ? At the 
moment n e i t h e r n a t i o n a l nor European Parliaments have the power 
to f u l l y c o n t r o l the a c t i v i t i e s of the executive - y e t the 
European Parliament i s the only d i r e c t l y e l e c t e d i n s t i t u t i o n 
f o r the Union. Although some powers of s c r u t i n y have been 
t r a n s f e r r e d from n a t i o n a l parliaments to the European 
Parliament, there i s s t i l l a s e r i o u s d e f i c i t i n the democratic 
a c c o u n t a b i l i t y of the European i n s t i t u t i o n s . While ever t h a t i s 
the case, John Cole's charge t h a t the Union i s d i r e c t e d as much 
Page 51 
by diplomacy as democracy w i l l be s u s t a i n a b l e . 
The other s i d e t o the question of the 
'democratic d e f i c i t ' , i s how we hold our e l e c t e d 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s accountable. One of the constant problems which 
c o n s t i t u e n t s and MEP's a l i k e experience i s t h a t of a c c e s s , f o r 
a fundamental mode of a c c o u n t a b i l i t y i s a c c e s s i b i l i t y . The very 
s i z e of the Union and i t s s t r u c t u r e s , as w e l l as the s i z e of 
members' e l e c t o r a t e s m i l i t a t e , a g a i n s t easy a c c e s s . For 
example, the monthly parliamentary c y c l e of B r u s s e l s 
committees, and Strasbourg plenary s e s s i o n s r e s t r i c t members' 
a v a i l a b i l i t y to t h e i r c o n s t i t u e n t s . Moreover, the very f a c t 
t h a t most B r i t i s h e u r o - c o n s t i t u e n c i e s are composed of seven or 
e i g h t Westminster parliamentary c o n s t i t u e n c i e s compound the 
d i f f i c u l t y . Despite t h i s , as has been pointed out, "whatever 
s o l u t i o n i s found, i t i s c l e a r t h a t a Parliament t h a t i s 
a l r e a d y a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l y cumbersome cannot go on growing 
i n d e f i n i t e l y . " ( 3 5 ) Thus, i f the Union grows, the parliament 
cannot expand much f u r t h e r ; the l i k e l i h o o d i s t h a t 
c o n s t i t u e n c i e s would be enlarged as each n a t i o n a l a l l o c a t i o n 
diminishes. 
Another important i s s u e r e l a t i n g to the 
Parliamentary a c c o u n t a b i l i t y , and indeed of the EU a t l a r g e , i s 
the s o - c a l l e d "information d e f i c i t " ( 3 6 ) . Although 'Europe' i s 
seldom out of the news, i t i s e q u a l l y c l e a r t h a t knowledge 
about how Europe and i t s Parliament works, how one gains a c c e s s 
to the organs of the union, even, perhaps who one's own MEP i s , 
i s g e n e r a l l y l a c k i n g . Thus, when a l a r m i s t and biased views are 
portrayed i n the news media, opinion may be accepted as f a c t . A 
l a c k of knowledge and information i s fundamentally 
undemocratic, indeed anti-democratic, as information and 
knowledge, as the old dictum suggests, i s power. I f c i t i z e n s do 
not have accurate information and a c c e s s to the organs of the 
European Union, and e s p e c i a l l y t h a t of i t s parliament, then the 
a l i e n a t i o n and c y n i c i s m of the e l e c t o r a t e i s hardly s u r p r i s i n g 
- even i f i t i s profoundly d i s t u r b i n g . Thus, we can see a 
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'double democratic d e f i c i t ' : a weak democratic o v e r s i g h t of the 
organs of the EU by i t s parliament, but a l s o weak l i n k s and 
poor information between and about Europe, i t s Parliament and 
members. As I s h a l l e x p l a i n i n chapter 5, when co n s i d e r i n g the 
i n d i v i d u a l and the Churches' engagement with Europe, the 
Churches have an important c o n t r i b u t i o n t o make i n t h i s 
r e s p e c t . 
Another general c r i t i c i s m which i s 
f r e q u e n t l y l e v e l l e d a t the European Parliament i s i t s e x c e s s i v e 
c o s t s . There are two areas i n which t h i s charge i s made. The 
f i r s t area i s the parliament's l o c a t i o n . I n 1992 the Edinburgh 
European Council decreed t h a t the European Parliament must s i t 
i n Strasbourg f o r a t l e a s t 12 plenary s e s s i o n s per annum. 
However, the v a s t m a j o r i t y of the Parliament's work i s 
conducted i n B r u s s e l s . Thus, there are the c o s t s of maintaining 
b u i l d i n g s i n both c i t i e s , and there are the great c o s t s of 
t r a n s p o r t i n g members, o f f i c i a l s , a s s i s t a n t s and documentation 
between B r u s s e l s and Strasbourg f o r 1 week per month. As a 
r e c e n t leader a r t i c l e i n the European v o i c e i l l u s t r a t e s , "MEPs 
are often portrayed by the media as holders of f i r s t - c l a s s 
s e a t s on a luxury Euro gravy t r a i n . I t may be u n f a i r , but i t i s 
an image which has lodged i n the minds of many ordinary members 
of the p u b l i c . " ( 3 7 ) i n a recent debate about the c o s t s of i t s 
b u i l d i n g s members of the European Parliament recognised the 
r i d i c u l e aimed a t them, and the r e s u l t i n g unpopularity of the 
Parliament and Europe ( 3 8 ) . The Parliament's p r e r o g a t i v e s i n 
t h i s r e s p e c t are l i m i t e d by the Edinburgh Summit's d e c i s i o n . 
However, for 2 consecutive y e a r s , the Parliament has 
u n i l a t e r a l l y reduced the number of Strasbourg s e s s i o n s , which 
has l e d France to take the Parliament to court. I t seems to me 
t h a t t h i s s p l i t c o u n t r y / s p l i t s i t e nature of the Parliament i s 
g r o s s l y i n e f f i c i e n t . More importantly, i t i l l u s t r a t e s how 
r e s t r i c t e d the Parliament i s , not even being able t o decide 
where i t s h a l l meet. Thus the i n e f f i c i e n c i e s (which can 
conveniently be blamed on the Parliament) w i l l continue. As the 
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European Voice leader commented, " i t i s only when the Union i s 
seen to be t a c k l i n g such apparent examples of waste and 
i n e f f i c i e n c y on i t s own doorstep t h a t i t w i l l be able to 
convince Europe's tax-payers t h a t t h e i r money i s w e l l spent." 
(39) 
Another major expenditure which the EU, and 
e s p e c i a l l y the Parliament i n c u r s i s t h a t of language 
t r a n s l a t i o n . At present, a l l documents, debates and committees 
are r e q u i r e d to be t r a n s l a t e d i n t o each of the o f f i c i a l 
languages of the Union. Consequently, the c o s t s are immense. 
Moreover, i f the Union expands eastwards, the c o s t s of 
t r a n s l a t i o n seem s e t t o r i s e even f u r t h e r . G e n e r a l l y speaking, 
i t would be p o s s i b l e f o r the parliamentary committees to 
operate using a reduced s e r v i c e of, say, 5 languages i n c l u d i n g 
E n g l i s h , French and German. I t seems to me t h a t w h i l s t i t may 
be p r a c t i c a l indeed necessary to t r i m the budget, as I s h a l l 
argue i n a chapter 5, i t i s n e v e r t h e l e s s imperative t h a t 
plenary s e s s i o n s of parliament should r e t a i n the f u l l 
simultaneous t r a n s l a t i o n s e r v i c e , and t h a t a l l EU documents are 
a v a i l a b l e i n a l l the o f f i c i a l languages of the EU. Otherwise i t 
makes the d e c i s i o n making procedures of the EU even more remote 
from i t s c i t i z e n s and l e s s accountable. As before, knowledge 
and information i s fundamental to power and a c c o u n t a b i l i t y . 
So then, I have r a i s e d a number of i s s u e s 
surrounding the Parliament, such as c o s t s , and democratic 
a c c o u n t a b i l i t y . I n both areas I have i l l u s t r a t e d some of the 
d e f i c i e n c i e s of the present s t r u c t u r e s . I b e l i e v e t h a t present 
s t r u c t u r e s are problematic, y e t to a l t e r the Parliament would 
r a i s e not only procedural questions, but i n f a c t the c e n t r a l 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l question f a c i n g the EU today: which way i s the EU 
going? W i l l i t remain broadly s i m i l a r to today's c o n s t r u c t i o n ? 
W i l l i t 'return' to a more G a u l l i s t Europe des patries? W i l l i t 
develop i n t o a more c l a s s i c a l f e d e r a l s t r u c t u r e ? Or w i l l i t 
advance as i t has a l r e a d y done, a f t e r the f a s h i o n of Monnet -
s e c t o r by s e c t o r , i n a gradual development? The Parliament 
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merely r e f l e c t s these questions t h a t face the governments and 
c i t i z e n s of the EU. T h e i r conclusions, though, w i l l a l s o a f f e c t 
those c o u n t r i e s who seek to enter the EU i n the futur e . I t i s 
important to remember, however, t h a t such developments have 
been made l a r g e l y p o s s i b l e because of the fundamental reviews 
of the European Community i n s t i t u t i o n s which have taken p l a c e 
s i n c e 1973, which I s h a l l now examine. 
Since the c r e a t i o n of the EEC i n 1957 there 
have only been four fundamental reviews of the foundation 
t r e a t i e s : the f i r s t inter-governmental conference (IGC) l e d to 
the s i g n i n g of the Tr e a t y of Luxembourg, more popularly known 
as the 'Single European Act' (SEA) which came i n t o f o r c e i n 
J u l y 1987; the second and t h i r d working c o n c u r r e n t l y on 
economic and monetary union, and European P o l i t i c a l union, l e d 
to the Treaty on European Union, known as the Maastricht 
Treaty, which came i n t o f o r c e i n November 1993; and the fourth, 
leading to the r e v i s i n g Amsterdam Tr e a t y of 1997. I t w i l l , i n 
f a c t , be impossible t o understand the development of the EU 
without e x p l o r i n g these conferences which, i n Community Law, 
are the only ways i n which the Community and Union may be 
changed. 
The f i r s t IGC was c a l l e d as a r e s u l t of 
s e v e r a l p r e s s u r e s . One s i g n i f i c a n t p r e s s u r e arose from Lord 
C o c k f i e l d ' s white paper on the S i n g l e Market, which was 
endorsed by the Milan European Council i n June 1985. I t was 
c l e a r t h a t i f the S i n g l e Market was to be created, d e c i s i o n -
making procedures needed improving. Pres s u r e from the European 
Parliament for i n c r e a s e d powers, together with the prospect of 
Spain and Portugal j o i n i n g the EC, showed c l e a r l y t h a t 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l reform was urgently r e q u i r e d i f the EC was to 
avoid complete atrophy i n the f u t u r e . By January 1986 a d r a f t 
t r e a t y was ready, and a f t e r much delay, came i n t o being i n J u l y 
1987. 
The Act brought about a number of important 
changes f o r the EC. For the f i r s t time the European Council 
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became a formal p a r t of the Community's i n s t i t u t i o n s , though 
i t s d e f i n i t i o n remained vague. Pro c e d u r a l l y , the Treaty 
extended the areas i n which q u a l i f i e d m a j o r i t y voting (QMV) 
could be used, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n areas r e l a t i n g to the formation 
of the S i n g l e Market. G e n e r a l l y , only new p o l i c i e s r e q u i r e d 
unanimity; p o l i c y implementation could be voted on by QMV. The 
Act agreed co-operation and as s e n t procedures ( s e e above). SEA 
a l s o enhanced the powers of the European Court of J u s t i c e , and 
cre a t e d the Court of F i r s t I n s t a n c e , which was empowered to 
deal with cases i n a l i m i t e d scope, i n order to speed up 
European l e g a l p r ocesses. The S i n g l e European Act s e t 31st 
December 1992 as the f i n a l date f o r the c r e a t i o n of the S i n g l e 
Market. The t r e a t y a l s o included a r t i c l e s on cohesion, r e s e a r c h 
and technology and environmental p o l i c y . S i g n i f i c a n t l y , the 
Treaty formalised modes of European P o l i t i c a l Co-operation 
(EPC), which c a l l e d f or a j o i n t European Foreign P o l i c y , and 
c l o s e r c o l l a b o r a t i o n on defence and s e c u r i t y i s s u e s . 
Although the B r i t i s h government was opposed 
to i t , the Treaty r e s t a t e d t h a t the goal of the European 
Community was a European union, and t h a t the quest f o r economic 
and monetary union was a s t a t e d aim. " I n essence", says Urwin, 
"the S i n g l e European Act was an attempt to turn the EC towards 
the o r i g i n a l goal of a common market s e t out i n the Treaty of 
Rome."(40) So then, how important was the S i n g l e European Act? 
i n i t i a l l y , as Bainbridge and Teasdale 
observed, "The SEA f e l l f a r s h o r t of the European Parliament's 
hopes and was regarded as being only of t e c h n i c a l i n t e r e s t as 
an e x e r c i s e i n t i d y i n g up the T r e a t i e s . ( 4 1 ) I t heralded, f o r 
some, the r e o r i e n t a t i o n of the Community i n the B r i t i s h 
Government's free-market d i r e c t i o n ( 4 2 ) . Lord Howe commented 
th a t "This was indeed our [The Conservative P a r t y ' s ] c h i e f 
campaigning c r y - 'Thatcherism on a European s c a l e ' . " ( 4 3 ) The 
Cabinet and Prime M i n i s t e r approved of the compromise t h a t the 
SEA was b e l i e v e d to be. I t was, a t t h a t time seen as a l i m i t e d 
Act, b r i n g i n g a modest v i c t o r y f o r B r i t i s h diplomacy and 
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compromise which had s u b s t a n t i a l l y won f o r the Tory government 
what i t wanted. I n f a c t , with the b e n e f i t of h i n d - s i g h t and 
experience, I b e l i e v e t h a t W i s t r i c h ' s view was to be the more 
percepti v e , t h a t "The S i n g l e European Act marked a major step 
forward i n the process of European i n t e g r a t i o n . " ( 4 4 ) 
i t was t o have f a r reaching consequences 
because i t r e a s s e r t e d and extended the r o l e of q u a l i f i e d 
m a j o r i t y voting, which seemed to undermine the Luxembourg 
Compromise of 1966 (see p.26), and the r h e t o r i c of the Treaty 
r e k i n d l e d the a s p i r a t i o n f o r a f u l l European Union. I n a l i t t l e 
over a year a f t e r the commencement of the SEA Margaret Thatcher 
gave her 'Bruges Speech' i n which she "appeared to repudiate 
the commitment i n the S i n g l e European Act to the European 
Union, pre s e n t i n g i n s t e a d the n e o - G a u l l i s t idea of a Europe of 
independent s t a t e s . . . " ( 4 5 ) thus, g i v i n g vent and focus to the 
d i v i s i o n s i n the Conservative Party over Europe which have 
become a f i s s u r e i n the 1990's. 
I t does seem, n e v e r t h e l e s s , t h a t a t f i r s t 
the SEA was seen as a t e c h n i c a l e x e r c i s e , and t h a t most d i d not 
see the " p o t e n t i a l f o r r e v o l u t i o n " - i n c l u d i n g Margaret 
Thatcher. I n f a c t , though, i t was to be r e v o l u t i o n a r y ( i f such 
a r e v o l u t i o n could take p l a c e v i r t u a l l y un-noticed). I t was 
e q u a l l y c l e a r t h a t when the second IGC began, any proposals 
would be r i g o r o u s l y thought through, and argued over. 
I n many ways the S i n g l e European Act was 
enacted a t a high-water mark i n European Community a f f a i r s . 
Europe was enjoying an economic boom and B r i t a i n appeared to be 
co-operating i n the EC a f t e r the settlement of the budgetary 
dispute. The S i n g l e European Act appeared t o be a focus f o r 
both of these elements. Conversely, the Maastricht Treaty was 
p a i n f u l l y enacted a t a low-water mark f o r EC a f f a i r s . Communism 
had c o l l a p s e d i n the c e n t r a l and e a s t e r n European s t a t e s . The 
optimism i t had generated was q u i c k l y replaced with a 
resurgence i n n a t i o n a l i s m and neo-Nazism, which seemed to 
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undermine a l i b e r a l Europe. Economically, Europe was now i n 
r e c e s s i o n . The ' f e e l good f a c t o r ' of the mid-eighties had gone. 
The T E U began i t s tortuous passage through the EC's l e g i s l a t i v e 
processes i n these d i f f i c u l t circumstances, augmented, not 
l e a s t , by the scope and complexity of the Treaty. 
The T r e a t y on European union (TEU) r e s u l t e d 
from two p a r a l l e l inter-governmental conferences: one on 
economic and monetary union guided by finance m i n i s t e r s , and 
the second on European P o l i t i c a l Union, l a r g e l y guided by EC 
f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s . The economics IGC s e t out the three stages 
f o r EMU which I have o u t l i n e d on pages 43 and 44. The B r i t i s h 
Government obtained an opt-out: i t could chose whether to s i g n 
up to Stage 3 or not; Denmark was permitted by the Edinburgh 
Summit of December 1992 to have a permanent opt-out of Stage 3. 
The ' p o l i t i c a l ' IGC l e d to f a r reaching 
changes for the EC, as i t made e x p l i c i t once more the 
determination of the EC to work towards ever c l o s e r union. The 
Competence of the Community was extended i n t o new are a s , such 
as c u l t u r e , education and v o c a t i o n a l t r a i n i n g ; consumer 
p r o t e c t i o n , i n d u s t r i a l p o l i c y and environmental p o l i c y ; as w e l l 
as trans-European networks, and a i d p o l i c i e s . However, at the 
i n s i s t e n c e of the B r i t i s h Government the S o c i a l Chapter of the 
D r a f t Treaty, so much the Conservatives' bete noire, was 
b e l i e v e d to be "quite simply a s o c i a l i s t c h a r t e r - devised by 
s o c i a l i s t s i n the Commission and favoured predominantly by 
s o c i a l i s t s t a t e s . " ( 4 6 ) I n s t e a d , the other 11 EC members agreed 
a Protocol on S o c i a l P o l i c y . As I have al r e a d y o u t l i n e d , the 
Treaty enhanced the powers of the European Parliament, and 
extended the scope of d e c i s i o n s t h a t could be taken by 
q u a l i f i e d m a j o r i t y v oting. Major a d d i t i o n s to the nature of the 
EU were the s o - c a l l e d " p i l l a r s " t h a t were c r e a t e d . The TEU 
envisaged a European Union made up of three ' p i l l a r s ' , the 
f i r s t , the i n s t i t u t i o n s of the European Community, the 
supranational element. The second two p i l l a r s were to be i n t e r -
governmental s t r u c t u r e s , c r e a t i n g j u s t i c e and home a f f a i r s , 
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and Common Foreign and S e c u r i t y P o l i c y " p i l l a r s ' . Although i n 
one sense the two new p i l l a r s widened the scope of the European 
Union, g i v i n g credence to the charge made by some of the 
c r e a t i o n of a European ' s u p e r - s t a t e 1 , i n f a c t the r o l e of the 
Commission and European Parliament i s very r e s t r i c t e d . The 
Council of M i n i s t e r s and European Council remain i n the 
ascendant i n these a r e a s . 
I f i t can be s a i d t h a t there are any two 
concepts which help t o de f i n e the t r e a t y and antagonise i t s 
opponents, these are the concepts of f e d e r a l i s m and 
s u b s i d i a r i t y . I n n e g o t i a t i o n , the B r i t i s h government i n s i s t e d 
t h a t a l l r e f e r e n c e s to a f e d e r a l Europe were to be omitted from 
the Treaty. Any overt r e f e r e n c e to f e d e r a l i s m would have been 
c l e a r l y p o l i t i c a l l y e x p l o s i v e i n B r i t a i n . I n s t e a d , the 
p r i n c i p l e of s u b s i d i a r i t y was enshrined i n the Maas t r i c h t 
Treaty. O f f i c i a l l y , "This p r i n c i p l e purports t h a t the Community 
should deal only with those matters i t i s b e t t e r equipped to 
deal with than the Member S t a t e s and the r e g i o n a l and l o c a l 
a u t h o r i t i e s . " ( 4 7 ) Noting the irony, however, W i s t r i c h r e f l e c t e d 
t h a t "The p r i n c i p l e of s u b s i d i a r i t y has r e i n f o r c e d i t s f e d e r a l 
nature by d e f i n i n g the d i s t r i b u t i o n of powers between the 
European and n a t i o n a l l e v e l s of government."(49) As I s h a l l 
argue i n chapter 5, however, the p r i n c i p l e of s u b s i d i a r i t y has 
f a r wider i m p l i c a t i o n s than t h a t . 
Although the Treaty may w e l l be 
fundamentally l e s s r a d i c a l than the S i n g l e European Act, the 
r e s u l t s of the Maastricht Treaty were f a r more p o l i t i c a l l y 
e x p l o s i v e . 
A c o n s i d e r a b l e weakness of the Tre a t y 
(though t h i s has been considered i t s g r e a t e s t s t r e n g t h ) i s t h a t 
the M a a s t r i c h t Treaty i s s u s c e p t i b l e to v a s t l y d i f f e r i n g 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s which subsequently leave i t wide open to be so 
c a r i c a t u r e d as to be v i r t u a l l y two d i f f e r e n t T r e a t i e s ! For 
example, the Treaty was portrayed by the Major Government as 
pre s e r v i n g the r o l e and a n c i e n t h i s t o r i e s of the na t i o n s t a t e s . 
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At the same time the then p r e s i d e n t of the Commission, Jacques 
Delors, was p o r t r a y i n g the Maastricht Treaty as relaunching the 
Community. He repeatedly s t r e s s e d the f e d e r a l nature of the 
Treaty. I n a sense both are c o r r e c t , hence the ambiguity: the 
Treaty s t r e s s e s the p r i n c i p l e of s u b s i d i a r i t y (Major); i t a l s o 
created a more comprehensively f e d e r a l s t r u c t u r e ( D e l o r s ) . 
The attendant problem, i s the question of 
f e d e r a l i s m and i t s meaning. To Conservative " E u r o - s c e p t i c s " a 
f e d e r a l Europe i s anathema. I t i s synonymous with the end of 
the n a t i o n - s t a t e and n a t i o n a l and c u l t u r a l i d e n t i t y . Yet to 
others who l i v e i n a f e d e r a l s t r u c t u r e , such as i n the USA and 
Germany, a f e d e r a t i o n i s the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l means of ensuring a 
d e l i n e a t i o n of a u t h o r i t y and i d e n t i t y - the very p r i n c i p l e 
espoused by the p r i n c i p l e of s u b s i d i a r i t y . I t seems to me t h a t 
a weakness of the T r e a t y i s t h a t i n f a c t , i t does not have a 
thorough-going d e f i n i t i o n of i t s f e d e r a l g o a l s . Although i t 
might have been expedient - perhaps even e s s e n t i a l - to omit 
any r e f e r e n c e s to f e d e r a l i s m i n order f o r the Treaty of 
Maastricht to be r a t i f i e d , u n l e s s there i s a genuine debate 
t h a t i s not grounded i n v i t u p e r a t i v e polemics i t may be 
d i f f i c u l t for Europe to move forward i n any d i r e c t i o n . 
The element which should s u r e l y be 
applauded i n the T r e a t y i s the avowal of the p r i n c i p l e of 
s u b s i d i a r i t y , rooted as i t i s i n C a t h o l i c s o c i a l teaching (see 
chapters 4 and 5 ) , f o r , as Baroness Williams has contended, " I t 
i s a p r i n c i p l e t h a t s i t s w e l l with the emphases on empowering 
c i t i z e n s , b u i l d i n g p u b l i c and p r i v a t e p a r t n e r s h i p s , and working 
with non-governmental and community-based o r g a n i s a t i o n s t h a t 
c h a r a c t e r i s e so much contemporary p o l i t i c a l d i s c o u r s e . " ( 4 9 ) I t 
has i m p l i c a t i o n s not j u s t f o r the EC, but n a t i o n a l governments 
as w e l l . 
Another important f e a t u r e of the Treaty of 
Maastricht i s i t s e s s e n t i a l l y temporary nature. I t gave a 
mandate for an inter-governmental conference to begin i n 1996 
to make a thorough-going review of the EC T r e a t i e s , and where 
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the EU i s to go i n t o the new millenium. However, i t seems t h a t 
the Amsterdam Treaty has been a r e v i s i n g , r a t h e r than a 
r e v o l u t i o n a r y t r e a t y , which has f a i l e d to give much new 
v i s i o n a r y impetus. 
Perhaps the g r e a t e s t weakness of the 
Maastricht Treaty from the p u b l i c ' s point of view i s i t s 
language and format. As Teasdale and Bainbridge have noted, 
"However w e l l - i n t e n t i o n e d , a t r e a t y covering so many 
heterogeneous i s s u e s , some very s e n s i t i v e , negotiated l a r g e l y 
i n s e c r e t , and for the most p a r t u n i n t e l l i g i b l e to the general 
p u b l i c , could h a r d l y be expected to win f r i e n d s . " ( 5 0 ) . S u r e l y , 
t h a t i s a c r u c i a l problem (as I have a l l u d e d t o i n r e l a t i o n to 
the European P a r l i a m e n t ) . I f the general p u b l i c cannot have an 
e f f e c t i v e r a t i o n a l debate about the f u t u r e of Europe, i t i s 
again undemocratic. As C h u r c h i l l r e a l i s e d n e a r l y 50 years ago, 
Europe would be b u i l t by people's h e a r t s ( 5 1 ) . L a r g e l y 
speaking, i t has f a i l e d to do so. 
However one chooses to judge the Maastricht 
Treaty, what i s c l e a r i s t h a t i t aroused strong emotion. The 
r a t i f i c a t i o n process was fraught with d i f f i c u l t y . The Danish 
referendum voted 50.7% a g a i n s t r a t i f i c a t i o n . Only a f t e r 
s e c u r i n g a permanent opt-out from Stage 3 of EMU a t the 
Edinburgh Summit could Denmark r a t i f y the Treaty a f t e r a new 
referendum r e c e i v e d a vote of 56.8% i n favour. The referendum 
i n France c a l l e d by P r e s i d e n t Mitterand gained only a very 
narrow m a j o r i t y i n favour of r a t i f i c a t i o n , 51.05% voting 'yes'. 
I n Germany, the t r e a t y was r e f e r r e d to the German 
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Court f o r judgement. But i t was i n B r i t a i n t h a t 
the r a t i f i c a t i o n process was s t o r m i e s t . The passage of the B i l l 
through Parliament was t u r b u l e n t because the Labour Party had 
determined to cause as much d i f f i c u l t y as p o s s i b l e i n view of 
the S o c i a l Charter "opt-out". The small group of E u r o - s c e p t i c s 
i n the Conservative Party used the opportunity t o e x e r c i s e 
t h e i r d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e might to inconvenience the B i l l ' s 
passage. I t was not u n t i l a motion had been l i n k e d to a vote of 
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confidence i n the government, a f t e r what "was p o s s i b l y the 
most s e r i o u s parliamentary defeat s u f f e r e d by the Conservative 
Party t h i s c e n t u r y " ( 5 2 ) , t h a t the B i l l could pass i n t o law. 
Although the M a a s t r i c h t process was 
concluded by the enacting of the l e g i s l a t i o n the legacy of 
d i v i s i o n i t exposed i n the Conservative Party has not gone 
away. I t i s remarkable (though now not unusual) t h a t Norman 
Lamont, l e s s than a year a f t e r h i s r e s i g n a t i o n as C h a n c e l l o r of 
the Exchequer, openly d e f i e d Government P o l i c y when speaking to 
the Selsdon Group f r i n g e meeting a t the Party Conference i n 
1994, and considered the p o s s i b i l i t y of the UK l e a v i n g the EU. 
At the very l e a s t , he d e c l a r e d t h a t "The l e s s o n of M a a s t r i c h t 
i s t h a t the T o r i e s w i l l not go on down the road to a f e d e r a l 
Europe."(53). For E u r o - s c e p t i c s the M a a s t r i c h t T r e a t y was a 
"Treaty too f a r . " (54) 
Although Norman Lamont may r e f l e c t t h a t "We 
seemed to have j o i n e d a club very d i f f e r e n t from t h a t we had i n 
mind i n the e a r l y 1970's. The f o r c e s f o r p o l i t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n 
have proved stronger t h a t was f o r e s e e n " ( 5 5 ) , i n f a c t we should 
see the Treaty on European union as p a r t of the process of 
European i n t e g r a t i o n so espoused by Jean Monnet and Robert 
Schumann. Indeed, i t may be one of the i r o n i e s of h i s t o r y t h a t 
John Major i n s i s t e d t h a t the preamble of the Treaty should 
r e a f f i r m the T r e a t y of Rome's quest f o r "ever c l o s e r union". 
Such a Union was always envisaged as being both economic and 
p o l i t i c a l . Moreover, i t seems to me t h a t the c u r r e n t debate 
r e c a l l s the d i s c u s s i o n of the 1960s des c r i b e d i n chapter l : as 
B r i t a i n explored whether EFTA or EEC was the way i t wanted to 
t r a v e l . What the Maastricht T r e a t y has served to show once 
more, i s t h a t the i s s u e s surrounding the Union are s t i l l very 
much l i v e ones. The EU i s s t i l l p o l i t i c a l l y and i d e o l o g i c a l l y 
i n f l u x . Undoubtedly t h i s i s r e f l e c t e d i n the controversy which 
Europe has i l l u s t r a t e d i n the B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s i n 
p a r t i c u l a r . I t i s , t h e r e f o r e , necessary to explore more f u l l y , 
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the p l a c e of ideology i n B r i t a i n ' s p o l i t i c s to the i s s u e of 
Europe. 
As I have al r e a d y i l l u s t r a t e d , the B r i t i s h 
p o l i t i c a l approach to Europe s i n c e the Second World war was 
e s s e n t i a l l y pragmatic. P r a g m a t i c a l l y , Harold Macmillan sought 
B r i t i s h e ntry i n t o the EEC; Wilson followed s u i t . The 1970's 
and 1980's however, i n the main, witnessed a departure from 
t h i s p o s i t i o n . I t has, i t seems, reappeared i n the 1990's i n 
John Major's pragmatic ( i f pressured) approach to Europe. I f 
Edward Heath was, as has been suggested on p.29, the only 
B r i t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r t o be i n t e l l e c t u a l l y committed to the EC 
(56) Margaret Thatcher, h i s successor, was i n many ways h i s 
a n t i t h e s i s . For her p o l i t i c s was the p o l i t i c s of c o n v i c t i o n , 
not l e a s t i n her approach to Europe. 
At f i r s t , as we have seen, Thatcher 
appeared to be broadly n e u t r a l to Europe a t f i r s t , keeping out 
of the l i m e l i g h t i n the 1975 referendum debate. At times she 
even appeared to be moderately 'pro-European 1, i n d i c a t i n g her 
w i l l i n g n e s s to j o i n the ERM 'when the time was r i p e ' . As her 
memoirs r e v e a l , " I sought a t the s t a r t to strengthen our 
'European c r e d e n t i a l s ' , we Conservatives were welcomed i n 
Strasbourg because we were seen as more pro-European than 
Labour..." However, concerning j o i n i n g the ERM, she added, " I 
a l r e a d y had doubts about the wisdom of t h i s course..."(57) 
Although she appeared to be more "pro-European than Labour" a t 
f i r s t , by the end of her premiership, as Heath was synonymous 
with Euro-enthusiasm, so Thatcher became synonymous with a n t i -
Europeanism. T h i s was seen, i n the popular mind, as Thatcher 
h e r s e l f records, as "a narrow, n o s t a l g i c n a t i o n a l i s t who could 
not bear to see the feudal trappings of B r i t a i n ' s and en regime 
crumble to dust l i k e Miss Haversham's wedding cake, when the 
s u n l i g h t of Europe's r a t i o n a l modernity was turned upon them." 
(58) How d i d such a marked change come about, and B r i t a i n 
C h a p t e r 2 P a g e 63 
f u r t h e r become known f o r p o l i t i c a l awkwardness? 
One important c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of Thatcher's 
approach to p o l i t i c s was c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l i s m . For her, consensus 
and compromise were repugnant. The ' B u t s k e l l i s t ' approach to 
post-war consensus p o l i t i c s i n B r i t a i n had, i n her mind "shaped 
and d i s t o r t e d B r i t i s h s o c i e t y " ( 5 9 ) . when the B r i t i s h Budgetary 
Question was faced, Thatcher was t y p i c a l l y pugnacious, i n s t a r k 
c o n t r a s t to Geoffrey Howe, her then c h a n c e l l o r , who "came to be 
seen as the soft-cop i n c o n t r a s t to the hard-cop persona t h a t 
enfolded Margaret Thatcher's championship of our case."(60) 
Such a persona, w h i l s t s u c c e s s f u l i n some circumstances, not 
l e a s t i n s e c u r i n g a more e q u i t a b l e f i n a n c i a l settlement f o r 
B r i t a i n , could a l s o be counter-productive. For example, d e s p i t e 
there being widespread support f o r a r e n e g o t i a t i o n of B r i t a i n ' s 
budgetary c o n t r i b u t i o n s , Thatcher's s t y l e was so a b r a s i v e t h a t 
she "thus performed the considerable f e a t of u n n e c e s s a r i l y 
i r r i t a t i n g two b i g c o u n t r i e s , three small ones and the 
Commission w i t h i n her opening hour of performance a t a European 
Counci l . " ( 6 1 ) F i n a l l y , she f e l t forced to thr e a t e n to withhold 
B r i t i s h payments to the EC. Only a f t e r years of wrangling was a 
s o l u t i o n to the B r i t i s h budgetary question e v e n t u a l l y agreed a t 
the Fontainbleau Summit of June 1984. 
Again, i n 1987, a new b a s i s f o r EC funding, 
reforming the CAP and i n c r e a s i n g r e s e a r c h funding was proposed, 
but the European Council of June 1987 ended i n confusion 
because Thatcher vetoed the proposal, even though the d r a f t 
communique " i n the opinion of many observers went much f u r t h e r 
to meet her demands than i t d i d t o meet anybody e l s e ' s . " ( 6 2 ) 
Compromise was, f o r Margaret Thatcher, anathema. I n Europe, 
where the method of p o l i t i c a l operating (and e s p e c i a l l y 
European p o l i c y ) , was a r r i v e d a t by consensus, i t i n c r e a s e d 
B r i t a i n ' s p e r c e i v e d awkwardness. I n t h a t important sense, Mrs 
Thatcher was not ' c o m m u n a u t a i r e ' . 
A l l i e d to her a b r a s i v e c h a r a c t e r , Margaret 
Thatcher was a l s o convinced i n the Tightness of her own views. 
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As John Cole observed, by the time Thatcher l e f t o f f i c e , "She 
now b e l i e v e d t h a t she knew b e t t e r than almost anyone what was 
r i g h t and what was wrong. "(63) I t i s a c o n v i c t i o n which i s 
r e f l e c t e d i n her memoirs. She was "convinced not j u s t t h a t I 
was r i g h t about the way forward f o r Europe, but confident t h a t 
i f the Government and Party I l e d kept t h e i r nerve we would be 
v i n d i c a t e d by i n t e l l e c t u a l developments and i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
events."(64) Such s e l f - b e l i e f precluded any achievement of 
consensus. Her f i r s t volume of memoirs, The Downing S t r e e t 
Years, c e r t a i n l y l eaves l i t t l e room f o r an a l t e r n a t i v e view. 
Such a c e r t i t u d e u l t i m a t e l y l e d to the r e s i g n a t i o n of Nigel 
Lawson and Geoffrey Howe from her Cabinet, which p r e c i p i t a t e d 
her own downfall i n November 1990. 
When exp l o r i n g her a t t i t u d e towards Europe, 
i t i s a l s o necessary to examine Margaret Thatcher's b e l i e f i n 
B r i t a i n . One of her heroes was Winston C h u r c h i l l "for whom my 
admiration... now knew no bounds." (65) I n some ways there i s a 
l e g i t i m a t e p a r a l l e l to be made between the two. One was t h e i r 
shared pugnacity of c h a r a c t e r . Another was t h e i r grand view of 
B r i t a i n ' s r o l e and p l a c e i n the world. R e c a l l i n g her youth, 
Thatcher wrote, " I have to admit t h a t I had the p a t r i o t i c 
c o n v i c t i o n t h a t , given great l e a d e r s h i p of the s o r t I heard 
from Winston C h u r c h i l l . . . t h e r e was almost nothing t h a t the 
B r i t i s h people could not do."(66) T h i s a t t i t u d e was r e f l e c t e d 
i n her b e l i e f t h a t " B r i t a i n was the most s t a b l e and developed 
democracy i n Europe..." and t h e r e f o r e , "we had perhaps the most 
to l o s e from these [ s c . f e d e r a l ] developments."(67). T h i s 
c r e a t e d an arrogant view of the B r i t i s h system, and, 
conversely, a condescension towards other s t a t e s : " I f you have 
no r e a l confidence i n the p o l i t i c a l system or p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s 
of your own county you are bound to be more t o l e r a n t of 
fo r e i g n e r s of manifest i n t e l l i g e n c e , a b i l i t y and i n t e g r i t y l i k e 
M. Delors t e l l i n g you how to run your a f f a i r s . Or to put i t 
more b l u n t l y , i f I were an I t a l i a n , I might p r e f e r r u l e from 
B r u s s e l s too. But the mood i n B r i t a i n was d i f f e r e n t . I sensed 
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i t . . . " ( 6 8 ) Consequently, any European i n f l u e n c e would be 
r e s i s t e d . 
S i g n i f i c a n t l y , though, Thatcher d i f f e r e d 
from her hero. Whereas C h u r c h i l l was a p a s s i o n a t e b e l i e v e r i n 
' B r i t i s h n e s s 1 and the B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l system, he a l s o 
supported and encouraged the development of post-war European 
i n t e g r a t i o n . Although he was t i e d emotionally and 
i n t e l l e c t u a l l y to the Commonwealth and the United S t a t e s 
r a t h e r than to Europe, he d i s p l a y e d an i n t e l l e c t u a l f l e x i b i l i t y 
towards Europe t h a t escaped Margaret Thatcher, thus g i v i n g 
credence to her own c a r i c a t u r e of her n a t i o n a l i s m (see p. 63). 
Both C h u r c h i l l and Thatcher, did, however, 
share the view t h a t the c e n t r a l p o l i t i c a l a l l i a n c e must be with 
the USA. Thatcher b e l i e v e d t h a t " I f America remains the 
dominant partner i n a u n i t e d West, then the west can continue 
to be the dominant power i n the world as a whole." 
S i g n i f i c a n t l y , " B r i t a i n ' s r o l e i n such a s t r u c t u r e would, I 
b e l i e v e , be a d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y i n f l u e n t i a l one."(69) She thus 
concluded her notorious Bruges Speech of 1988 by saying, "Let 
us have a Europe which p l a y s i t s f u l l p a r t i n the wider world, 
which looks outward and not inward, and which p r e s e r v e s the 
A t l a n t i c Community - t h a t Europe on both s i d e s of the A t l a n t i c 
which i s our noblest i n h e r i t a n c e and our g r e a t e s t 
s t r e n g t h . " ( 7 0 ) 
E q u a l l y c r u c i a l f o r understanding 
Thatcher's a c t i o n s on Europe, i s her a t t i t u d e towards Europe 
i t s e l f . I n many ways they r e f l e c t the a t t i t u d e s of the 1960s. 
S t r u c t u r a l l y , Thatcher i s a G a u l l i s t . For her Europe should 
develop not as a ' f e d e r a l i s t s u p e r - s t a t e " but as a "Europe des 
pa tries", where the n a t i o n - s t a t e i s paramount, and European 
i n t e g r a t i o n i s no more than co-operation. Moreover, i t s 
e s s e n t i a l aim should not be t o f o s t e r p o l i t i c a l or c u l t u r a l 
i n t e g r a t i o n , but simply be a modified v e r s i o n of the European 
Free Trade Area, i n t h i s l i g h t i t i s p o s s i b l e t o understand her 
support of the S i n g l e European Act of 1986, and her opposition 
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to the Maastricht Treaty. T h i s A t l a n t i c i s t , a n t i - f e d e r a l i s t , 
f r e e - t r a d e approach to the f u t u r e of Europe was s e t out i n what 
may w e l l be her abiding i d e o l o g i c a l statement and c o n t r i b u t i o n 
t o the debate on the f u t u r e of Europe, the Bruges Speech of 
1988. 
The Bruges speech caused c o n s t e r n a t i o n and 
confusion f o r B r i t i s h p o l i c y towards Europe. Howe b e l i e v e d t h a t 
at t h a t point "The p a r t y was e f f e c t i v e l y being s p l i t by the 
d e f e c t i o n of i t s own l e a d e r . " ( 7 1 ) I n my b e l i e f , however, such 
a judgement i s u n f a i r . The Prime M i n i s t e r 'defected' i n the 
sense of turning a g a i n s t her own government's p o l i c y , but i n 
another way, she simply gave oxygen to those who were 'Euro-
s c e p t i c ' i n the Conservative Party, i n t h a t r e s p e c t , she was 
not so much d e f e c t i n g , as r e f l e c t i n g the views of a wing of her 
party. One person's d e f e c t i o n i s another's strong l e a d e r s h i p ! 
The f u l l e f f e c t of such a p o s i t i o n , was seen during the 1992-
1997 Major a d m i n i s t r a t i o n which e v e n t u a l l y l o s t i t s 
parliamentary m a j o r i t y . 
I n s h o r t , Margaret Thatcher's i d e o l o g i c a l 
goal was not a united Europe, but a free-market, pro-American, 
a n t i - s o c i a l i s t B r i t a i n , i n s p i r e d by her b e l i e f i n the 
s u p e r i o r i t y of B r i t a i n , and b o l s t e r e d by an a s t o n i s h i n g s e l f -
confidence t h a t became arrogant towards the end of her 
premiership. What seems to me to be most s i g n i f i c a n t , i s t h a t 
Thatcher's ideology c l a s h e d fundamentally w i t h Europe when i t 
moved beyond a merely economic, f r e e trade area. She d i d not 
have the i n t e l l e c t u a l or personal f l e x i b i l i t y t o work t o modify 
i t . Her approach was t o stop the change, and to oppose any h i n t 
of compromise. I t i s no coincidence t h a t as Europe pursued 
c l o s e r p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l co-operation as w e l l as economic 
co-operation, she became more and more opposed t o Europe, i t 
was t h i s i n c r e a s i n g i n t e l l e c t u a l and emotional antipathy 
towards Europe which l e d to Howe's r e s i g n a t i o n , and her 
subsequent l o s s of o f f i c e . She was, e v e n t u a l l y , impaled by her 
ideology towards Europe, amongst other i s s u e s . 
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Thatcher's legacy concerning Europe, has 
t h e r e f o r e been one which has made p u b l i c the s e r i o u s d i v i s i o n s 
w i t h i n her own party concerning Europe. I t has a l s o been one 
which has challenged the d i r e c t i o n , the pre-suppositions of 
Europe. I n t h a t sense i t has been c r e a t i v e . The very longevity 
of her premiership, though, meant t h a t any 'fr e e t h i n k i n g ' on a 
developing i s s u e was going t o be dangerous p o l i t i c a l l y both to 
her and her party. The enduring legacy of Thatcher's 
i d e o l o g i c a l and c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l approach to Europe has been 
th a t B r i t a i n i s seen to be the awkward, i f not tempestuous 
partner i n Europe. Helen Wallace has concluded t h a t " i n 1985 a 
number of other Europeans were prepared to work hard to keep 
the B r i t i s h on s i d e and on the i n s i d e . That w i l l i n g n e s s and 
commitment can no longer be assumed..."(72) would Mrs 
Thatcher's Bruges Speech have caused so much consternation, i f 
she had been more temperate towards Europe? Who knows? The 
turbulence experienced by the Major a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , himself a 
pragmatist i n the Macmillan and Wilson mould, has hardly put 
B r i t a i n " a t the hea r t of Europe" however much t h a t may have 
been h i s hope. The enduring legacy of the Thatcher ideology may 
w e l l be m a r g i n a l i s a t i o n f o r years to come. I t remains to be 
seen whether the p o s i t i v e r h e t o r i c of the B l a i r government w i l l 
fundamentally improve B r i t a i n ' s r e l a t i o n s w i t h the r e s t of the 
EU. 
To conclude, then, i n t h i s chapter 
concerned with B r i t i s h membership of the EC, we have seen 
B r i t a i n p e r s i s t e n t l y perceived as being awkward. B r i t i s h 
European P o l i c y has been dominated by the i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c s of 
the i n d i v i d u a l p a r t i e s , which have not favoured an easy 
r e l a t i o n s h i p with the r e s t of the EC. We have a l s o seen many 
developments w i t h i n the EC, which have r e f l e c t e d d i f f e r e n c e s i n 
aims f o r Europe between B r i t a i n and other EC members, notably 
i n the p r e s s u r e f o r the achievement of economic and monetary 
union. We have seen an expansion i n areas of EC competence, as 
the process of work towards a European union progressed. 
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We have a l s o examined a Community which i s 
f a r from p e r f e c t . The questions surrounding the European 
Parliament and EMU, as we have seen beg important p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
questions about the future of the EU, which need to be 
re s o l v e d . Both areas have been problematic f o r B r i t i s h 
p o l i t i c i a n s , i n a r e a l sense, B r i t a i n i s s t i l l a marginal 
member of the EU, a f t e r 23 y e a r s of membership. Before 
exploring the B r i t i s h Church's r e l a t i o n s h i p to Europe, i t would 
be p r o f i t a b l e to review b r i e f l y , the main developments I have 
noted, s i n c e 1940. 
At the beginning of 1940 as I have shown 
i n Chapter 1, B r i t a i n was very much the hope f o r the f r e e 
world. At f i r s t i t seemed t h a t B r i t a i n was going to be a p l a c e 
of r a d i c a l v i s i o n f o r a post-war Europe. At the highe s t 
echelons of Government a f e d e r a l union had been spoken of but, 
as we have seen, t h i s was seen as a ploy to keep an a l l y 
f i g h t i n g . Nevertheless, a t the end of the war, i t seemed 
inco n c e i v a b l e t h a t the United Kingdom could ever be remote from 
Europe again. At the same time, the p o l i t i c i a n s who would be a t 
the helm of Western European post-war r e c o n s t r u c t i o n were 
beginning to dream of a new Europe, f r e e and more uni t e d . 
Unlike the League of Nations, a u n i t e d Europe needed strong 
backing: i t needed l e g a l enforcement, and by i m p l i c a t i o n 
required the ceding of n a t i o n a l sovereignty to a s u p r a n a t i o n a l 
body. But above a l l , the post-war western European p o l i t i c i a n s 
seemed to have a v i s i o n f o r a new Europe, t h a t went beyond the 
c r e a t i o n of new p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e s . The v i s i o n had four main 
t e n e t s : permanent peace, r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , and 
the i n c r e a s e i n m a t e r i a l p r o s p e r i t y f o r a l l i t s c i t i z e n s . I n 
short, Europe was coming to r e a l i s e t h a t i t s f u t u r e was b e t t e r 
served by working together. Only a deeper l e v e l of co-operation 
seemed to se r v e these aims. And i n the l i g h t of the League of 
Nations' f a i l u r e , t h i s seemed to suggest the need f o r a 
supranational s t r u c t u r e . 
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i n my opinion, the post-war process of 
i n t e g r a t i o n and co-operation i n western Europe has been 
a s t o n i s h i n g l y s u c c e s s f u l i n a c h i e v i n g i t s four aims. With the 
t r a g i c exception of Y u g o s l a v i a and mindful of the post-war 
stalemate caused by the 'Cold war', Europe has enjoyed 50 years 
of peace i n the west. Moreover, i t i s h i g h l y u n l i k e l y t h a t 
Germany and France would have achieved so deep a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n 
had i t not been fo r the v i s i o n of men such as Schumann, Monnet, 
and Adenauer which was symbolised i n the 1963 Franco-German 
Treaty of F r i e n d s h i p . Undoubtedly such s t a b i l i t y has been the 
bedrock to m a t e r i a l p r o s p e r i t y which the c i t i z e n s of member 
s t a t e s have enjoyed. I t i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t i n the post-Cold 
War world c e n t r a l and e a s t e r n European s t a t e s are seeking 
membership of the European Union as a means of perpetuating the 
years of peace, r e c o n c i l i a t i o n and p r o s p e r i t y . Yet the B r i t i s h 
a t t i t u d e has been p e r s i s t e n t l y problematic. Why i s t h i s ? 
H i s t o r y has played a major p a r t i n d e f i n i n g 
our n a t i o n a l consciousness, and we a r e s t i l l , 50 y e a r s a f t e r 
world War I I , i n the process of coming to terms with our 
l i m i t e d world r o l e . We have s t i l l not c o n s c i o u s l y become 
"European", r a t h e r we are s t i l l " B r i t i s h , and members of the 
Common Market" to many. Moreover, as I have shown, the reasons 
for B r i t a i n applying to j o i n the EEC were r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t 
from those of the o r i g i n a l S i x . Our reason f o r membership was, 
and i s , pragmatic and economic. We wanted to j o i n because we 
wanted the g r e a t e r m a t e r i a l p r o s p e r i t y t h a t the EEC seemed to 
o f f e r . I n t h i s way, we have only had one of the four reasons 
for co-operation and i n t e g r a t i o n . We have j o i n e d , to put i t 
crudely, f o r the money, but without the v i s i o n of Monnet, 
Adenauer, Schuman, S p i n e l l i , Spaak, even C h u r c h i l l . As Geoffrey 
Howe remarked i n h i s r e s i g n a t i o n speech - i n e f f e c t summing up 
the B r i t i s h pragmatic approach to Europe - " I am not a Euro-
i d e a l i s t or f e d e r a l i s t . My concern i s l e s s w ith grand schemes 
than with immediate r e a l i t i e s , as they a f f e c t our w e l l - b e i n g 
and prospects as a nation."(73) U n t i l we move beyond pragmatism 
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alone and catch a v i s i o n f o r EU membership, we w i l l , I b e l i e v e 
always be on the p h y s i c a l , i n t e l l e c t u a l and emotional edge of 
Europe. As Wallace has p e r c e p t i v e l y commented, "For B r i t a i n to 
be a t the he a r t of Europe would r e q u i r e Europe to be i n the 
hea r t s of the B r i t i s h . " ( 7 4 ) . As i t i s , Norman Lamont may be 
c o r r e c t i n suggesting t h a t the d i r e c t i o n f o r f u t u r e i n t e g r a t i o n 
i n Europe " i s not two speeds a t a l l . I t i s two completely 
d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n s " i . e . the B r i t i s h view, and the European 
view. (75) 
Another key reason, i t seems to me, why 
B r i t a i n has been mar g i n a l i s e d has been because domestic 
p o l i t i c s played a r e s t r a i n i n g , indeed damaging, r o l e i n B r i t i s h 
European p o l i t i c s . Even a t the out s e t , with the foundation of 
the ECSC, as I have noted, the Cabinet r e a l i s e d t h a t 
p o l i t i c a l l y i t was impossible t o j o i n the ECSC when the coal 
and s t e e l i n d u s t r i e s had j u s t been n a t i o n a l i s e d , because of the 
b e l i e f t h a t t h i s would th r e a t e n the demise of those i n d u s t r i e s . 
When B r i t a i n j o i n e d the Community, the i n t e r n a l s t r i f e t a k i n g 
p l a c e i n the Labour Party ensured t h a t the Wilson governments, 
and to some extent the Callaghan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , were l i m i t e d 
i n t h e i r a b i l i t y to work i n and with Europe. T h i s trend, of 
course, has been mirrored by the machinations of the 
Conservative Party. 
Although, from the outset, Margaret 
Thatcher was not as I have shown a 'Euro-enthusiast', her 
e a r l i e r r o l e was c o n s t r u c t i v e , and her t e n a c i t y i n the fac e of 
the budgetary question has won p l a u d i t s . But as her 
ad m i n i s t r a t i o n continued, d e s p i t e having a Cabinet i n which 
strong 'pro-Europeans' had prominent p o r t f o l i o s , such as 
Geoffrey Howe a t the Foreign O f f i c e and Nigel Lawson a t the 
Treasury, her p o s i t i o n became f a r more dogmatic and a b r a s i v e . 
Her r e j e c t i o n of the membership of the exchange r a t e mechanism, 
her i n c r e a s i n g obsession with n a t i o n a l i s m and sovereignty and 
so on, brought her i n t o i n c r e a s i n g c o n f l i c t with European 
p a r t n e r s , and with members of her own Cabinet. Such an 
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a b r a s i v e s t y l e and s t r i d e n t anti-Europeanism u l t i m a t e l y l e d to 
Geoffrey Howe's r e s i g n a t i o n i n November 1990, and p r e c i p i t a t e d 
a challenge to her l e a d e r s h i p . 
I t seemed, however, t h a t when John Major 
became Prime M i n i s t e r , such anti-European r h e t o r i c had been put 
as i d e . John Major c a l l e d f o r B r i t a i n to be "at the heart of 
Europe", and h i s p o l i c y seemed aimed a t h e a l i n g the wounds 
i n f l i c t e d by Margaret Thatcher. A l l t h a t , however, seems to 
have been only temporary. A f t e r winning the 1992 e l e c t i o n with 
only a t i n y parliamentary m a j o r i t y , once more the i n t e r n a l 
s t r u g g l e s of the Conservative Party came to dominate our 
r e l a t i o n s w ith Europe. Through the "def e c t i o n of i t s own 
leade r " as Howe described Thatcher, a st r a n d of anti-Europeans 
has been able to i n f l i c t s e r i o u s wounds upon Major's European 
p o l i c y , most s p e c t a c u l a r l y i n the temporary defeat of the 
Maastricht B i l l i n the House of Commons. T h i s w i t h e r i n g e f f e c t 
l e d to Major's i n c r e a s i n g l y h o s t i l e stance towards Europe. As 
we have seen, i n September 1993, Major wrote a staunch defence 
of B r i t a i n ' s p o s i t i o n i n Europe, and of h i s d e s i r e to see 
Europe enlarged ( 7 6 ) . I n j u s t over two ye a r s , the r h e t o r i c had 
become n o t i c e a b l y more " E u r o - s c e p t i c a l " . I n h i s a r t i c l e i n the 
D a i l y Telegraph on 18th December 1995, although s t a t i n g t h a t 
"My agenda [ a t the Madrid Summit] was simple: t o help t o 
shape a Europe t h a t succeeds and i n which B r i t a i n can succeed", 
i t was necessary f o r B r i t a i n , "to continue to r a i s e the 
d i f f i c u l t questions". Far from o f f e r i n g a v i s i o n , or 
suggestions, Major was reduced t o asking questions, as i f 
B r i t a i n was s t i l l on the outsi d e w a i t i n g to j o i n . Moreover, h i s 
r h e t o r i c was a n t a g o n i s t i c towards the EU. I n a s t e r n warning 
from EU Commissioner, S i r Leon B r i t t a n , wrote of the danger of 
pandering to E u r o - s c e p t i c s and not being more p o s i t i v e about 
Europe ( 7 7 ) . I t may w e l l be the case, t h a t u n l e s s there can be 
a b i - p a r t i s a n approach to European questions - and t h i s seems 
h i g h l y u n l i k e l y to be achieved because B r i t a i n ' s membership i n 
Europe has pragmatic r a t h e r than i d e o l o g i c a l o r i g i n s - such 
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i n t e r n a l p a rty squabbling w i l l continue to s e r i o u s l y damage the 
h e a l t h of B r i t a i n ' s p o s i t i o n i n Europe. 
I t i s easy, however, to say t h a t B r i t a i n ' s 
r e l a t i o n s h i p has been wholly negative, and d e s t r u c t i v e . T h i s , 
as we have a l s o seen, has not been the case. Although 
t e n a c i o u s l y arguing f o r budgetary changes, Thatcher and Howe 
helped to p r e s s for a more j u s t and permanent budgetary 
settlement. The B r i t i s h EC commissioner, Lord C o c k f i e l d , was 
instrumental i n s e t t i n g out the plan f o r economic i n t e g r a t i o n 
leading to the S i n g l e European Act of 1986, and f o r the g r e a t e r 
l i b e r a l i s a t i o n of trade, which had, s i n c e EFTA days, been a 
keen B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t . B r i t a i n has been r e l a t i v e l y e f f e c t i v e i n 
implementing EU p o l i c y and law once i t had been made, more so, 
some would suggest than other members. And, perhaps most 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y , B r i t a i n a t times remembered the b e n e f i t of 
using the language of the community i n order to get i t s own 
way. For example, Stephen George c i t e s the example of the 
concept of S u b s i d i a r i t y w i t h i n the Treaty of Maastricht, as a 
method of safe-guarding B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s as the government 
sees i t , w h i l s t using the language of co-operation ( 7 8 ) . 
We may n e v e r t h e l e s s conclude t h a t B r i t a i n 
i s , i n the t i t l e of Stephen George's book, j u s t i f i a b l y c a l l e d , 
"An Awkward Partner". T h i s has been the case s i n c e 1973, but i t 
s u r e l y r e f l e c t s the e n t i r e post-war period. Despite p o l i c y 
o b j e c t i v e s being achieved, and p o s i t i v e approaches i n Europe 
being made, r i g h t to the present time, the abiding impression 
i s of a r e l u c t a n t Europeanism. Membership of the EU, s t i l l 
needs to be consolidated i n B r i t i s h p o l i t i c s , and i n the 
B r i t i s h mind, i f t h a t i s to change permanently. T h i s i s c r u c i a l 
i n view of the many i n s t i t u t i o n a l changes we have seen s i n c e 
1973, such as the development of EMU, the S i n g l e European Act, 
and the Treaty on European Union. 
So then, how have the churches i n B r i t a i n 
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r e l a t e d t o Europe? I s h a l l examine t h i s question i n my next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3: E N G L I S H CHURCH ENGAGEMENT 
WITH EUROPE: 1 9 3 9 - 1 9 7 2 
By the Middle Ages Europe and C h r i s t i a n i t y 
had become v i r t u a l l y synonymous. Although Europe i s now a 
m u l t i - c u l t u r a l and m u l t i - f a i t h continent, the Church has 
continued to be i n t e r e s t e d i n the "world", even i n a post-
Christendom Europe. For B r i t a i n , and i n p a r t i c u l a r E n g l i s h 
C h r i s t i a n i t y , t h ere i s a long h i s t o r y of an i n t e r - c o n n e c t i o n 
between C h r i s t i a n i t y and S t a t e p o l i t i c s . The Church of England 
was forged i n the c r u c i b l e of controversy between the E n g l i s h 
King and the Pope, becoming a Church which i s both C a t h o l i c and 
Reformed. The Roman C a t h o l i c Church i n England has had a 
tu r b u l e n t h i s t o r y of persecution, i n t o l e r a n c e and e v e n t u a l l y 
grudging acceptance. The Free Churches have often been involved 
i n r a d i c a l p o l i t i c s , not l e a s t i n the formation of the Labour 
Party. I n f a c t , i n European terms, the denominational s t r u c t u r e 
i s unique: there i s no p a r a l l e l i n mainland Europe between the 
t r i - p a r t i t e Church composition of E s t a b l i s h e d Church (of 
England), Roman C a t h o l i c and Free Church outside of the B r i t i s h 
i s l e s ( l ) . As chapters l and 2 showed a d i s t i n c t i v e B r i t i s h 
p o l i t i c a l outlook ( e s p e c i a l l y towards Europe), now I s h a l l a l s o 
show t h a t B r i t a i n has i t s own p e c u l i a r Church i d e n t i t y , 
experiences and i n s i g h t s . I n the next two chapters, I s h a l l 
t h e r e f o r e ask whether the E n g l i s h Churches s t i l l have i n s i g h t s 
to b r i n g to bear i n the modern p o s t - C h r i s t i a n Europe, l e t alone 
o f f e r a v i s i o n f o r the f u t u r e of Europe. 
As i n chapter 1 I s h a l l take the 
commencement of the Second world War as my s t a r t i n g p oint. I 
s h a l l show t h a t the a c t i v i t y of the B r i t i s h Churches i n 
r e l a t i o n to European p o l i t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n has g e n e r a l l y f i t t e d 
i n t o t hree phases: the war and e a r l y post-war y e a r s ; the 
1960's; and the l a t e 1980's onwards. Although the c o r r e l a t i o n 
i s not p r e c i s e , I s h a l l show t h a t , i n the main, these three 
more in t e n s e periods of thought and a c t i v i t y r e l a t e to the 
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g r e a t e s t s e c u l a r B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t i n Europe: World War I I ; 
B r i t i s h a p p l i c a t i o n s to j o i n the EEC i n the 1960's; and ( i n 
chapter 4) the i n c r e a s i n g l y tense p o l i t i c a l debate i n B r i t a i n 
from the middle to l a t e 1980's. 
i n t h i s chapter, covering the ye a r s from 
the beginning of world war I I to the entry of the United 
Kingdom i n t o the European Community i n 1973, I s h a l l e v a l u a t e 
the c o n t r i b u t i o n of the Churches which has l a r g e l y come through 
p r i n t e d m a t e r i a l produced by some of the leading C h r i s t i a n 
t h i n k e r s of the period. As we s h a l l see, i n t h i s period (1939-
1972) the Church was very i n t e r e s t e d i n the f u t u r e of Europe. 
At times i t s t h i n k i n g was f a r more advanced and "pro-European" 
than i t s contemporary p o l i t i c a l counter-part, e s p e c i a l l y during 
the 1960's. By c o n t r a s t , however, i n chapter 4, as the m a t e r i a l 
published by the main E n g l i s h denominations shows, the E n g l i s h 
Churches have only engaged with Europe at the more l i m i t e d 
l e v e l of d e s c r i p t i o n , r a t h e r than by e n t e r i n g i n t o a deeper 
t h e o l o g i c a l and p o l i t i c a l d i s c o u r s e . I n chapter 5 I w i l l 
explore ways i n which the Church might engage and c o n t r i b u t e 
with Europe i n the f u t u r e . F i r s t l y , though, we must r e t u r n to 
the period of 1939-1972, and i n p a r t i c u l a r , to the Church's 
war-time engagement with the whole European question. 
As I have shown i n Chapter 1, from the 
outset of the Second World War there was a keen i n t e r e s t i n the 
type of world and European order t h a t would emerge from the 
war. T h i s was t r u e no l e s s of the key t h i n k e r s i n the Church of 
i t s day. T h i s s p i r i t of e x p l o r a t i o n and t h i n k i n g i s 
c h a r a c t e r i s e d w e l l by George B e l l , Bishop of C h i c h e s t e r (1929-
1958); William Temple, Archbishop of York (1929-1942) and 
subsequently Archbishop of Canterbury (1942-1944); l a y Roman 
C a t h o l i c t h i n k e r and e d u c a t i o n a l i s t A.C.F. Beales, as w e l l as 
the "Sword of the S p i r i t " movement i n s p i r e d by C a r d i n a l 
Archbishop Arthur H i n s l e y (Archbishop of Westminster, 1935-
1943). So then, what d i d these d i s t i n g u i s h e d churchmen o f f e r i n 
t h e i r t h i n k i n g and a c t i o n f o r post-war European r e c o n s t r u c t i o n ? 
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Although Bishop B e l l was no Utopian and 
b e l i e v e d t h a t "Systems have to be worked not by angels but by 
men. And men are moved by pas s i o n s , p r e j u d i c e s , ambitions and 
v i c e s " ( 2 ) , he was an i d e a l i s t , who refused simply to accept the 
jingoism of war. Indeed, i n h i s f i r s t war-time l e t t e r to The 
Times B e l l a s s e r t e d t h a t "there should be an honest r e c o g n i t i o n 
t h a t the Church can express s o l i d a r i t y , not by saying d i t t o to 
the S t a t e , nor by s t i m u l a t i n g p a t r i o t i s m , but by r e a l l y being 
the Church." He f u r t h e r added t h a t , "The Church i s a u n i v e r s a l 
s o c i e t y , w h i l e i t seeks to f u l f i l i t s mission i n d i f f e r e n t 
n a t i o n s . I t binds i t s members i n a u n i t y which i n c l u d e s the 
members of the nation with which we are a t war. " ( 3 ) i n many 
ways t h a t quotation i s i n d i c a t i v e of h i s p e r s i s t e n t and 
c o n s i s t e n t message to the country, so w e l l enunciated i n h i s 
'Penguin s p e c i a l ' , C h r i s t i a n i t y and world Order of 1940. 
I n C h r i s t i a n i t y and World Order B e l l g i v e s 
a b r i e f and c l e a r a n a l y s i s of what he viewed as the causes of 
the Second World War, as w e l l as h i s understanding of the 
nature of the Church, together with h i s b e l i e f s about the 
nature of the war, peace aims, and the b a s i s of r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . 
I t i s , e s s e n t i a l l y , a manifesto of B e l l ' s war-time m i n i s t r y . 
C e n t r a l to t h a t m i n i s t r y was B e l l ' s 
repeated a s s e r t i o n (indeed sometimes i t was a reminder) t h a t 
"Germany and Nazism are not the same th i n g . " ( 4 ) T h i s 
d i s t i n c t i o n was important f o r him not simply f o r judging the 
method of prosecuting the war, but a l s o f o r post-war 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . 
One reason f o r t h i s p o s i t i o n was B e l l ' s 
e x t e n s i v e personal and formal ecumenical l i n k s , both a t home 
(as we s h a l l see with h i s involvement with Sword of the 
S p i r i t ) , and e s p e c i a l l y i n c o n t i n e n t a l Europe. For him, the 
Church as Una Saneta transcended n a t i o n a l b a r r i e r s - a point to 
which I s h a l l r e t u r n i n chapter 5. Throughout the war B e l l 
attempted to keep the p l i g h t of European C h r i s t i a n s i n the 
p u b l i c ' s mind, a f t e r a l l , the bombs t h a t were dropping on 
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Germany were dropping on churches he had known and people who 
were h i s f r i e n d s . As soon as was s a f e and p r a c t i c a l , towards 
the end of the war he attempted to r e b u i l d l i n k s with 
c o n t i n e n t a l churches, i n f a c t , the ecumenical dimension to 
B e l l ' s c h a r a c t e r and a c t i v i t y should not be underestimated. 
The r e s u l t of such p e r s i s t e n t s o l i d a r i t y with C h r i s t i a n s i s 
w e l l described by Bishop Walker: "By 1946 t h i s n a t u r a l l y shy 
and g e n t l e man was l i s t e n e d to i n Europe as a leading C h r i s t i a n 
v o i c e . " ( 5 ) 
I n many ways the i n t e l l e c t u a l p o s i t i o n 
Bishop B e l l adopted and held to which embodied h i s views f o r 
peace and r e c o n s t r u c t i o n were the F i v e Peace P o i n t s , given by 
Pope Pius X I I i n an a l l o c u t i o n on Christmas Eve, 1939. For 
B e l l , the Peace Points were, to h i s mind, "the most f r u i t f u l 
c o n t r i b u t i o n to r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . " ( 6 ) Although the Peace Points 
were openly supported by the Anglican, Roman C a t h o l i c and Free 
Church lea d e r s i n a l e t t e r to The Times on 21st December 1940, 
i t was B e l l who kept r e t u r n i n g to them. Quoting them f u l l y i n 
C h r i s t i a n i t y and world Order ( 7 ) , he was a l s o a strong advocate 
for them at the Sword of the S p i r i t meetings hel d at the S t o l l 
Theatre i n 1941, indeed, Thomas Moloney a s s e r t s t h a t "By common 
consent the speech by the Anglican Bishop George B e l l on the 
Pope's F i v e Peace Poi n t s was regarded as the f i n e s t of those 
d e l i v e r e d . " ( 8 ) The P o i n t s a s s e r t e d t h a t a l l n a t i o n s had the 
r i g h t to l i f e and independence; any peace settlement must work 
towards disarmament; some form of j u r i d i c a l a u t h o r i t y needed to 
be c r e a t e d to a c t as a r b i t e r to s e t t l e i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i s p u t e s ; 
j u s t a t t e n t i o n must be given to the claims of n a t i o n s , 
populations and r a c i a l m i n o r i t i e s ; and, u l t i m a t e l y a l l 
settlements must be governed by the p r i n c i p l e s of love and 
j u s t i c e . 
As a fundamental b a s i s of r e c o n s t r u c t i o n 
B e l l was convinced t h a t any occupation of the Axis c o u n t r i e s 
a f t e r the end of the war must only be temporary. I n a f i e r c e 
i d e o l o g i c a l c l a s h i n the House of Lords, Lord v a n s i t t a r t wanted 
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the government to make i t c l e a r t h a t "we are e n t e r i n g Germany 
not as f r i e n d s but as conquerors, bent on reducing t h i s German 
nation to s u f f i c i e n t h u m i l i t y and m i l i t a r y impotence..." B e l l ' s 
agenda was d i f f e r e n t . He s t r e s s e d t h a t " i t ought to be regarded 
as a f i r s t s t ep... i n the r e b u i l d i n g of Europe." Moreover, i t 
presented an opportunity to the A l l i e s to "encourage whatever 
democratic f o r c e s can make good"... and to s t r e s s "that i t i s 
t h e i r f i r m i n t e n t i o n . . . to l e t the r u l e of freedom, i n 
government as w e l l as i n speech, begin as soon as they can."(9) 
What i s a l s o v i t a l to remember, when 
con s i d e r i n g h i s views on peace and r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , i s t h a t f o r 
B e l l , C h r i s t i a n i t y and C h r i s t i a n p r i n c i p l e s o f f e r e d the only 
sure b a s i s f o r r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , because i t alone had the power 
to change people's h e a r t s ( 1 0 ) . Throughout the war, d e s p i t e the 
c r i t i c i s m he endured f o r h i s p r i n c i p l e d stance, he remained 
l o y a l to h i s b e l i e f s , so much so t h a t Adrian Hastings a s s e r t e d 
t h a t " B e l l was one of the f i r s t Anglicans i n high p o s i t i o n to 
r e c l a i m the r o l e of prophecy and to recognise the need f o r a 
d u a l i s t d i s t a n c i n g of church from s t a t e . " ( 1 1 ) Indeed, i n my 
judgement, Jaako Rusama has c o r r e c t l y concluded t h a t "The 
word ' i n t e g r i t y ' w e l l d e s c r i b e s h i s [ B e l l ' s ] b a s i c 
outlook."(12) 
Bishop B e l l ' s more famous war-time 
contemporary was Archbishop William Temple. As with B e l l , 
Temple was concerned about both the prosecution of the war and 
e s p e c i a l l y , what should come i n the p l a c e of war. 
I n many ways Temple i s s i g n i f i c a n t f o r the 
f a c t t h a t he l a r g e l y r e f l e c t e d contemporary t h i n k i n g , i n a way 
i n which B e l l never q u i t e d i d . B e l l was, to quote Hastings 
again, "Much more of a prophet than Temple but l e s s of a 
statesman..."(13) As I have alr e a d y shown, there was a 
s i g n i f i c a n t body of opinion t h a t looked towards a post-war 
f e d e r a l union between some s t a t e s i n Europe. T h i s was a 
p o s i t i o n Temple endorsed. Reported i n The Times, he spoke on 
u l t i m a t e peace aims. Temple looked to a p o s s i b l e peace 
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settlement a r r i v e d a t through a Congress of Nations i n which a 
post-Nazi Germany could p l a y a f u l l p a r t - an idea not 
d i s s i m i l a r from C h u r c h i l l ' s March 1943 broadcast (see p . 8 f ) . 
Importantly, he added t h a t "Many of us hope t h a t the Congress 
w i l l pave the way f o r a Federal Union of Europe i n which we can 
see the only hope of a permanent peace settlement."(14) Such a 
post-war f e d e r a l s t r u c t u r e was needed i n order to l i m i t 
n a t i o n a l sovereignty, s t r e s s i n g t h a t " I t i s not a mere 
r e p e t i t i o n of a League of Nations programme, f o r t h a t e x p r e s s l y 
l e f t n a t i o n a l sovereignty untouched."(15) He went f u r t h e r when 
he not only p o s i t e d the p o s s i b i l i t y of a f u t u r e union of 2 or 3 
s t a t e s , but a l s o suggested t h a t n a t i o n a l sovereignty should 
disappear i n t h a t i n s t a n c e and t h a t to want to r e t a i n the r i g h t 
t o secede from the union should be a bar on e n t e r i n g the union 
(1 6 ) . With remarkable p r e s c i e n c e , i n J u l y 1942, Temple 
speculated on the p o s s i b i l i t y of an " i n t e r n a t i o n a l s y n d i c a t e " 
working the i n d u s t r i a l resources of the Ruhr "together with 
some neighbouring c o u n t r i e s beyond the f r o n t i e r s of the 
R e i c h " ( 1 7 ) . Such a suggestion was not d i s s i m i l a r from what 
a c t u a l l y happened w i t h the foundation of the European Coal and 
S t e e l Community (see pp.14-17). 
To summarise Temple's p o s i t i o n on a f e d e r a l 
Europe, i t i s worth quoting Alan Suggate a t length: "guided by 
r e a l i s m e l e v a t e d to a p r i n c i p l e , Temple t h i n k s t h a t , short of 
the leavening i n f l u e n c e of an e f f e c t i v e u n i v e r s a l Church, the 
way forward best l i e s i n the organised co-operation of groups 
of people s u f f i c i e n t l y c l o s e i n t r a d i t i o n and i n t e r e s t f o r t h i s 
to be v o l u n t a r i l y accepted, y e t s u f f i c i e n t l y d i s p a r a t e to 
introduce some e f f e c t i v e checks and balances... Temple was 
searching f o r something p r a c t i c a b l e , intermediate between 
complete n a t i o n a l autonomy and a general f e d e r a t i o n . " ( 1 8 ) I t 
can remain only a question of s p e c u l a t i o n as to how he would 
have reac t e d to the post-war push f o r c l o s e r European 
i n t e g r a t i o n , but i t i s q u i t e c l e a r t h a t i n the e a r l y y e a r s of 
the war, Temple's European f e d e r a l i s t i d e a l s were s i m i l a r i n 
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s t y l e and r a t i o n a l e to h i s s e c u l a r counter-parts. He was 
rooted, however, not simply i n the p o l i t i c a l world; he sought 
to make the world l e s s un-godly, by sea r c h i n g f o r p o s s i b l e 
s t r u c t u r e s i n which un-godliness (such as war and aggression) 
could be p r a c t i c a l l y outlawed. 
I f Temple was concerned with post-war 
s t r u c t u r e s , he was even more concerned with the p r i n c i p l e s 
which could prepare the way f o r , and underpin, them. I n a j o i n t 
l e t t e r to The Times i n support of the Pope's Peace Points 
(summarized on p.79), the four Church l e a d e r s , Cosmo Lang, 
C a r d i n a l K i n s l e y , Walter Armstrong of the Free Church F e d e r a l 
C o u n c i l , and William Temple, b e l i e v e d t h a t "The present e v i l s 
i n the world are due t o the f a i l u r e of nations and peoples to 
c a r r y out the laws of God. No permanent peace i s p o s s i b l e i n 
Europe u n l e s s the p r i n c i p l e s of the C h r i s t i a n r e l i g i o n are made 
the foundation of n a t i o n a l p o l i c y and of a l l s o c i a l l i f e . " ( 1 9 ) 
For Temple, such p r i n c i p l e s were worked out i n two s u b s t a n t i a l 
ways. The f i r s t were what might be de s c r i b e d as ' p r a c t i c a l 
p r i n c i p l e s ' which could a s s i s t the immediate prosecution of the 
war; and the second, ' t h e o r e t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s ' which could 
c o n t r i b u t e to the emerging debate about the nature of post-war 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n and s o c i e t y . So then, what were h i s ' p r a c t i c a l 
p r i n c i p l e s ' ? 
I n i t i a l l y , Temple was keen to a s s e r t a 
d u a l i t y of t h i n k i n g and a t t i t u d e towards the war. The war must 
be f o r something, and conducted i n the r i g h t way. For example, 
i n the e a r l y days of the War Temple was keen to s t r e s s t h a t "we 
wish to conduct the war as crusaders f o r j u s t i c e and freedom." 
(20) 
Temple was a l s o notable for h i s open and 
t o l e r a n t a t t i t u d e towards Germany. Although he was q u i t e c l e a r 
about Nazi Germany's g u i l t , and t h a t there could be no 
accommodation with the Nazis, he was a l s o s w i f t to suggest a t 
the same time t h a t "the terms which we make with an honourable 
German government s h a l l be a r r i v e d a t i n such a way as t o show 
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that we have sought no kind of advantage f o r o u r s e l v e s and no 
h u m i l i a t i o n f o r the German people."(21) 
Whilst Temple c a l l e d f o r the use of r i g h t 
p r i n c i p l e s both f o r the a c t i o n s of the A l l i e s and t h e i r 
a t t i t u d e s towards t h e i r enemies, i t i s , I b e l i e v e , c e r t a i n l y 
questionable as to whether he d i d i n f a c t manage to keep the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between the quest f o r j u s t i c e , r i g h t a c t i o n , and 
r i g h t a t t i t u d e . U n l i k e B e l l , as the war progressed - and i n 
common with the p u b l i c a t t i t u d e - Temple's own a t t i t u d e 
towards Germany hardened and h i s l e s s c r i t i c a l acceptance of 
A l l i e d war p o l i c y became more apparent. 
However, w h i l s t ' p r a c t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s ' were 
important f o r Temple's war-time t h i n k i n g , i t i s h i s 
' t h e o r e t i c a l e t h i c s ' f o r which he i s perhaps best remembered -
the c l a s s i c statement of which was C h r i s t i a n i t y and S o c i a l 
Order. 
I n 1941 Temple accepted the i n v i t a t i o n to 
be chairman and convenor of a conference c a l l e d by the 
i n d u s t r i a l C h r i s t i a n F e l l o w s h i p . I n h i s l e t t e r t o the delegates 
he s e t out the aims of the conference. These were: "'to 
consider from the Anglican point of view what are the 
fundamental f a c t s which are d i r e c t l y r e l e v a n t to the ordering 
of the new s o c i e t y t h a t i s q u i t e e v i d e n t l y emerging, and how 
C h r i s t i a n thought can be shaped to p l a y a leading p a r t i n the 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n a f t e r the war'."(22) Because of the b r e v i t y of 
the Malvern Conference and the 'heavy-weight' nature of the 
delegates, Iremonger remarked t h a t "whatever e l s e i t was or 
achieved, i t c e r t a i n l y was not a conference."(23) Nevertheless, 
i t gave r i s e to C h r i s t i a n i t y and S o c i a l Order, which has 
subsequently been des c r i b e d as "Temple's personal sequel t o the 
Malvern Conference."(24) 
Although C h r i s t i a n i t y and S o c i a l Order i s 
composed of only seven b r i e f chapters and an appendix, B e l l 
d escribed i t "as one of the most p e r s u a s i v e and l u c i d 
statements of the C h r i s t i a n ' s a t t i t u d e to the s o c i a l system, 
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as Temple viewed i t . " ( 2 5 ) So then, what p r i n c i p l e s does 
Temple enunciate i n C h r i s t i a n i t y and S o c i a l Order? 
The f i r s t t h i r d of C h r i s t i a n i t y and S o c i a l 
Order i s comprised of a defence of the r i g h t of the Church to 
speak to the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n . "The Church must 
announce C h r i s t i a n p r i n c i p l e s and point out where the e x i s t i n g 
s o c i a l order a t any time i s i n c o n f l i c t with them. I t must then 
pass on to C h r i s t i a n c i t i z e n s , a c t i n g i n t h e i r c i v i c c a p a c i t y , 
the t a s k of reshaping the e x i s t i n g order i n c l o s e r conformity 
to the p r i n c i p l e s . " ( 2 6 ) Although I s h a l l explore t h i s p o s i t i o n 
i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l when c o n s i d e r i n g "The p o l i t i c a l p r a c t i t i o n e r 
as p r i e s t " i n my next chapter, i t i s worth s e t t i n g out here i n 
b r i e f what Temple meant. Temple b e l i e v e d t h a t the ta s k , indeed 
duty, of the Church was to s t a t e the p r i n c i p l e s of the Gospel 
for i n d i v i d u a l s and communities t o l i v e by. However, he a l s o 
b e l i e v e d t h a t the Church could not s t a t e p r a c t i c a l p o l i c i e s -
only p o l i t i c i a n s as 'experts' could do t h a t . Temple defended 
t h i s p o s i t i o n by poi n t i n g out t h a t " t h i s r e p u d i a t i o n of d i r e c t 
p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n does not exhaust i t s p o l i t i c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . 
I t must e x p l i c i t l y c a l l upon i t s members to e x e r c i s e t h e i r 
c i t i z e n s h i p i n a C h r i s t i a n s p i r i t . " ( 2 7 ) indeed, mindful of the 
charge t h a t the Church i s t a l k i n g but not doing, he affirmed 
h i s b e l i e f t h a t "By t a l k i n g we g r a d u a l l y form p u b l i c opinion, 
and p u b l i c opinion, i f i t i s strong enough gets t h i n g s 
done."(28) With t h i s j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the Church's r i g h t to 
speak, Temple then went on to o u t l i n e two d i v i s i o n s : primary 
and d e r i v a t i v e p r i n c i p l e s . 
For him the two primary p r i n c i p l e s concern 
God and the nature of human beings. He b e l i e v e d t h a t God had no 
need f o r the world, however " c r e a t i o n i s a kind of overflow of 
d i v i n e l ove"(29) Human beings a r e creat e d f o r f e l l o w s h i p with 
God, but l i v e i n a s t a t e of corruption, y e t "The image of God -
the image of h o l i n e s s and love - i s s t i l l t here, though 
defaced."(30) T h i s i s important t o note, f o r r a t h e r than 
espousing a Utopian cause, Temple affirmed t h a t a human "must 
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be t r e a t e d as what he a c t u a l l y i s , but always with a view to 
what i n God's purposes he i s destined to become."(31) 
i n a d d i t i o n to these two primary 
p r i n c i p l e s , Temple a l s o d e s c r i b e d three d e r i v a t i v e p r i n c i p l e s : 
freedom, s o c i a l f e l l o w s h i p , and s e r v i c e . For him, a l l people 
are c r e a t e d f r e e . Even i f some abused the p r i v i l e g e , 
n e v e r t h e l e s s , freedom ought to be preserved and sought a f t e r , 
indeed he b e l i e v e d t h a t "Freedom i s the goal of p o l i t i c s . To 
e s t a b l i s h and secure t r u e freedom i s the primary o b j e c t of a l l 
r i g h t p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n . For i t i s i n and through h i s freedom 
t h a t a man makes f u l l y r e a l h i s p e r s o n a l i t y - the q u a l i t y of 
one made i n the image of God."(32) I n t e r e s t i n g l y , though, 
freedom was only p o s s i b l e i f order was present, f o r Temple 
b e l i e v e d t h a t without order t h e r e could be no freedom ( 3 3 ) , 
indeed the law was c r e a t e d t o p r o t e c t t h a t order, and thus 
freedom ( 3 4 ) . I n p r a c t i c e the war was prosecuted f o r the sake 
of freedom. I r o n i c a l l y , perhaps, Temple was prepared to concede 
t h a t i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y could be given up for the g r e a t e r good, 
when planning r e c o n s t r u c t i o n ( 3 5 ) . 
The second of Temple's d e r i v a t i v e 
p r i n c i p l e s was t h a t of f e l l o w s h i p , because God c r e a t e d people 
" i n order t h a t they might be a f e l l o w s h i p of love answering the 
love which has made them."(36) Furthermore, " f o r the 
completeness of p e r s o n a l i t y , there i s needed the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
to both God and neighbours. The r i c h e r h i s personal 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s , the more f u l l y personal he w i l l be."(37) Thus, 
f e l l o w s h i p and community were the counterpoint to 
i n d i v i d u a l i t y , and y e t i t was p r e c i s e l y i n t h a t f e l l o w s h i p t h a t 
the i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n a l i t y could reach i t s g r e a t e s t maturity. 
Temple's t h i r d ' d e r i v a t i v e p r i n c i p l e ' was 
t h a t of s e r v i c e . He argued t h a t "the combination of Freedom and 
F e l l o w s h i p as p r i n c i p l e s of s o c i a l l i f e i s s u e s i n the 
o b l i g a t i o n of S e r v i c e . " ( 3 8 ) T h i s could be found i n voluntary 
work, or i n the a t t i t u d e to paid work, and indeed, i n s e r v i c e 
to the n a t i o n . So then, what was s i g n i f i c a n c e of Archbishop 
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Temple's c o n t r i b u t i o n towards the prosecution of the war and 
post-war r e c o n s t r u c t i o n ? 
Undoubtedly Temple's war years d i d 
c o n t r i b u t e towards t h i n k i n g about post-war r e c o n s t r u c t i o n f o r 
he was, l i k e B e l l , prepared even i n the e a r l y days of the 
Second world war to r e f l e c t on what might happen a f t e r i t . As I 
have shown, t h i s can be seen i n Temple's i n t e r e s t i n f e d e r a l 
s t r u c t u r e s , and indeed, i n the conduct of the war i t s e l f . 
The most s t r i k i n g f e a t u r e of Temple's 
t h i n k i n g , though, i s h i s r e f l e c t i o n of contemporary main-stream 
thought. Again, t h i s may be seen i n the e a r l y days of the war 
i n toying with f e d e r a l s t r u c t u r e s , but perhaps more keenly i n 
C h r i s t i a n i t y and S o c i a l Order because here, i n h i s " t r a c t f o r 
the times, designed to give C h r i s t i a n s the t o o l s and 
i n s p i r a t i o n f o r the t a s k of post-war r e c o n s t r u c t i o n " ( 3 9 ) , he 
h i g h l i g h t e d the p r i n c i p l e s and i s s u e s which so animated B r i t i s h 
t h i n k i n g i n the second h a l f of the war, such as employment, 
work and s o c i a l w e l fare, and the education system. The 
contemporary p a r a l l e l s were the Beveridge Report, the Education 
Act 1944 ( i n which Temple was very a c t i v e ) and l a t e r s o c i a l 
s e c u r i t y reforms. As with B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l t h i n k i n g perhaps we 
do see a s h i f t away from concentration on post-war Europe to 
post-war B r i t a i n . However, as I s h a l l show i n Chapter 5, the 
p r i n c i p l e s t h a t Temple o u t l i n e d i n C h r i s t i a n i t y and S o c i a l 
Order, i n my judgement, s t i l l o f f e r an important c o n t r i b u t i o n 
to our t h i n k i n g today about the p r i n c i p l e s t h a t may inform and 
guide Europe. 
As I have a l s o shown, Temple was a l s o 
concerned with the ' p r a c t i c e ' of the war. Here, though, i s the 
most d i s t u r b i n g aspect of h i s war-time m i n i s t r y . Temple was 
happy to s t a t e h i s p r i n c i p l e s , but one must ask whether he 
l i v e d up t o them. He remained s i l e n t on o b l i t e r a t i o n bombing, 
and as Suggate has noted, " r e t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e can e a s i l y l apse 
i n t o vengeance", and indeed, r e t r i b u t i o n i s not enough, 
reformation was a l s o needed f o r Germany to be r e h a b i l i t a t e d 
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( 4 0 ) . Perhaps t h i s i s evidence of an i n a b i l i t y t o r e l a t e the 
theory to the awful r e a l i t y . Comparing B e l l with Temple, Rusama 
noted t h a t Temple "did not take a r e a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t i n 
the German Church c o n f l i c t . On i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i c y Temple did 
not have the knowledge B e l l had."(41) Consequently, without 
B e l l ' s personal knowledge, he might have found i t e a s i e r t o be 
convinced of the o f f i c i a l A l l i e d p o s i t i o n . Temple was c e r t a i n l y 
not the prophet B e l l was. Thus, h i s weakness was not so much i n 
the p r i n c i p l e but i n t r a n s l a t i n g i t i n t o p r a c t i c a l a c t i o n - a 
danger which, as I s h a l l e x p l a i n i n chapter 5, the Churches 
must avoid today i n i t s r e l a t i o n s with Europe. 
I n s p i t e of Temple's weaknesses, i t would, 
n e v e r t h e l e s s be a great mistake to w r i t e o f f h i s c o n t r i b u t i o n 
towards B r i t i s h C h r i s t i a n t h i n k i n g about post-war B r i t a i n and 
post-war Europe. For a l l h i s f a u l t s Temple was s t r u g g l i n g to 
l i v e out the C h r i s t i a n gospel i n the midst of a d e v a s t a t i n g war 
which was, as he r e a l i s e d , a f i g h t t o keep the p o s s i b i l i t y of a 
world based on C h r i s t i a n p r i n c i p l e s a l i v e . 
I t was not simply the Church of England 
which was concerned with the prosecution of the war or what 
followed i t . One of the most s t r i k i n g e c c l e s i a s t i c a l f e a t u r e s 
of the e a r l y y e a r s of the Second World War was the c r e a t i o n of 
Sword of the S p i r i t . I n s p i r e d by C a r d i n a l Arthur H i n s l e y ' s 
r a d i o broadcast of 10th December 1939, a group of leading Roman 
C a t h o l i c l a i t y urged the C a r d i n a l t o follow up h i s words with 
the c r e a t i o n of the Sword of the S p i r i t . Launched on 1 s t August 
1940, i n h i s inaugural address t o the Sword of the S p i r i t 
H i n s l e y a s s e r t e d t h a t , '"We are met together t o s t a r t a 
movement for a more united and i n t e n s e e f f o r t f o r a t r u e , j u s t 
and l a s t i n g peace. Our aim i s C a t h o l i c . We mean by prayer, 
s e l f - s a c r i f i c e and work t o do our p a r t i n promoting the 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of Europe. We are convinced t h a t a b e t t e r world 
can be b u i l t only on the foundations of f a i t h , hope and 
c h a r i t y * . " ( 4 2 ) Barbara ward, honorary s e c r e t a r y of the Sword, 
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f u r t h e r added i n a l e t t e r to p r i e s t s t h a t "The purpose of the 
o r g a n i s a t i o n i s , b r i e f l y , t o t r y t o b r i n g home t o our f e l l o w -
C a t h o l i c s and to as many non-Catholics as we can reach, the 
important C h r i s t i a n i s s u e s a t stake i n the present war, and 
a l s o t o i n s i s t t h a t no post-war settlement or r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , 
whether s o c i a l or i n t e r n a t i o n a l can hope t o l a s t u n l e s s i t be 
founded upon a t r u l y C h r i s t i a n s p i r i t . " ( 4 3 ) Wherein l a y i t s 
s i g n i f i c a n c e ? 
Sword of the S p i r i t was s i g n i f i c a n t i n the 
e a r l y war y e a r s f o r a number of reasons. F i r s t l y , as K i n s l e y 
himself pointed out i n a l e t t e r to f e l l o w bishops, ' " A f t e r the 
c o l l a p s e of France, i t seemed u r g e n t l y n e c e s s a r y to show t h a t 
we i n t h i s country were l o y a l , i n s p i t e of the entry of I t a l y 
i n t o the war and i n s p i t e of the other ' C a t h o l i c ' peoples 
a c t u a l l y or p o s s i b l y h o s t i l e t o B r i t a i n . I had reason to f e a r 
propaganda a g a i n s t B r i t i s h C a t h o l i c s i f steps were not taken t o 
f o r e s t a l l i t ' . " ( 4 4 ) H i t h e r t o , the Roman C a t h o l i c Church had 
been considered s u s p i c i o u s i n many B r i t i s h minds. Here, K i n s l e y 
was a s s e r t i n g t h a t B r i t i s h Roman C a t h o l i c s were as l o y a l as any 
other B r i t i s h c i t i z e n t o the B r i t i s h 'cause'. 
Secondly, the Sword had as a key aim, post-
war r e c o n s t r u c t i o n i n Europe. As B e l l and Temple i l l u s t r a t e d , 
the Church was not merely concerned with the war, but what came 
a f t e r i t i n Europe. I n a sense, t h i s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e of 
the Roman C a t h o l i c Church, being as i t was and i s more t r u l y 
pan-European than the other E n g l i s h denominations. Indeed 
C a r d i n a l K i n s l e y hoped t h a t the Sword of the S p i r i t would 
explode "outwards from an embattled B r i t a i n t o r e f e r t i l i s e the 
continent i n a s p i r i t u a l r e v i v a l . " ( 4 5 ) However, as Michael 
Walsh has noted, "although i t s members were un i t e d i n a d e s i r e 
t o oppose t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m i n any form and t o r e c o n s t r u c t Europe 
along C h r i s t i a n p r i n c i p l e s , they were f a r from agreed as t o 
how, i n p r a c t i c e , the second of these two aims was to be 
achieved." (46) I n t h a t r e s p e c t , the Sword was by no means 
unique! 
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E q u a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t was the Sword's a b i l i t y 
( a t f i r s t ) t o a c t as a major c a t a l y s t f o r ecumenical co-
operation i n the U.K. As Hastings has observed, " i n the fac e 
of the n a t i o n a l emergency the ecumenical f r a t e r n i t y had widened 
yet f u r t h e r to inc l u d e the C a r d i n a l Archbishop of 
Westminster."(47) T h i s was most s t r i k i n g l y seen i n the Sword of 
the S p i r i t sponsored meetings a t the S t o l l Theatre on l O t h / l l t h 
May 1941, which were perhaps more t r u l y ecumenical than any 
experience before: H i n s l e y i n the c h a i r on the 10th, with 
Bishop B e l l the keynote speaker (see p.79); Arcbishop Lang i n 
the c h a i r on the Sunday, with the a c t i n g moderator of the Free 
Church Federal Council and Dorothy Sayers amongst others, being 
key-note speakers. As Hastings has commented, "To have an 
ecumenical platform of t h i s s t r e n g t h sponsored by an E n g l i s h 
C a t h o l i c o r g a n i z a t i o n was something which t r u l y needed to be 
seen t o be b e l i e v e d . " ( 4 8 ) 
Unfortunately, because of opposition w i t h i n 
the Roman C a t h o l i c h i e r a r c h y to such an ecumenical movement, i t 
soon became necessary f o r the non-Catholics to leave Sword of 
the S p i r i t and c r e a t e the p a r a l l e l ' R e l i g i o n and L i f e ' 
movement. "The j o i n t C h r i s t i a n meetings were a f e a t u r e of the 
war y e a r s and, broadly speaking, d i d not s u r v i v e the war..." 
(49) The experience n e v e r t h e l e s s showed new ecumenical 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r co-operation on i s s u e s of common concern. As 
Thomas Moloney has concluded, "The 'Sword of the S p i r i t ' was 
born i n 1940, and i n a sense i t f i n i s h e d t h e r e , f o r i t was a 
phenomenon which could f l o u r i s h only i n the e x t r a o r d i n a r y and 
unrepeatable atmosphere of t h a t year. As the major 
interdenominational n u c l e a t i n g f o r c e of i t s generation the 
'Sword of the S p i r i t ' must be measured not by i t s l a t e r 
s t r u g g l e s . . . but by the very f a c t t h a t i t came to b i r t h . 
T herein l a y Arthur K i n s l e y ' s j u s t i f i c a t i o n , and t h e r e i n l a y the 
movement's g l o r y . " ( 5 0 ) I n t h a t sense, as ecumenical c a t a l y s t 
and as an o r g a n i s a t i o n formed to look beyond the war and i n t o 
the f u t u r e , the Sword of the S p i r i t was important f o r i t s 
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times. 
One of the Sword of the S p i r i t ' s key 
a c t i v i s t s was the e d u c a t i o n a l i s t A.C.F. Beales. i n 1941 he 
published The C a t h o l i c Church and I n t e r n a t i o n a l Order i n the 
Penguin S p e c i a l s e r i e s . As with B e l l and Temple's books i n the 
s e r i e s , The C a t h o l i c Church and I n t e r n a t i o n a l Order r e f l e c t e d 
from an E n g l i s h Roman C a t h o l i c p e r s p e c t i v e on how i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
s o c i e t y a r r i v e d a t i t s problems i n the e a r l y 1940s, and how the 
fu t u r e might be b e t t e r shaped. 
The tone of h i s book i s c l e a r l y s e t out i n 
h i s f i r s t chapter, f o r th e r e Beales recognises the p r e v a i l i n g 
f e d e r a l i s t wind of the e a r l y 1940's i n t e l l e c t u a l s . However, he 
i s s w i f t to disagree with t h e i r emphasis i n f i n d i n g an 
appropriate p o l i t i c a l machine f o r the prevention of war, 
arguing t h a t "the r e l i g i o u s world has seen a good machine (the 
League) ruined f o r a l a c k of moral s p i r i t among i t s l e a d e r s 
with which i t alone could f u n c t i o n t r u l y . " Moreover, "without a 
foundation of elementary p r i n c i p l e s c l e a r l y s t a t e d , and 
accepted by a l l p a r t i e s concerned, no machinery or 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n s t i t u t i o n w i l l be worth the time and labour 
spent i n d r a f t i n g i t . " ( 5 1 ) Thus he s t a k e s the c l a i m of h i s book 
tha t "The C a t h o l i c theory of i n t e r n a t i o n a l order i s not 
concerned merely with the i n t e r n a t i o n a l convenience and smooth 
r e l a t i o n s and the avoidance of war; but with something 
fundamental... the 'wholeness' and corporate nature of l i f e 
i t s e l f " , which " r e s t s on the s o l i d a r i t y of mankind."(52) So 
then, how does A.C.F Beales see the i n t e r n a t i o n a l order, and 
what does he hope f o r the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a post-war Europe? 
I n the f i r s t p a r t of The C a t h o l i c Church 
and i n t e r n a t i o n a l Order, Beales d e s c r i b e s what he sees as the 
descent i n t o the problems of the e a r l y 1940's. i n h i s view, 
Christendom had " d i s i n t e g r a t e d i n t o a s e t of Sovereign 
S t a t e s " ( 5 3 ) which a s s e r t e d t h a t the S t a t e could be r u l e d 
without r e f e r e n c e t o r e l i g i o n ; t h a t Man was autonomous, 
independent of supernatural c o n t r o l or refe r e n c e , and where 
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j u s t i c e was a matter of s o c i a l agreement; and t h a t t h i s was 
expressed i n the d o c t r i n e of economic man, where humans are 
r a t i o n a l i s t i c and n a t i o n a l i s t i c ( 5 4 ) . For him, evidence could 
be found i n Fascism, Marxian Communism, Nazism and Neo-
Democracy. Consequently, "When modern man abandoned the 
theology, he abandoned the only c r i t e r i o n t h a t gave h i s 
p r i n c i p l e s any u l t i m a t e v a l i d i t y . He has been, ever s i n c e , a t 
the mercy of a s u c c e s s i o n of usurper-Absolutes c r e a t e d by 
h i m s e l f . " ( 5 5 ) Moreover, w h i l s t the Pope could speak through 
e n c y c l i c a l s and so on to these p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n s , o f f e r i n g 
moral guidance t o i n d i v i d u a l s and nations a l i k e , i n the end the 
papacy had to a c t through the power (and l i m i t a t i o n s ) of 
diplomacy. Having thus s t a t e d the problem, Beales then turned 
h i s a t t e n t i o n towards e x p l o r i n g C a t h o l i c teaching, based on the 
t r a d i t i o n a l Thomist view of n a t u r a l law. 
A f t e r a n a l y s i n g the ideas of peace and war 
Beales goes on to examine the nature of s o c i e t y . A key 
component f o r any understanding of s o c i e t y was an 
understanding of s o c i e t y ' s b a s i c u n i t - the i n d i v i d u a l , and i n 
p a r t i c u l a r , the nature of the 'natural man'. I n c l a s s i c a l 
C a t h o l i c teaching human nature i s common to a l l . T h i s i s 
r e f l e c t e d i n u n i v e r s a l human r i g h t s : the r i g h t t o l i f e , 
freedom, family and property. Nevertheless, Beales p o i n t s 
out t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s do not possess a l l a b i l i t i e s ; i n d i v i d u a l 
reason and w i l l i s l i m i t e d . Thus "only a s o c i e t y of persons 
can make up f o r t h i s inadequacy of the i n d i v i d u a l person." 
Conversely, "extreme i n d i v i d u a l i s m i s a s i n a g a i n s t humanity, 
for i t tends to d i s i n t e g r a t e s o c i e t y . . . I n short , the human 
person i s f u l l y human but can r e a l i s e h i s humanity only i n 
communion with o t h e r s . " ( 5 6 ) Stated more p o s i t i v e l y , "Each 
person i s v i t a l to the l i f e of the whole - f o r each person has 
a f u n c t i o n , a vocation, i n r e l a t i o n to the whole community"(57) 
which can only be r e a l i s e d through the grace of God and the 
a i d of the sacraments ( 5 8 ) . 
As a consequence of t h i s mutuality of worth 
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and need comes a mutuality of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . On the one hand 
the i n d i v i d u a l has d u t i e s t o God and one's neighbours i n 
s o c i e t y a t l a r g e ; on the other hand the c i v i l a u t h o r i t y has a 
duty to p r o t e c t the r i g h t s of i n d i v i d u a l s . Moreover the r i g h t s 
of the S t a t e are l i m i t e d by the r i g h t s of persons, family, 
Church and neighbouring s t a t e s , i n order f o r t h i s to be 
achieved, laws must be i m p a r t i a l , and must not be c o n t r a r y to 
Natural Law. i n a comment reminiscent of Temple (se e p.84), 
Beales concludes t h a t , w h i l s t the Church has no competence i n 
i t s e l f to determine which form of government i s s u p e r i o r , 
n e v e r t h e l e s s , "any government, i f i t v i o l a t e s the r i g h t s of man 
and God and the family and s o c i e t y . . . becomes a u t o m a t i c a l l y i n 
need of c o r r e c t i o n by i t s people. "(59) Again, as I have 
remarked above, i t i s questionable as t o whether he r e a l i s e d 
the g r a v i t y and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y inherent i n t h i s claim. 
From t h i s s m a l l e r u n i t of a s i n g l e n a t i o n 
or community, Beales magnifies the teaching, e x p l o r i n g the 
i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o c i e t y . For i n t e r n a t i o n a l order 
to be p o s s i b l e , i t i s important i n h i s judgement f o r c o u n t r i e s 
t o remember both the e s s e n t i a l u n i t y of human nature, and a t 
the same time acknowledge the great d i v e r s i t y found w i t h i n 
human communities. T h i s fundamental premiss has important 
consequences for the o r g a n i s a t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o c i e t y . 
F i r s t l y , i t enabled him t o d i s t i n g u i s h the 
'Nation' from the ' S t a t e 1 . According to Beales n a t i o n a l i t y can 
be defined as a c u l t u r a l l y d i s t i n c t i v e community a l l i e d t o a 
d e s i r e t o p reserve a common form of government ( 6 0 ) , whereas a 
' s t a t e ' may contain more than one 'nation' w i t h i n i t s borders 
(as S w i t z e r l a n d does), or i t may provide a home to a n a t i o n a l 
minority. Where the l a t t e r i s the case, i t i s incumbent upon 
the ' s t a t e ' t o p reserve the n a t u r a l r i g h t s of m i n o r i t i e s w i t h i n 
i t s borders. Beales warns how f r a g i l e t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p may be, 
f o r "A n a t i o n i s a n a t u r a l form of s o c i e t y ; but a S t a t e can be 
something very a r t i f i c i a l , h e l d together by nothing stronger 
than the bonds of temporary i n t e r e s t . . . and ready to s p l i t up 
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i n t o the n a t i o n a l groups t h a t compose i t , the moment the bond 
ceases to hold. "(61) As I s h a l l show i n chapter 5, i t i s a 
warning t h a t the present-day European union needs to remember 
as i t d i s c u s s e s i t s f u t u r e d i r e c t i o n . 
Secondly, Beales p o i n t s out t h a t n e i t h e r 
n a t i o n a l i t y or s t a t e - s o v e r e i g n t y are absolute, because a l l 
people are equal before God. Consequently the notion of r a c i a l 
s u p e r i o r i t y i s an i l l u s i o n . Because s t a t e sovereignty i s not 
absolute, i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o c i e t y must be based on the p r i n c i p l e s 
of n a t u r a l law. Thus, "What has to be found i s a body of common 
o b l i g a t i o n s , derived from t h i s s o c i a b i l i t y , t h a t can be agreed 
on i n advance by the co-operating s o c i e t i e s of the world, and 
enforced, from a sure knowledge t h a t the a l t e r n a t i v e to them i s 
anarchy."(62) Such o b l i g a t i o n s , which by t h e i r very nature 
must be binding on a l l members of such an i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
s o c i e t y , are s i n c e r i t y , j u s t i c e (based on the n a t u r a l r i g h t s of 
humans), and c h a r i t y . These demand l o y a l t y t o the community, 
for such moral o b l i g a t i o n s are "derived from n a t u r a l law, and 
not from mere convenience"(63). Beales then d e s c r i b e s h i s "Ten 
Point Framework of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Order" ( i n c l u d e d i n the 
footnotes to t h i s chapter [ 6 4 ] ) , which, as can be seen from my 
f i r s t two chapters, have i n a l a r g e way been incorporated i n t o 
the development of the EEC and EU. 
Having thus de s c r i b e d h i s understanding of 
C a t h o l i c s o c i a l teaching, Beales s e t s out the i m p l i c a t i o n s of 
h i s a n a l y s i s f o r the f u t u r e . His e x p l o r a t i o n brings him to four 
conclusions f o r a c t i o n . The f i r s t i s t h a t any f u t u r e system of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l order must not simply repeat the f a i l u r e s of the 
past, indeed to do t h a t , " w i l l be merely t o wreck a second 
machine and to d i s i l l u s i o n s t i l l another generation."(65) 
Secondly, Beales b e l i e v e s t h a t any f u t u r e 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n , however formed, must have a moral 
s t r u c t u r e underpinning i t . Thus, Aquinas' assumption t h a t "a 
sound moral b a s i s as i n d i s p e n s a b l e to the steady working of any 
form of government, i s v i t a l . " ( 6 6 ) For a C h r i s t i a n continent, 
Chap t t r 3 P a g e 93 
the only a l t e r n a t i v e t o a s e c u l a r e t h i c i s the C h r i s t i a n 
p r i n c i p l e , based on C a t h o l i c teaching on n a t u r a l law. 
Beales' t h i r d c o n c l usion i s t h a t , 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e s must not simply have underlying 
p r i n c i p l e s , but t h a t membership of the 'Club', as he d e s c r i b e s 
i t , must be over a high t h r e s h o l d : "The higher the 
s u b s c r i p t i o n , i n terms of moral p r i n c i p l e s accepted, the 
b e t t e r . " ( 6 7 } Although, as he acknowledges, i n the short term 
t h i s may lead t o slower growth i n the new i n t e r n a t i o n a l order, 
i t should a l s o be deeper. Conversely, " I f what i s wanted i s 
f a i t h f u l adherence to standards i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o c i e t y , the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l Community i s b e t t e r without the contamination of 
the unworthy."(68) Thus, i f a n a t i o n t r a n s g r e s s e s the code, the 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Community i s f u l l y j u s t i f i e d i n e x p e l l i n g the 
code-breaker. Nevertheless, i n time a t r a n s g r e s s o r may reapply 
to j o i n , and such high standards would a l s o a t t r a c t those who 
were not members to j o i n . I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note here t h a t 
only i n p a s s i n g does Beales see economic f a c t o r s , such as a 
customs union or currency s t a b i l i s a t i o n , as p l a y i n g a p a r t i n 
t h i s process of i n t e g r a t i o n and s t a b i l i s a t i o n . 
The f o u r t h c o n c l usion i s the c o r o l l a r y of 
the previous two which a l s o r e s t a t e s the sub-theme of Beales* 
book, t h a t the papacy as the focus of Church has no view per sc 
on the s t r u c t u r e s of I n t e r n a t i o n a l S o c i e t y , only the aims and 
p r i n c i p l e s underlying t h a t s o c i e t y . Moreover, i n the f a c e of 
moral questions, w h i l s t the Pope can make suggestions on 
contemporary i s s u e s , he must be c a r e f u l not t o make s i t u a t i o n s 
worse, c i t i n g p o t e n t i a l c i v i l war i n Germany had the Pope 
condemned the Nazi regime. Thus, w h i l s t the Church may inform 
moral p r i n c i p l e s , and may or may not speak out on i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
a f f a i r s , i t i s not t here to determine the best form of 
government. So then, what i s the c o n t r i b u t i o n of The C a t h o l i c 
Church and i n t e r n a t i o n a l Order to contemporary t h i n k i n g about 
the f u t u r e of Europe? 
The C a t h o l i c Church and i n t e r n a t i o n a l Order 
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i s an important book f o r a number of reasons. F i r s t l y , i n 
adopting a c l a s s i c a l Thomist view of s o c i e t y , and reminiscent 
of Temple's t h i n k i n g , Beales p o i n t s out t h a t c r e a t i n g a new 
s o c i e t y a f t e r the war was not simply about having good 
s t r u c t u r e s . As he pointed out, the League of Nations seemed 
l i k e a good s t r u c t u r e , y e t i n f a c t i t was f a t a l l y weak. 
S t r e s s i n g t h a t for any post-war s t r u c t u r e t o br i n g l a s t i n g 
peace, he h i g h l i g h t e d the need of a bed-rock of p r i n c i p l e s to 
guide i t . I t i s important f o r Europeans today to ask whether, 
for a harmonious Europe to e x i s t , a common bed-rock of 
p r i n c i p l e s subscribed to by the v a s t m a j o r i t y of i t s c i t i z e n s 
needs t o be found. As Beales reminds us, Europe needs to be 
founded on more than t r e a t i e s or economics. 
Beales i s a l s o s i g n i f i c a n t f o r h i s a n a l y s i s 
of the nature of n a t i o n a l i t y and s o c i e t y . He p o i n t s out t h a t 
n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y i s more than holding a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e ' s 
passport. He f u r t h e r s t r e s s e s t h a t t here needs t o be a dynamic 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between the i n d i v i d u a l and s o c i e t y , f o r both are 
necessary and n e i t h e r i s sovereign. As I s h a l l explore i n 
g r e a t e r depth i n chapter 5, i t behoves the c i t i z e n s and 
governments of the European Union, to remember the e s s e n t i a l 
wholeness and s o l i d a r i t y of humankind, and i t s attendant 
mutuality of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , which c h a r a c t e r i s e d Beales' 
understanding of Thomist Law. 
As with the EU of today, Beales was 
e x e r c i s e d by the t h r e s h o l d a t which members could j o i n the new 
s t r u c t u r e s . Concluding t h a t a high t h r e s h o l d needed to be 
adopted f o r membership, he r a i s e s questions about the nature 
and speed of future EU enlargement. There i s s u r e l y a case f o r 
saying t h a t the higher t h r e s h o l d of membership, the g r e a t e r the 
s t a b i l i t y w i t h i n the EU. However, the contemporary s i t u a t i o n i s 
very much d i f f e r e n t to the e a r l y 1940's. Today, much of E a s t e r n 
Europe looks to the EU f o r s t a b i l i t y and economic development 
and p r o s p e r i t y - p r e c i s e l y the v i s i o n which, as I have shown i n 
chapter 1 - led to the c r e a t i o n of the EEC. Therefore the 
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question needs to be asked, what type of enlargement does 
Europe need, and what type of enlargement can be sustained? 
Beales reminds us t h a t a quick form of enlargement i s not the 
only way forward, and indeed such a process does have i t s 
dangers too. 
The C a t h o l i c Church and i n t e r n a t i o n a l Order 
i s a l s o noteworthy f o r a s s e r t i n g t h a t i t i s the duty of the 
s t a t e to enshrine and p r o t e c t the r i g h t s of i n d i v i d u a l s i n a l l 
l e g i s l a t i o n . Beales however a l s o p o i n t s out t h a t fundamental 
n a t u r a l r i g h t s are balanced by the d u t i e s of the i n d i v i d u a l to 
the s t a t e , and one's f e l l o w c i t i z e n s . However, a s e r i o u s 
question which can be asked of Beales i s whether he t r u l y 
understood the i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s balance. For example, he 
was prepared to argue f o r the primacy of the human conscience, 
even i f t h a t l e d a person i n t o e r r o r ( 6 9 ) . Beales a l s o argues 
t h a t , i n the face of war, i t i s the duty of the c i t i z e n to take 
up arms a t the government's request u n l e s s they are a b s o l u t e l y 
sure of the j u s t i c e of t h e i r case, because the statesmen know 
more of the f a c t s than the i n d i v i d u a l . 
A r e l a t e d weakness i s found i n Beales' 
u n c r i t i c a l view of the papacy. As Hastings has r i g h t l y s a i d , 
The C a t h o l i c Church and I n t e r n a t i o n a l Order presents "a h e a v i l y 
ultramontane view of the papacy", and, " w h i l s t Beales was very 
much a Sword of the S p i r i t man, he was a l s o perhaps too recent 
a convert not t o take Roman claims r a t h e r o v e r - s e r i o u s l y . " (70) 
T h i s i s evident when B e a l e s 1 repeatedly supports Pope Pius X I I 
l i m i t e d pronouncements concerning f a s c i s t and Nazi aggression 
( 7 1 ) . He f u r t h e r supported the Pope's r e f u s a l to c a l l German 
c a t h o l i c s to l a y down t h e i r arms, because the consequences of 
t h a t might be g r e a t e r t h a t the e v i l t h a t was being perpetrated. 
With the help of h i n d s i g h t , t h i s seems i n c r e d i b l e . The s e r i o u s 
c r i t i c i s m i s t h a t w h i l s t he proclaimed the v i r t u e s of the 
d o c t r i n e of Natural Law, propounding the balance between the 
r i g h t s of the i n d i v i d u a l and the c a l l of the s t a t e , Beales did 
not seem to have the a b i l i t y to r e l a t e t h a t to the grave 
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s i t u a t i o n of the war. At times he was b l a t a n t l y i n c o n s i s t e n t . 
I n s p i t e of i t s weaknesses The C a t h o l i c 
Church and i n t e r n a t i o n a l Order, i s a very v a l u a b l e book, not 
l e a s t because here i s a Roman C a t h o l i c t h i n k i n g s e r i o u s l y about 
the f u t u r e from a C a t h o l i c p e r s p e c t i v e , and r a i s i n g important 
p r a c t i c a l and t h e o l o g i c a l questions t h a t are s t i l l r e l e v a n t 
today. I f Sword of the S p i r i t was a s i g n t h a t the c a t h o l i c 
Church had taken i t s f u l l p l a c e i n B r i t i s h S o c i e t y , then The 
C a t h o l i c Church and I n t e r n a t i o n a l Order i s a l i v e l y symbol of 
th a t new r e a l i t y i n B r i t i s h l i f e . 
As I have shown, then, the f i r s t few yea r s 
of the Second World War were an extremely f e r t i l e period f o r 
C h r i s t i a n t h e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n , both on the problems t h a t had 
led to the war, and p o s s i b l e ways i n which Europe - not j u s t 
B r i t a i n - could develop a f t e r the war was won and over. I n the 
th i n k i n g of B e l l , Temple, Beales and the Sword of the S p i r i t 
movement, many of the i s s u e s t h a t face the European Union today 
were r a i s e d and explored: f e d e r a l union and n a t i o n a l 
sovereignty, j u s t i c e and freedom, mutuality of worth and 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , ecumenism a t a personal and i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
l e v e l , p r a c t i c a l and t h e o r e t i c a l C h r i s t i a n p r i n c i p l e s t o 
underpin post-war s t r u c t u r e s , the t h r e s h o l d a t which c o u n t r i e s 
may j o i n the s t r u c t u r e s , the pl a c e of the prophetic w i t h i n the 
Church balanced by the b e l i e f t h a t the Church has no a u t h o r i t y 
to d i c t a t e the type of government s t r u c t u r e s . I n many ways the 
agenda i s s e t the r e . So how did the Churches follow t h i s a f t e r 
the war y e a r s ? 
Undoubtedly as world War I I progressed 
towards i t s conclusion, the emphasis of the E n g l i s h Churches 
changed as d i d t h a t of the B r i t i s h Government. As I have shown 
i n chapter 1, B r i t i s h i n t e l l e c t u a l vigour went very much i n t o 
the reform of the domestic education and w e l f a r e systems - both 
of which Temple had keenly supported. I n s t i t u t i o n a l l y , 
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ecumenical r e l a t i o n s had been formalised, with the c r e a t i o n of 
the B r i t i s h Council of Churches i n 1942. As I s h a l l now show, 
once the problems caused by the war had been responded to, the 
Church's keen i n t e r e s t i n the f u t u r e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of Europe 
appears to have diminished. The end of the war, did, however, 
bri n g much need i n i t s wake. 
One o r g a n i s a t i o n which sprang up i n the 
wake of the war was the inter-Church Agency f o r the 
i n t e l l e c t u a l R e l i e f i n Germany which was committed to 
providing books and magazines i n order to help i n "the 
e l i m i n a t i o n of p r e j u d i c e s , misunderstandings and 
ignorance".(72) T h i s would, they hoped, c o n t r i b u t e to the r e -
i n t e g r a t i o n of Germany i n t o post-war European s o c i e t y . 
I n a d d i t i o n to t h i s , "Save Europe Now" was 
formed of which Bishop B e l l was a sponsor. U l t i m a t e l y the 
campaign led to the formation of C h r i s t i a n Action. At the "Save 
Europe Now" meeting i n the Conway H a l l i n October 1945, 
r e s o l u t i o n s were passed noting t h a t , " I n view of the c r u c i a l 
importance of the Ruhr coa l mines f o r the economy of the whole 
of western Europe" the means of i n t e r n a t i o n a l co-operation and 
the i n c r e a s e of production should be f o s t e r e d from which "the 
allotment of a proportion from the output of German household 
needs" should be made. Moreover, r e s o l u t i o n 6 c a l l e d f o r 
governments "To p r e s s forward with the establishment of a 
Supreme Economic Council f o r the co-ordination of the 
a s s i s t a n c e to be given to and by the d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s 
concerned, and f o r the longer-term r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a l l needy 
and devastated a r e a s . " ( 7 3 ) Thus, as with s e c u l a r European 
p o l i t i c s (see chapter 1 ) , the impulse f o r economic co-operation 
came from the p r e s s i n g need f o r economic s u r v i v a l , 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n and s t a b i l i t y . 
I t i s f u r t h e r i n t e r e s t i n g t o note t h a t the 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of Europe began to s l i p from Sword of the 
S p i r i t ' s agenda, d e s p i t e the f a c t t h a t i t s core aim a t i t s 
in c e p t i o n was the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of Europe based on C h r i s t i a n 
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p r i n c i p l e s ( 7 4 ) . Following on from the death of C a r d i n a l 
H i n s l e y i n 1943, Hastings has w i t t i l y noted t h a t "the Sword 
would s h r i n k t i l l i t became l i t t l e more than a penknife."(75) 
indeed, i n the l a t e 1940s, Sword of the S p i r i t had t o b a t t l e 
not to be cl o s e d down. However, Hastings goes on to note t h a t 
although the Sword "had struggl e d on none too e f f e c t i v e l y 
through the f o r t i e s and f i f t i e s . . . as the f i f t i e s turned i n t o 
the s i x t i e s , i t too came back t o l i f e . " ( 7 6 ) Indeed, the 1960's 
marked a period of renewed Church i n t e r e s t i n the f u t u r e 
d i r e c t i o n of Europe. I t should, of course be remembered t h a t 
the 1960's a l s o mark the B r i t i s h government's a b o r t i v e attempts 
to j o i n the EEC. 
In 1967 a B r i t i s h Council of Churches 
report noted "the almost complete s i l e n c e of the B r i t i s h 
Churches during the past twenty y e a r s concerning European 
u n i t y . . . " ( 7 7 ) The most s i g n i f i c a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n during the 
" s i l e n t period" was, undoubtedly the E n g l i s h Roman C a t h o l i c 
Church's emerging pro-European stance a t the beginning of the 
1960's. 
One of the church instruments which 
supported the development of the EEC was the Roman c a t h o l i c 
newspaper, The T a b l e t . Although somewhat u n c r i t i c a l of the EEC 
- which perhaps r e f l e c t s the EEC's halcyon days i n the e a r l y 
1960's - i t was, n e v e r t h e l e s s c l e a r on what i t saw as i t s 
b e n e f i t s and i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s . Economically, The T a b l e t 
recognised t h a t i n d u s t r y was i n the process of g l o b a l i s a t i o n . 
Although i t s e t back S o c i a l i s t hopes of state-owned i n d u s t r y , 
i t b e l i e v e d t h a t "This i s the p r i c e t o be paid f o r the very 
r e a l advantages of making western Europe r i c h e r . " ( 7 8 ) I t a l s o 
recognised t h a t B r i t i s h i n d u s t r y was alre a d y looking t o the 
markets of the EEC, commenting t h a t "while the government i s 
s t i l l looking f o r ways i n , p r i v a t e f i r m s are going i n . " ( 7 9 ) 
P o l i t i c a l l y , The Ta b l e t a l s o supported the 
Treaty of Rome's aim of eventual p o l i t i c a l union between the 
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member s t a t e s . I t b e l i e v e d t h a t "The men whom made the Rome 
t r e a t i e s saw very c l e a r l y not only t h a t a customs union can 
produce p o l i t i c a l union... but t h a t p o l i t i c a l u n i t y i s the only 
guarantee t h a t a customs union w i l l endure. "(80) I n t h a t same 
a r t i c l e the w r i t e r f u r t h e r b e l i e v e d t h a t p o l i t i c a l union would 
be the only antidote to n a t i o n a l s e l f - i n t e r e s t undermining 
European progress. 
The T a b l e t ' s main i n t e r e s t , however, was i n 
exploring B r i t a i n ' s p o s i t i o n i n r e l a t i o n to membership of the 
EEC. One p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y t h a t B r i t a i n needed to l e a r n was 
B r i t a i n ' s p o s t - i m p e r i a l r o l e i n the world. I n p a r t i c u l a r , The 
Tablet c r i t i c i s e d the b e l i e f t h a t the UK could provide a l i n k 
between America, Europe and the B r i t i s h Commonwealth: "On the 
contrary... only i f B r i t a i n i s p a r t of the second u n i t y w i l l 
she be a t the centre of the p o l i t i c a l and economic developments 
of the A t l a n t i c Community."(81) Thus, The Ta b l e t b e l i e v e d t h a t 
B r i t a i n as an i n t e g r a l p a r t of the EEC would be the be s t way of 
pre s e r v i n g B r i t a i n ' s s t a t u r e i n the new p o s t - i m p e r i a l world. 
E q u a l l y noteworthy was The T a b l e t ' s 
p e r s i s t e n t c r i t i c i s m of the B r i t i s h Government's p o s i t i o n a t 
the beginning of the 1960's. I t c r i t i c i s e d the f a l s e 
perceptions of the EEC, as i t saw i t , p o i n t i n g out t h a t "The 
united Europe which i s being wanted f o r today i s not the 
su c c e s s i o n of P h i l i p I I , Louis XIV, or Napoleon, c a r r i e s no 
s o r t of t h r e a t to B r i t a i n . . . I t i s t h e r e f o r e the kind of 
u n i f i c a t i o n we should support and not thwart from any ignoble 
f e e l i n g t h a t i t w i l l d i s p l a c e London, and t h a t P a r i s or 
B r u s s e l s w i l l become the counterpart of Washington and 
Moscow. "(82) Part of B r i t a i n ' s myopic view of the EEC was, i n 
The T a b l e t ' s view, because B r i t a i n was determined "not to get 
c l o s e l y a s s o c i a t e d with anything we could not be sure of 
c o n t r o l l i n g , a determination f o r long nourished by the thought 
t h a t i t was very improbable t h a t West European Governments 
would ever agree on anything, l e a s t of a l l the French and the 
German."(83) 
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Whilst c r i t i c i z i n g B r i t a i n ' s n a t i o n a l 
'psyche', The T a b l e t a l s o a s s e r t e d t h a t i t was pleased t h a t the 
B r i t i s h Government had not been present at the Messina 
n e g o t i a t i o n s which l e d to the t r e a t i e s of Rome, l e s t i t had 
wrecked the t r e a t i e s which had been made on "what are proving 
very sound l i n e s . " Going f u r t h e r , the same a r t i c l e b e l i e v e d 
t h a t "there should be some f u r t h e r growth [ i . e . w i t h i n the EEC] 
before our r e l a t i o n s h i p i s negotiated."(84) 
When B r i t a i n d i d apply to j o i n the EEC, 
although The T a b l e t judged t h a t any f a i l u r e i n the n e g o t i a t i o n s 
would have a s e r i o u s e f f e c t , i t saw a f a r graver problem 
a r i s i n g i f B r i t a i n subsequently j o i n e d the EEC on " f a l s e 
pretences", e s t a b l i s h i n g "ourselves while there s t i l l has t o be 
a unanimity i n the p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n s , and then s e t out to 
thwart every step towards the f i n a l p o l i t i c a l goal. 1 1 (85) 
Moreover, the a r t i c l e warns t h a t B r i t a i n must take s e r i o u s l y 
the claims of the ' p o l i t i c a l c l a u s e s ' of the Treaty of Rome. 
Under no circumstances must B r i t a i n enter and then destroy the 
EEC from w i t h i n , because there was the danger t h a t , once i n , 
"we should be immediately under an immense temptation to resume 
our o l d ways... to hold up every step t h a t could r e a l l y l e a d t o 
a u n i t e d Europe. Now t h a t the v i s i o n has begun to take c l e a r 
shape, we should not be f o r g i v e n i f we brought i t t o nought." 
I n s h o r t , B r i t a i n should only enter the EEC i f i t was deeply 
committed to i t and to European u n i t y . I f t h a t was not the 
case, i t was f a r b e t t e r f o r Europe t h a t B r i t a i n should remain 
outs i d e the Community. 
I n f a c t The T a b l e t could h a r d l y have had a 
stronger message! Within those s i x or seven a r t i c l e s i n the 
e a r l y 1960's, The T a b l e t c l e a r l y and c o n c i s e l y addressed the 
B r i t i s h view of i t s p l a c e i n the world, the d i r e c t i o n and 
i m p l i c a t i o n s of the EEC, and a l s o the need (as i t saw i t ) for 
B r i t a i n to be e i t h e r deeply committed to membership or to 
d e s i s t from j o i n i n g . I t w i l l be obvious t h a t the i s s u e s which 
The T a b l e t r a i s e d i n the 1960's have i n many ways, as I have 
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shown i n chapter 2, not y e t been f u l l y worked out. I t would be 
easy t o transpose the a r t i c l e s from the e a r l y 1960's t o the 
l a t e 1990's. Much of the substance of the a r t i c l e s remains 
p e r t i n e n t . 
What i s most s i g n i f i c a n t , though, i s t h a t 
The T a b l e t ' s view on Europe was ahead of i t s time. When B r i t a i n 
was l a r g e l y opposed to membership of the EEC - remember 
G a i t s k e l l ' s "Thousand y e a r s of h i s t o r y speech" had s t i l l to be 
made - here was a h i g h l y respected B r i t i s h Church newspaper 
advocating the cause of the European Economic Community, and 
the change i n a t t i t u d e which B r i t a i n needed to be an e f f e c t i v e 
p a r t of i t . I t was very much ahead of i t s time. However, i t was 
not e n t i r e l y alone i n e x p l o r i n g the question of Europe. 
At the beginning of the 1960's the Sword of 
the S p i r i t began examining the theme of B r i t a i n and the Common 
Market. The executive committee of Sword of the S p i r i t met on 
9th February 1961 and agreed to the s e t t i n g up of a committee 
of European e x p e r t s . I n 1961 the Sword a l s o arranged a s e r i e s 
of l e c t u r e s on the whole i s s u e . Unfortunately, t h e r e a r e now 
no extant d e t a i l e d records of the programme i n the a r c h i v e 
m a t e r i a l of the Sword of the S p i r i t , however, the Sword's 
h i s t o r i a n , Michael Walsh, noted t h a t the programme "was one of 
the most s u c c e s s f u l i t ever undertook."(86) I t was not, 
however, to be s u s t a i n e d i n the long-term as the emphasis of 
the Sword was s h i f t i n g towards i s s u e s r e l a t i n g t o the 
developing world. T h i s was confirmed by the d e c i s i o n of 
A p r i l 1965 t o transform the Sword of the S p i r i t i n t o the 
C a t h o l i c I n s t i t u t e f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s . There i t s main 
focus was the developing world, and Europe only i n so much as 
i t s p o l i c i e s impacts upon the developing world. 
So then, two important c o n t r i b u t i o n s from 
the B r i t i s h Roman C a t h o l i c Church towards t h i n k i n g about the 
f u t u r e d i r e c t i o n of Europe: The T a b l e t looking a t general 
p o l i t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s of B r i t i s h membership; and Sword of the 
S p i r i t (and subsequently the C a t h o l i c I n s t i t u t e f o r 
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I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s ) r a i s i n g the i s s u e s surrounding 
Europe's wider r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to the developing world. Both 
were much i n advance of the other main B r i t i s h denominations. 
I n 1967, however, an important report was 
presented to the B r i t i s h Council of Churches, C h r i s t i a n s and 
the Common Market. Described as "pioneering" by David Edwards 
( 8 7 ) , i t aimed to remind C h r i s t i a n people t h a t the European 
question was a l s o a moral question. 
C h r i s t i a n s and the Common Market commences 
by suggesting f i v e reasons why C h r i s t i a n s should be i n t e r e s t e d 
i n Europe: the Church was p a r t of s o c i e t y ; Europe had a r i c h 
C h r i s t i a n h e r i t a g e ; C h r i s t i a n i t y had, conversely, been 
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r much d i v i s i o n i n Europe; the EEC a f f e c t e d 
B r i t i s h c i t i z e n s whether B r i t a i n was i n the EEC or not; and, 
indeed, many areas of the Church's mission found resonance i n 
the EEC, such as r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , the best use of reso u r c e s , and 
the campaign f o r t h i r d world development. I n t e r e s t i n g l y , the 
report i s a l s o aware t h a t the brin g i n g down of s e c u l a r b a r r i e r s 
i n Europe might a l s o have a s i m i l a r e f f e c t f o r the Church as 
w e l l . Having thus s t a t e d why i t b e l i e v e s C h r i s t i a n s should be 
i n t e r e s t e d i n Europe, the report then turns to examine the kind 
of European Community the Churches should be working towards. 
At the centre of the re p o r t ' s world view i s 
the b e l i e f i n the e s s e n t i a l u n i t y of humankind. C h r i s t i a n s , 
consequently are c a l l e d to shape developments which may help 
the furtherance of t h i s b e l i e f . C h r i s t i a n s , i t argues, should 
be looking to the EEC to take i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s towards the 
t h i r d world s e r i o u s l y . C h r i s t i a n s should a l s o be looking to 
f u r t h e r r e c o n c i l i a t i o n w i t h i n Europe, and encouraging the 
c o d i f i c a t i o n and enforcement of human r i g h t s as contained 
w i t h i n the European Convention on Human Righ t s . The Community 
must always be an open one, and i t should be s t r o n g l y 
democratic. E s s e n t i a l l y , "What i s sought i s a f l e x i b l e system 
which can enable the member s t a t e s to deal on a Community b a s i s 
with problems t h a t can no longer adequately be planned f o r 
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n a t i o n a l l y . Within these present spheres, i t should be 
recognised... t h a t the e x e r c i s e of sovereignty i s henceforth a 
sovereignty between the European i n s t i t u t i o n s i n B r u s s e l s and 
the n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s of Member S t a t e s . " ( 8 8 ) I f , t h e r e f o r e , 
the Community experience was a good one, i t could provide a 
'community model' fo r the c o u n t r i e s emerging from c o l o n i a l r u l e 
to l e a r n from. The report then goes on to i d e n t i f y three core 
aims of Europe as i t sees i t : the prevention of war; the 
expansion of technology and industry; and Europe's wider r o l e 
i n the world. Then C h r i s t i a n s and the Common Market i d e n t i f i e s 
three p a r a l l e l C h r i s t i a n concepts to consider i n r e l a t i o n to 
the aims: r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , stewardship and s e r v i c e . How then can 
the Community c o n t r i b u t e i n these ways? 
i n order to prevent war, the quest f o r 
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n needs to be present w i t h i n the EEC. T h i s process 
of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , i n the Report's judgement, i s focused i n the 
Community i n s t i t u t i o n s : the Commission, Parliament and Courts. 
R e c o n c i l i a t i o n between i n d i v i d u a l s may a l s o be f o s t e r e d as the 
f r e e r movement of EC n a t i o n a l s became p o s s i b l e . E q u a l l y , 
though, the EEC could a l s o f u n c t i o n as a r e c o n c i l e r between 
member and non-member European s t a t e s . 
C h r i s t i a n s and the Common Market a l s o 
s t r e s s e s the importance of good stewardship, r e c o g n i s i n g t h a t 
"the C h r i s t i a n concept of stewardship poses questions about the 
s o c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the v a s t European companies the EEC 
favours, about the co n d i t i o n s of production, about the nature 
and d i s t r i b u t i o n of the wealth produced, and above a l l how i t 
i s used to a l l e v i a t e world poverty."(89) However, although the 
report recognises the advantages of l a r g e - s c a l e i n d u s t r y , not 
l e a s t the Common A g r i c u l t u r a l Programme, the report a l s o notes 
t h a t many areas were not covered by the o r i g i n a l t r e a t i e s , such 
as t r a n s p o r t , energy, and even most areas of s o c i a l p o l i c y . 
F urther, the report a l s o b e l i e v e s t h a t the r e g i o n a l p o l i c y was 
underfunded. I f good stewardship of resources was to be a 
r e a l i t y , these areas needed addressing. 
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A l l i e d to the concept of stewardship i n the 
r e p o r t ' s eyes was t h a t of s e r v i c e . Although i t acknowledges the 
importance of a i d to developing c o u n t r i e s given by EEC s t a t e s , 
i t a s s e r t s i t s b e l i e f t h a t "trade i s where the s e l f - r e s p e c t of 
developing c o u n t r i e s demands t h a t s p e c i a l emphasis be 
placed."(90) The report b e l i e v e d t h a t a c o l l e c t i v e European 
p o l i c y on both a i d and trade was needed, f o r i t r e g r e t t e d t h a t 
"a 'Europe united i n order t o serve' remains an idea f a r ahead 
of the r e a l i t y . " (91) The report then asks what c o n t r i b u t i o n 
B r i t a i n could make to the EEC. 
The most s t r i k i n g a s s e r t i o n of the whole 
report ( c o n s i d e r i n g the time i n which i t was w r i t t e n ) , was the 
b e l i e f t h a t " B r i t a i n ' s p o t e n t i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n to the European 
Community i s not t h a t we are e s s e n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t but t h a t we 
have a r e l e v a n t s i m i l a r i t y . Put b l u n t l y , B r i t a i n r e p r e s e n t s 55 
m i l l i o n more Europeans."(92) Although C h r i s t i a n s and the Common 
Market i s keen t h a t t a l k of B r i t i s h l e a d e r s h i p of the EEC 
should cease, i t does b e l i e v e t h a t B r i t a i n could make a 
p o s i t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n to the Community, such as b r i n g i n g i t s 
world-wide l i n k s , i t s f i n a n c i a l system based i n the C i t y , i t s 
democratic c r e d e n t i a l s , and i t s more l i b e r a l a t t i t u d e to 
t r a d i n g with developing c o u n t r i e s . Negatively, i t was aware 
t h a t B r i t a i n would b r i n g a r e p u t a t i o n of h o s t i l i t y to 
supranationalism. I t a l s o had a slower economic growth r a t e 
than the EEC, and i t had a ' s u p e r i o r i t y complex'. I f the UK was 
to enter the EEC then i t would bri n g t h a t mixed baggage with 
i t . That would have i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r Europe as a whole. 
The repo r t hoped t h a t B r i t i s h membership 
would make a p o s i t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n to r e c o n c i l i a t i o n i n Europe, 
both f a c i n g up to l a t e n t B r i t i s h anti-German f e e l i n g , and a l s o 
providing a power balance to the Franco-German a l l i a n c e , which 
may, i n t u r n help the s m a l l e r member-states' own process of 
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n w i t h i n Europe. B r i t i s h r e s e a r c h and development, 
e s p e c i a l l y i n science-based i n d u s t r i e s , could help to f u r t h e r a 
common stewardship of r e s o u r c e s . E q u a l l y , B r i t i s h l i b e r a l trade 
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p o l i c y could l i b e r a l i z e Europe's own, whereas Europe's g r e a t e r 
l i b e r a l i t y of a i d might encourage the UK government to gr e a t e r 
generosity. E q u a l l y , i t was hoped t h a t B r i t i s h membership of 
the EEC would help to r e v i t a l i s e B r i t i s h i n d u s t r y and the 
economy i n general, whatever happened, the rep o r t was convinced 
t h a t "The most important r e s u l t of B r i t i s h membership would be 
i t s e f f e c t s on the nature of the European Economic 
Community."(93) What, though, di d t h i s mean? 
I n acknowledging the p o s s i b i l i t y of B r i t i s h 
membership of the EEC, the report recognised t h a t B r i t a i n ' s 
r e l a t i o n s h i p with the EEC was always l i k e l y to be somewhat 
ambiguous and awkward, suggesting t h a t " i t i s u n l i k e l y ever to 
be 'European' other than as a power with world-wide i n t e r e s t s , 
a commitment to c o u n t r i e s of the Commonwealth... and a c l o s e 
bond with North America."(94) C e r t a i n l y there has been l i t t l e 
i n the i n t e r v e n i n g 30 y e a r s to disabuse us of the substance of 
t h a t comment. 
F i n a l l y , the report concludes with the 
b e l i e f t h a t B r i t a i n was, u l t i m a t e l y , on the road to membership. 
There was no v i a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e i n the long term f o r , although 
i t i s " i n v a l u a b l e f o r dialogue a c r o s s the North-South d i v i d e , 
the Commonwealth does not o f f e r an a l t e r n a t i v e economic and 
p o l i t i c a l p a r t n e r . " E q u a l l y i t recognised t h a t c l o s e co-
operation with the United S t a t e s was not v i a b l e e i t h e r , 
d e s c r i b i n g the A t l a n t i c Free Trade area as "a phrase f o r the 
51st S t a t e option without voting r i g h t s . Only i n Europe i s 
there the combination of p o l i t i c a l , economic, c u l t u r a l , and 
h i s t o r i c r e l a t i o n s h i p s t h a t makes equal B r i t i s h membership of a 
Community conceivable."(95) 
Whatever might happen regarding B r i t a i n ' s 
membership of the EEC - and i n 1967 the outcome was by no 
means c e r t a i n - C h r i s t i a n s and the Common Market reminded the 
Churches t h a t " I t i s more important t h a t European power should 
not become an end i n i t s e l f . I t i s a new 'method' of conducting 
a f f a i r s between s t a t e s , not as a r e - a s s e r t i o n of European 
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Power, t h a t the European Community i s of most value to the 
world."(96) 
At i t s meeting on 25th and 26th October 
1967, the B r i t i s h Council of Churches adopted the fol l o w i n g 
r e s o l u t i o n : 
"'The Council c o n s i d e r s t h a t B r i t i s h membership of a Community 
which (based as i t i s on a common understanding of human r i g h t s 
and l i b e r t i e s ) counts among i t s aims the r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of 
European enmities, the r e s p o n s i b l e stewardship of European 
resources, and the enrichment of Europe's c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the 
r e s t of mankind, i s to be welcomed as an opportunity f o r 
C h r i s t i a n s to work f o r the achievement of these ends'."(97) 
So then, was David Edwards j u s t i f i e d i n 
d e s c r i b i n g the report as "pioneering"? He was c o r r e c t i n h i s 
judgement, because, i r r e s p e c t i v e of what i t a c t u a l l y s a i d , i t 
was the f i r s t time t h a t an ecumenical report had been produced 
e v a l u a t i n g B r i t a i n ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p with Europe. H i t h e r t o 
i n d i v i d u a l t h i n k e r s and v a r i o u s denominational movements had 
made t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n s . T h i s , however, was d i f f e r e n t , f o r 
C h r i s t i a n s and the Common Market was an interdenominational 
committee w r e s t l i n g together with a key p o l i t i c a l question of 
the age. Although the Roman C a t h o l i c Church was not a member of 
the B r i t i s h Council of Churches - and t h a t i s i n e v i t a b l y a 
weakness of the report - as w i l l have been seen, many of the 
i s s u e s w r e s t l e d with i n the report are those which were seen i n 
the s e r i e s of a r t i c l e i n The Tablet i n the e a r l y 1960's. I t i s 
the ecumenical nature of the report which i s t r u l y pioneering. 
C h r i s t i a n s and the Common Market i s a l s o 
important f o r i t s content too. Far from p r e s e n t i n g a f a l s e l y 
Utopian v i s i o n , the report i s r e a l i s t i c i n i t s p o l i t i c a l 
a n a l y s i s , even i f t h a t r e a l i t y might be unpalatable f o r some t o 
accept. For example, i t recognised t h a t B r i t a i n was a European 
country, i r r e s p e c t i v e of membership of the EEC. I t a l s o 
acknowledged t h a t even i f B r i t a i n entered the European 
Community i t would be an awkward member. Both of these views 
were based on an honest assessment of B r i t a i n ' s p o s i t i o n i n the 
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world by the middle 1960's. U l t i m a t e l y B r i t a i n ' s f u t u r e was 
w i t h i n Europe; the Commonwealth and the United S t a t e s could not 
make up for t h a t f a c t . 
The r e p o r t was a l s o u s e f u l f o r reminding 
the Churches of what may only have been i m p l i c i t : t h a t 
membership of a community would r e q u i r e both g i v e and take. 
B r i t a i n , i n i t s judgement, had a p o s i t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n to make 
to Europe i f i t chose to. S i m i l a r l y , i t a l s o had much to l e a r n 
from other European c o u n t r i e s . Therefore, any notions of 
' B r i t i s h l e a d e r s h i p ' should be d i s p l a c e d , i f B r i t a i n was to 
become a member of the EEC, then i t must be on the b a s i s of 
e q u a l i t y and not of s u p e r i o r i t y . 
One of the key f e a t u r e s of the report i s 
i t s repeated reminders t h a t the EEC must not be an end i n 
i t s e l f . Europe as a powerful t r a d i n g block composed of many o l d 
c o l o n i a l powers had a major r e s p o n s i b i l i t y towards the 
developing na t i o n s , and t h a t was not simply i n granting a i d , 
but i n opening up trade t o the developing c o u n t r i e s . I t i s 
indeed i n t e r e s t i n g to note t h a t the language the report uses 
throughout i s very redolent of William Temple, using key 
concepts such as r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , stewardship and s e r v i c e to 
d e f i n e i n t h e o l o g i c a l terms the f u n c t i o n the Churches b e l i e v e d 
t h a t the Community must l i v e out. 
Despite i t s s i g n i f i c a n c e the passage of 
time has a l s o shown up some of the r e p o r t ' s weaknesses. I t was 
somewhat naive i n i t s p r a i s e of the Common A g r i c u l t u r a l 
Programme. I t was a l s o i n c o r r e c t i n i t s assessment of the 
democratic impulse i t b e l i e v e d B r i t i s h membership would b r i n g 
to the EEC f o r , as I have shown i n chapter 2, the B r i t i s h 
Government has repeatedly balked a t any i n c r e a s e i n powers f o r 
the Community or Union. I t must be remembered, however, t h a t 
the report was w r i t t e n a t the apogee of the Community. The 
events of h i s t o r y t h a t were to s c a r the Community i n the 1970's 
had not happened. The EEC looked l i k e an unmitigated s u c c e s s . 
I n s hort then, the report was a pioneer. I t 
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was r e a l i s t i c when examining an i s s u e t h a t r a i s e s strong 
emotions. I n t h a t way i t was not only ecumenically pioneering 
but i n t e l l e c t u a l l y a pioneer too: i t was very much ahead of 
i t s time, and ahead of p u b l i c t h i n k i n g . Despite the 
e c c l e s i a s t i c a l traumas of the 1960's, the Church was s t i l l , i n 
some way, keen to think about the ou t s i d e world c r i t i c a l l y and 
t h e o l o g i c a l l y . 
To conclude then, i n t h i s chapter concerned 
with B r i t i s h C h r i s t i a n t h i n k i n g on Europe from 1939-1972, we 
have seen i n the e a r l y 1940's a keen i n t e r e s t i n how post-war 
Europe should be reconstructed. T h i s was followed by n e a r l y 15 
years of s i l e n c e , before renewed C h r i s t i a n t h i n k i n g i n the 
1960's. 
As I have shown, although t h e i r backgrounds 
were d i f f e r e n t , the t h i n k i n g of B e l l , Temple, Beales and Sword 
of the S p i r i t do have a good deal of common ground: the b e l i e f 
t h a t w h i l s t i t i s not the Church's f u n c t i o n to d e s c r i b e the 
type of post-war government machinery, the Church as Church has 
the r i g h t to speak out i n matters of n a t i o n a l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
importance. E q u a l l y , there was the common b e l i e f t h a t any 
s t r u c t u r e s t h a t arose from the ashes of war must be grounded on 
C h r i s t i a n p r i n c i p l e s f o r them to l a s t . 
T h e o l o g i c a l l y , each war-time w r i t e r i n 
varying degrees accepted the b a s i c b e l i e f i n the fundamental 
u n i t y of humankind t h a t was p a r t i c u l a r l y i n f l u e n c e d by the 
do c t r i n e of n a t u r a l law. T h i s b e l i e f was a l s o explored i n the 
1967 B r i t i s h Council of Churches' r e p o r t . As a consequence of 
t h i s t h i n k i n g , there was an awareness t h a t i t was e s s e n t i a l f o r 
Germany to be r e h a b i l i t a t e d i n t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o c i e t y as soon 
as p r a c t i c a b l e . 
E c c l e s i a s t i c a l l y , i t should be f u r t h e r 
remembered t h a t , during the e a r l y war years i n p a r t i c u l a r , both 
the w r i t e r s I have examined, and Sword of the S p i r i t , were 
p a r t i c u l a r l y noted f o r t h e i r strong ecumenical s p i r i t . T h i s 
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undoubtedly coloured t h e i r t h i n k i n g profoundly. I r o n i c a l l y , 
however, i t should be noted t h a t none of the w r i t i n g s , not even 
the Sword of the S p i r i t , represented the Church as 
i n s t i t u t i o n s . The books and movements I have explored are not 
o f f i c i a l church r e p o r t s , but the work of committed i n d i v i d u a l s 
and groups. Even at the end of our period only the 1967 
B r i t i s h C ouncil of Churches' repo r t , C h r i s t i a n s and the Common 
Market, addressed Europe as an i s s u e i n a major way f o r the 
E n g l i s h Churches ( 9 9 ) . 
I have a l s o shown i n t h i s chapter t h a t the 
times at which t h i n k i n g on Europe was both a c t i v e and i n a c t i v e 
were very s i m i l a r to s e c u l a r B r i t i s h p o l i t i c s as w e l l , as seen 
i n chapter 1. There was a g r e a t deal of a c t i v i t y a t the 
beginning of the war as C h r i s t i a n s w r e s t l e d with an u n c e r t a i n 
f u t u r e . As the war progressed, as i n s e c u l a r p o l i t i c s , i n t e r e s t 
turned to r e b u i l d i n g B r i t i s h s o c i e t y , and, i n as much as Europe 
was considered, i t was considered i n r e l a t i o n to the 
a l l e v i a t i o n of the s u f f e r i n g of the post-war y e a r s . Only i n 
the 1960's, when B r i t a i n was applying to j o i n the EEC d i d the 
Churches begin t o take European i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m as embodied by 
the EEC s e r i o u s l y . When the Churches did, however, begin to 
take the EEC s e r i o u s l y , then, as I have shown, they asked 
pen e t r a t i n g questions about the EEC, about B r i t a i n ' s 
r e l a t i o n s h i p to i t , and the i s s u e s they r a i s e d . 
As I have shown from the a r t i c l e s i n The 
Tablet and C h r i s t i a n s and the Common Market, there was a good 
deal of common C h r i s t i a n r e c o g n i t i o n of the i s s u e s t h a t the EEC 
r a i s e d , such as sovereignty, community, and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to 
the developing world. E q u a l l y these p u b l i c a t i o n s were f a r more 
prepared t o accept 'Europeanism' than s e c u l a r B r i t i s h s o c i e t y 
at the time, and a l s o , i t has to be s a i d , more r e a l i s t i c and 
honest about B r i t a i n ' s p l a c e i n the world. Was t h i s because the 
Church as a world-wide phenomena and o r g a n i s a t i o n could see 
beyond n a t i o n a l t e r r i t o r i a l boundaries? To some extent I think 
i t was. The Second V a t i c a n Council had opened up the Roman 
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C a t h o l i c Church and reminded the world t h a t i t was a world 
Church. The demise of the c o l o n i a l powers a l s o reminded the 
European c o u n t r i e s of t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s t o t h e i r former 
c o l o n i e s , and perhaps both streams deeply a f f e c t e d the Church 
i n the 1960's. 
I n my next chapter, however, as we s h a l l 
see, the whole question of Europe seemed to go i n t o the 
background of the E n g l i s h Churches' t h i n k i n g during much of the 
1970's and 1980's. I t i s only towards the end of the 1980's, 
when Europe became an e x p l o s i v e i s s u e i n B r i t i s h p o l i t i c s once 
more, a f t e r the s i g n i n g of the S i n g l e European Act, Mrs 
Thatcher's provocative 'Bruges speech', and the c o l l a p s e of the 
Communist bloc i n the e a s t t h a t the Churches i n B r i t a i n begin 
to examine Europe again. However, as we s h a l l a l s o see, u n l i k e 
i n t h i s chapter's period of 1939-1972, i n the main i t i s the 
Churches as denominational i n s t i t u t i o n s , r a t h e r than i n d i v i d u a l 
C h r i s t i a n t h i n k e r s , t h a t are beginning to explore Europe as a 
p o l i t i c a l and t h e o l o g i c a l i s s u e again. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE ENGLISH CHURCHES AND EUROPE 
1 9 7 3 - 1 9 9 7 
Adrian Hastings, when co n s i d e r i n g the 
E n g l i s h Churches' c o n t r i b u t i o n to theology and s o c i e t y i n the 
1970's and e a r l y 1980's c o n f i d e n t l y concludes t h a t "there was 
probably more mature C h r i s t i a n outspokenness i n the f i e l d of 
s o c i a l a f f a i r s i n these y e a r s than i n any e r a s i n c e t h a t of 
Temple and B e l l . " ( l ) Whilst t h a t may be the case f o r the 
Churches' response to domestic s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s , i t 
i s c e r t a i n l y not the case when i t comes to the Church's 
t h i n k i n g about Europe. As I i l l u s t r a t e d i n chapter 3, the 1967 
B r i t i s h Council of Churches' report, C h r i s t i a n s and the Common 
Market, noted the almost t o t a l s i l e n c e of the Church concerning 
Europe i n the 1950's and 1960's (see p.99). I t i s a c r i t i c i s m 
which could be a p p l i e d to the B r i t i s h Churches f o r most of the 
1970's and 1980's with ample j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r , as I s h a l l 
show, although there was some i n t e r e s t i n the 1975 referendum 
on B r i t i s h membership of the European Community, i t was not 
u n t i l the l a t e 1980's and e a r l y 1990's t h a t the major E n g l i s h 
denominations began to take Europe s e r i o u s l y as an important 
i s s u e again. Why should t h i s be so? 
I t seems to me t h a t there were three key 
events towards the end of the 1980's which must be remembered 
i n order to understand the renewed i n t e r e s t i n Europe. F i r s t l y , 
Margaret Thatcher d e l i v e r e d her 'Bruges speech' i n 1988 which 
i g n i t e d the domestic p o l i t i c a l debate about Europe. Although, 
as I have shown i n chapter 2, B r i t i s h membership of the EC had 
always been c o n t r o v e r s i a l the 'Bruges speech' made i t 
p o l i t i c a l l y e x p l o s i v e . Could the Churches s e r i o u s l y remain 
s i l e n t about Europe? 
The second impulse was the swingeing 
p o l i t i c a l changes ta k i n g p l a c e i n c e n t r a l and E a s t e r n Europe: 
the end of the 'Cold War' and the democratization of post-
S o v i e t dominated c o u n t r i e s . Although former Lutheran Bishop 
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Karoly T6th c o r r e c t l y w r i t e s t h a t "the way to i t s [ i e . the 
Sovi e t b l o c ' s ] demolition was Gorbachev's p o l i c y of p e r e s t r o i k a 
which gave up i t s c l a i m to hegemony i n C e n t r a l - E a s t e r n 
Europe"(2), i t i s a l s o c e r t a i n l y t r u e t h a t " i n d i v i d u a l 
C h r i s t i a n s and churches played a notable p a r t i n the peaceful 
r e v o l u t i o n of 1989-91."(3) A f t e r a l l , who could forget the 
s i l e n t c a n d l e - l i t v i g i l s of L e i p z i g ' s C h r i s t i a n s ? I n C e n t r a l 
and E a s t e r n Europe, i t seemed t h a t the Church was a dynamic 
for c e f o r peaceful change. How could the B r i t i s h Churches 
ignore t h e i r s i s t e r s and brothers i n h a l f of the European 
continent? 
The t h i r d impulse was th a t c r e a t e d by the 
c a l l i n g of the f i r s t European Ecumenical Assembly i n Bas e l i n 
May 1989 which was j o i n t l y sponsored by the Orthodox, 
P r o t e s t a n t and Anglican founded Conference of European 
Churches and the Roman C a t h o l i c Council of European Bishops' 
Conference. Although the conference d i d not produce an 
ecumenical b l u e - p r i n t f o r Europe's f u t u r e , i t affirmed the 
European Churches' quest f o r j u s t i c e , peace and the i n t e g r i t y 
of c r e a t i o n . No l e s s s i g n i f i c a n t was the f a c t of i t s meeting. 
Here, a f t e r a l l , was a conference which served to h i g h l i g h t the 
common European C h r i s t i a n i d e n t i t y once more. 
I am sure t h a t these three major events of 
1988-1989 served to re-awaken B r i t i s h e c c l e s i a s t i c a l i n t e r e s t 
i n Europe. However, as I s h a l l a l s o show, i n the main, the 
Churches have been p l a y i n g 'catch-up': t r y i n g to d e s c r i b e what 
Europe as a p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y i s . Only more r e c e n t l y have the 
E n g l i s h Churches begun to engage t h e o l o g i c a l l y i n r e f l e c t i n g 
upon the key i s s u e s t h a t surround the European union. What have 
the E n g l i s h Churches contributed t o t h i n k i n g about Europe, 
s i n c e the UK j o i n e d the European Community i n 1973? 
As I have shown i n chapter 3, one of the 
main supporters of the i d e a l of the European Community was the 
Roman C a t h o l i c newspaper, The T a b l e t , i n the 1960's i t had 
encouraged B r i t i s h membership of the EEC on the co n d i t i o n t h a t 
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i t adhered to the Community's i d e a l s . I t was, moreover, 
prepared to c r i t i c i s e the B r i t i s h government's v a c i l l a t i o n over 
membership, i n the mid-1970's, with B r i t i s h membership of the 
EEC now secured, i f anything The T a b l e t became even more 
s t r i d e n t i n i t s comments. T h i s i s seen no more c l e a r l y than at 
the time of the 1975 referendum campaign. 
Whilst remaining a c u t e l y c r i t i c a l of the 
referendum, and c a s t i g a t i n g Harold Wilson's "demagogic 
opportunism" (4) f o r c a l l i n g i t (although as I have shown i n 
chapter 2, with the b e n e f i t of h i n d - s i g h t i t seems t h a t 
Wilson's referendum campaign may w e l l have been the only way of 
keeping B r i t a i n i n the EC), The T a b l e t did, n e v e r t h e l e s s 
address many of the campaign i s s u e s . 
One of the i s s u e s t h a t i t returned to 
s e v e r a l times during the referendum campaign was the question 
of n a t i o n a l sovereignty. I t has, of course, been argued t h a t 
membership of the EC had reduced B r i t a i n ' s n a t i o n a l and 
parliamentary sovereignty. However, a major a r t i c l e i n February 
1975, "The myth of n a t i o n a l s o v e r e i g n t y " ( 5 ) r e j e c t s t h a t 
t h e s i s , b e l i e v i n g i n s t e a d t h a t i t had been a f r e e a c t of 
sovereign w i l l to enter the EC, and t h a t B r i t a i n s t i l l used i t s 
sovereign powers i n the decision-making processes of the EC. 
Moreover, B r i t a i n could e x e r c i s e i t s sovereign w i l l and leave 
the EC i f i t so chose. The T a b l e t then went on to r e j e c t the 
argument t h a t membership of the EC had reduced Parliament's 
r i g h t to s c r u t i n i z e European l e g i s l a t i o n , blaming i n s t e a d Party 
managers who didn't make enough time at Westminster a v a i l a b l e 
to s c r u t i n i s e European l e g i s l a t i o n . I n a subsequent a r t i c l e , 
Vincent 0'Donovan pointed out t h a t the sovereignty of the 
European Community i s l i m i t e d to the areas granted to i t by the 
Community T r e a t i e s , and where powers have been granted to the 
EC, they are s t i l l s u b j e c t to the r u l e of law as embodied i n 
the European Court of J u s t i c e ( 6 ) . 
I n a very thoughtful a r t i c l e , produced i n 
The T a b l e t on 31st May 1975 on the eve of the referendum, 
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Barbara ward (who had been instrumental i n the c r e a t i o n of 
Sword of the S p i r i t i n 1940) wrote of the moral n e c e s s i t y of 
the European Community, and of B r i t a i n ' s p l a c e i n i t . 
De s c r i b i n g Europe as being a post-sovereign community, she 
b e l i e v e d t h a t "Only i n Europe can the v a l u e s of the nation -
v a r i e t y , c u l t u r e , t r a d i t i o n , l o y a l t y - be transcended i n 'a 
wider community' which i s not blasphemously sovereign i n the 
old sense but post-sovereign i n being open, sh a r i n g and 
supportive, a symbol not of hate but of love... And i f i t i s 
indeed the vocation of what was once c a l l e d Christendom to 
c a r r y forward t h i s r e c o n c i l i a t i o n to a wholly new kind of 
s h a r i n g and l i v i n g i n community, how can the C h r i s t i a n s of 
Europe bear to be l e f t out?" 
For ward, there were other moral 
imperatives which n e c e s s i t a t e d B r i t a i n ' s remaining i n the 
European Community. F i r s t l y , there was the need to care f o r the 
p h y s i c a l environment, and t h a t needed to be Europe-wide. 
Environmental damage was not j u s t l i m i t e d to a s i n g l e s t a t e . 
Secondly, she b e l i e v e d t h a t Europe o f f e r e d a g r e a t e r hope of 
ac h i e v i n g j u s t i c e for the developing c o u n t r i e s of the world. 
"This i s why" she argues, "every Commonwealth country urges us 
to remain i n Europe". 
As I noted i n chapter 2, the s i m i l a r i t y 
between the referendum debate of 1975 and the B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l 
debate about Europe today i s s t r i k i n g . I t seems to me t h a t 
these few a r t i c l e s i n The T a b l e t not only address a c e n t r a l 
question r a i s e d today, namely n a t i o n a l sovereignty, but they 
a l s o point us towards a renewed understanding of what to be i n 
community means. Although I s h a l l explore the concept of 
community i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l i n my next chapter, i t i s worth 
remembering again t h a t the a r t i c l e s s t a t e d c a t e g o r i c a l l y t h a t 
being C h r i s t i a n has wider i m p l i c a t i o n s than j u s t being B r i t i s h . 
Perhaps i t i s the Church as Church, which can see beyond what 
Ward c a l l e d the " c o l l e c t i v e egoism" of the nation s t a t e . Here, 
once more, B r i t i s h C h r i s t i a n s were w r e s t l i n g with a key 
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p o l i t i c a l i s s u e of the day. But as we s h a l l see, f o r the 
following 14 y e a r s , the Churches l a r g e l y returned to t h e i r 
slumber over Europe. Only i n the l a t e 1980's d i d they awaken 
again. 
i n the wake of the dramatic e c c l e s i a s t i c a l 
and p o l i t i c a l events t h a t occurred i n Europe i n the l a t e 1980's 
(see above) David Edwards published C h r i s t i a n s i n a New Europe. 
Although i t n e i t h e r o f f e r s a syst e m a t i c h i s t o r y of European 
p o l i t i c a l developments, nor a sys t e m a t i c account of the 
Church's c o n t r i b u t i o n to Europe, Edwards n e v e r t h e l e s s attempts 
to grapple with both s e c u l a r and Church h i s t o r y i n a p o s i t i v e , 
yet c r i t i c a l way, b e l i e v i n g t h a t "new o b j e c t i v e s f o r s o c i e t y 
need c l a r i f i c a t i o n and agreement."(7) 
Despite i t s flaws, Edwards argues t h a t 
C h r i s t i a n s should welcome the European Community as a community 
of peace and freedom, which has i t s power di s p e r s e d , i s i n 
p r a c t i c e a Community of Communities, and a l s o r e f l e c t s the 
world i n which i t l i v e s . Thus the Community i s s u f f i c i e n t l y 
l a r g e i n a world t h a t demands e f f i c i e n c y , y e t which e q u a l l y 
s e t s common standards both f o r goods and s e r v i c e s , and which 
works towards the cohesion of a l l the people of the EC through 
a s s i s t i n g l e s s developed p a r t s of the Community. He a l s o 
b e l i e v e s t h a t the Community should be applauded for the work i t 
has done i n f o s t e r i n g a i d and trade agreements w i t h former 
c o l o n i e s through the Yaounde and Lom6 conventions. Moreover, 
de s p i t e i t s obvious d e f e c t s , Edwards g i v e s a q u a l i f i e d 
endorsement of the Common A g r i c u l t u r a l P o l i c y . 
Having thus welcomed the European 
Community, Edwards then goes on to s e t t h i s w i t h i n the wider 
context of European h i s t o r y . Noting t h a t w h i l s t the 'New 
Europe' i s no longer a monolithic C h r i s t i a n continent as 
perhaps i t once was, he b e l i e v e d t h a t C h r i s t i a n s had s t i l l 
profoundly i n f l u e n c e d Europe's developments - a l i n e which he 
b e l i e v e s has continued with the development of the European 
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Communities under the i n s p i r a t i o n of such eminent C h r i s t i a n 
p o l i t i c i a n s as Schumann, de Gasperi, and Adenauer. 
In s p i t e of the p o s i t i v e C h r i s t i a n 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s to Europe's development, Edwards a l s o o u t l i n e d 
the movements t h a t have challenged C h r i s t i a n i t y and Europe as a 
whole, such as the r i s e of s c e p t i c i s m , consumerism and 
Communism, and a l s o the Church's own g u i l t f o r often supporting 
European c o l o n i a l i s m . As a consequence, he f e l t t h a t Europe's 
g u i l t had l e f t i t too acquiescent today i n the face of s o c i a l 
i n j u s t i c e ; too p a t r i o t i c i n the face of war; a r r o g a n t l y 
dogmatic i n the face of s c e p t i c i s m ; f r i g h t e n e d of Communism; 
and too o f t e n indulgent i n the face of consumerism ( 8 ) . 
Consequently, Edwards argues i n the second h a l f of h i s book 
t h a t i n order fo r Europe to develop i n the f u t u r e i t must 
address i t s c o l o n i a l p a s t . 
Edwards argues fo r a sober judgement of the 
c o s t s and b e n e f i t s of c o l o n i a l i s m . Despite the t e r r i b l e t h i n g s 
done i n the name of European c o u n t r i e s and, indeed, i n the 
name of C h r i s t i a n i t y , he b e l i e v e s t h a t with c o l o n i a l i s m , 
economic expansion ( f o r Europe) had taken p l a c e , which had 
u l t i m a t e l y brought b e n e f i t s to the whole world. Thus he asks, 
"Could such a world a f f o r d a poor Euro p e ? " ( 9 ) . Edwards f u r t h e r 
notes t h a t the v a l u e s which had l e d to the emancipation of 
c o l o n i a l nations were 'European' i n o r i g i n . Today, Edwards a l s o 
notes, Europe provides a home, through immigration, fo r many 
from the two-thirds world. "For today's Europeans t h a t means 
repentance, but not a complete condemnation of a l l t h a t Europe 
has done."(10) Can i t be s a i d t h a t present day economic and 
immigrations p o l i c i e s are s u f f i c i e n t recompense f o r c o l o n i a l 
r u l e ? I s t h a t repentance or conscience s a l v i n g ? 
Edwards then s e t s out key i s s u e s which he 
b e l i e v e s w i l l face the European Community i n the f u t u r e . He 
a l s o observes t h a t the powers of the EC need to be more 
e f f i c i e n t and more d e m o c r a t i c a l l y c o n t r o l l e d . He a l s o wonders 
whether the work of the Council of Europe could e f f e c t i v e l y be 
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subsumed i n t o the work of the European Community, i n order to 
make a 'Second T i e r ' Europe i n which non-EU c o u n t r i e s might 
b e n e f i t from the f r u i t s of economic p r o s p e r i t y even before they 
were able to become f u l l members. S o c i a l l y , Edwards b e l i e v e s 
t h a t the Market must not be allowed to dominate Europe 
e n t i r e l y , and t h a t the question must be faced of how to 
safeguard freedom and d i v e r s i t y i n Europe. The European 
Community, he argues, needs to make s o c i a l cohesion a r e a l i t y 
and not leave i t merely as a hope. Further, the EC needs to 
emphasise i t s r o l e as a Community of communities " d e l i b e r a t e l y 
encouraging the d i v e r s i t y t h a t s t i l l makes sense 
economically."(11) Thus i t needs to develop i n t o being a C i v i l 
S o c i e t y f o r the people and not j u s t the Markets, and to t h i s 
end Edwards supports town-twinnings w i t h i n Europe as an a i d to 
ac h i e v i n g t h i s a s p i r a t i o n . Europe, though, a l s o has a wider 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y : to the environment; to the poorer regions of 
the EC; to E a s t e r n Europe, and to the Two-Thirds world. 
Edwards, however, does not stop by simply asking questions 
about the f u t u r e of the European Community. He goes on to 
examine what the f u t u r e of the Churches may be i n the 'New 
Europe*, and what they have to o f f e r . 
R e j e c t i n g any outdated ' c o l o n i a l a t t i t u d e s ' 
of European C h r i s t i a n s Edwards b e l i e v e s t h a t "European 
C h r i s t i a n i t y could become more a t t r a c t i v e i f i t s humbler 
a t t i t u d e s could become more mature and s t a b l e ; i f i t s own 
s p i r i t u a l l i f e could be so enriched t h a t i t i s perceived 
c h i e f l y as a r e l i g i o n , not as an ideology of i m p e r i a l 
Europe."(12) indeed, i n h i s judgement, "The best route to t h i s 
s p i r i t u a l wealth i s the road which European C h r i s t i a n s can take 
together, the road which i s c a l l e d ecumenical."(13) I n 
t h e o l o g i c a l terms, t h i s i s b e s t encapsulated i n the word 
koinonia - deep and genuine communion between the Churches. 
Acknowledging t h a t many of Europe's r e l i g i o u s problems a r i s i n g 
from the reformation have s c a r r e d C h r i s t i a n i t y throughout the 
world, Edwards a l s o notes t h a t the ecumenical movement sprang 
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to l i f e from i n i t i a t i v e s i n Europe - not l e a s t from the 
c r u c i b l e of war - so much so t h a t "without achieving, or r e a l l y 
wanting, uniformity under a s i n g l e a u t h o r i t y , the EC and the 
Church have t h i s i n common: both seek the growing wealth and 
union t h a t have come through exchange. "(14) Such a deep u n i t y 
of koinonia ought, b e l i e v e s Edwards, to be an i n s p i r a t i o n f o r 
the world. But i f t h a t i s to be more than a l o f t y hope the 
Churches must take a c t i o n . "As C h r i s t i a n i t y e n t e r s i t s t h i r d 
millenium i n Europe... C h r i s t i a n s a r e needed to help the new 
Europe come to b i r t h . But they cannot give the necessary help 
u n l e s s they are prepared to 'come over' i n s p i r i t , to move 
courageously from some of t h e i r present or rec e n t 
p o s i t i o n s . " ( 1 5 ) T h i s means, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t the Churches must 
not only come to terms with the ' New Europe' , but more 
r a d i c a l l y s t i l l , "as a new Europe i s born, European 
C h r i s t i a n i t y must be reborn."(16) So what c o n t r i b u t i o n to 
C h r i s t i a n t h i n k i n g about Europe does C h r i s t i a n s i n a New Europe 
make? 
Although a t times Edwards' h i s t o r i c a l 
surveys are d i s j o i n t e d - separate h i s t o r i c a l r e f l e c t i o n s 
depending on the s u b j e c t can be found i n chapters 3, 5 and 6 ( ! ) 
- C h r i s t i a n s i n a New Europe i s u s e f u l for s e t t i n g the 
developments of the European Community and of the Churches i n a 
wider h i s t o r i c a l context. E q u a l l y , he i s honest i n showing t h a t 
Europe's (and the Church's) achievements were not u n i v e r s a l l y 
praiseworthy. 
One of the major emphases of the book i s 
the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t h a t the EC has to the Two-Thirds world, 
both i n terms of a i d and trade, and i n t h i s way i s very 
reminiscent of the a r t i c l e s of the 1960's and 1970's i n The 
Ta b l e t . But Edwards' book i s a l s o i n t e r e s t i n g f o r suggesting 
t h a t a wealthy Europe a l s o b e n e f i t s the r e s t of the world. 
Indeed he asks, "Could such a world a f f o r d a poor Europe?"(17) 
Thus, by i m p l i c a t i o n , Edwards seems to be po i n t i n g towards the 
need f o r examining the p o s s i b i l i t y of a theology of wealth as 
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w e l l as a 'bias to the poor'. The question remains, as to 
whether he f u l l y understood the need f o r Europe to change i n 
order for the two-thirds world to f u l l y develop. 
Written when E u r o - s c e p t i c i s m was being 
re v i v e d i n B r i t a i n , i t seems to me, however, t h a t the g r e a t e s t 
s i g n i f i c a n c e of C h r i s t i a n s i n a New Europe r e s t s i n Edwards' 
challenge of the Church's a t t i t u d e s and a c t i o n s towards Europe. 
Although he r e j e c t s any c l a i m to any e x p e r t i s e to o f f e r a 
v i s i o n f o r Europe, he n e v e r t h e l e s s c a l l s upon the Church to 
wake up to the new p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s i n Europe; o f f e r i n g a 
p o s i t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n to Europe's future development w h i l s t , a t 
the same time, r e j e c t i n g any c o l o n i a l ' r i g h t ' to dominate 
European t h i n k i n g . I n f a c t , Edwards' c l o s i n g remarks seem to 
o f f e r a cogent summary of h i s book: "as a new Europe i s born, 
European C h r i s t i a n i t y must be reborn." Perhaps indeed, even 
without him admitting i t , t h a t i s a v i s i o n to o f f e r to the 
Churches i n Europe. 
I n 1993 the Methodist Church produced a 
report f o r d i s c u s s i o n c a l l e d , Under One Roof: The UK and Europe 
i n the 21st Century, i n s p i r e d i n the f i r s t i n s t a n c e by the 1989 
Assembly of the BCC, i t n e v e r t h e l e s s s i g n a l l e d the beginning of 
a flow of documents on Europe from the p r i n c i p a l E n g l i s h 
denominations, and not l e a s t from the Methodist Church i t s e l f . 
I n i t s 24 pages. Under One Roof b r i e f l y 
t r a c e s the development of, and o u t l i n e s the s t r u c t u r e s of, the 
European Community and the Maastricht Treaty. I t then 
o u t l i n e s , as i t sees i t , the European model of p o l i t i c a l 
economy i n which "there i s a powerful commitment to the value 
of the f r e e market on the one hand and to s o c i a l belonging on 
the other."(18) Under One Roof then suggests ways i n which the 
market, b u s i n e s s and government can work t h i s out i n p r a c t i c e . 
I t then b r i e f l y a n a l y s e s B r i t a i n ' s p o s i t i o n , before going on to 
ask how c l o s e any European Union should be, and the 
i m p l i c a t i o n s t h a t quest r a i s e s f o r both economic union and 
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p o l i t i c a l a c c o u n t a b i l i t y . The report next suggests p r i o r i t i e s 
f o r the Community, and r a i s e s questions surrounding migration, 
refugee and asylum l e g i s l a t i o n w i t h i n the EC, as w e l l as the 
Community's r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s toward the Two-Thirds World and 
the environment. 
I n s p i t e of i t being a b r i e f document, 
Under One Roof i s important. The Methodist Church was the f i r s t 
B r i t i s h denomination to p u b l i s h a 'popular' booklet on Europe. 
Although i t i s c l e a r l y aimed a t a wide market, and t h e r e f o r e 
f a i r l y b a s i c , i t seeks to s e t the scene concerning European 
p o l i t i c s . I t i s thus a d i s c u s s i o n s t a r t e r . Moreover i t i s not 
w r i t t e n from a p a r t i c u l a r l y 'Methodist' viewpoint, but w i t h an 
ecumenical readership i n mind. I t t h e r e f o r e avoids some of the 
more c r i t i c a l problems of subsequent denominational r e p o r t s and 
p u b l i c a t i o n s , as I s h a l l now i l l u s t r a t e . 
At the request of the united Reformed 
Church's 1993 General Assembly i t s Church and S o c i e t y group was 
requested to produce b r i e f i n g m a t e r i a l on contemporary Europe-
wide i s s u e s . The United Reformed Church: A European Church i s 
the response to the General Assembly's r e s o l u t i o n . 
The booklet begins with the a s s e r t i o n t h a t 
"The United Reformed Church i s a European Church" (page 3 ) . I t 
then goes on to j u s t i f y t h i s a s s e r t i o n by o u t l i n i n g i t s 
h i s t o r i c l i n k s with European denominations which have t h e i r 
o r i g i n s i n the Reformation, and how to the present day l i n k s 
have continued to be forged, not l e a s t of which was the 
Leuenberg Agreement of 1973. The document then l i s t s the 
denominations i n Europe with which the URC n a t i o n a l l y and 
p r o v i n c i a l l y has l i n k s , and then followed by l i s t i n g and 
d e s c r i b i n g the European ecumenical agencies and programmes 
which the URC p a r t i c i p a t e s i n , d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y , such as 
the Conference of European Churches (CEC), and the European 
Ecumenical Commission f o r Church and S o c i e t y (EECCS). 
Turning towards the p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e s of 
Europe, The United Reformed Church: A European Church then 
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g i v e s a b a s i c d e s c r i p t i o n of the 'three p i l l a r s ' of the 
Maastricht Treaty, and the instruments and o f f i c i a l bodies of 
the European Community to which the church o r g a n i s a t i o n s 
r e l a t e . 
The report then r a i s e s the main moral and 
p o l i t i c a l questions i t b e l i e v e s t h a t Europe and the Churches 
need to address. These are the questions of poverty and s o c i a l 
e x c l u s i o n , racism and xenophobia, the environment, the nature 
of Europe, Europe and the developing world. Indeed i t asks, 
whose common home i s Europe? The ' p o l i t i c a l s e c t i o n ' of the 
report concludes by a f f i r m i n g t h a t "Europe, conceived of as our 
common home, must f i n d ways of d e l i v e r i n g peace and j u s t i c e f o r 
a l l i t s peoples, and br i n g i n g h e a l i n g to the brokenness of the 
world (environmentally, economically and p o l i t i c a l l y ) " , adding 
t h a t " i n r e a l i t y there i s no se p a r a t i n g our concern f o r B r i t a i n 
from those of Europe or the world. The r i g h t s and l e g i t i m a t e 
expectations of people to l i v e i n peace and j u s t i c e , to support 
themselves and t h e i r f a m i l i e s and to be pa r t of communities of 
love and concern i s i n t i m a t e l y l i n k e d a c r o s s the pl a n e t . " ( 1 9 ) 
The remainder of the report o u t l i n e s 
p o s s i b l e modes of involvement with churches i n Europe such as 
l o c a l church twinning, formal ecumenical l i n k s , as w e l l as 
personal l i n k s through C h r i s t i a n s from Europe worshipping i n 
l o c a l churches. The document then concludes w i t h the g u i d e l i n e s 
f o r church l i n k i n g and the r e s o l u t i o n s of the 1993 URC General 
Assembly concerning Europe. 
The United Reformed Church: A European 
Church i s a f a r more thorough document than Under One Roof. I t 
i s more p r e c i s e i n o u t l i n i n g the e x i s t i n g l i n k s between the 
United Reformed Church and ' c o n t i n e n t a l 1 European Churches, 
and i t gi v e s a more comprehensive d e s c r i p t i o n of the European 
bodies (both e c c l e s i a s t i c a l and p o l i t i c a l ) w i th which i t i s 
l i n k e d . The document r a i s e s the contemporary questions more 
thoroughly than does Under One Roof. C l e a r l y , though, the 
rep o r t has weaknesses. Because i t i s a b r i e f i n g document, i t 
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does not attempt to respond to the questions i t r a i s e s about 
the nature and fu t u r e of Europe. E q u a l l y , i t does not analyse 
the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the ecumenical o r g a n i s a t i o n s with which 
the United Reformed Church i s a s s o c i a t e d . 
The report d i s p l a y s the authors' 
f r u s t r a t i o n with the Church of England i n r e l a t i o n to l i n k s 
with c o n t i n e n t a l denominations. As a r e s u l t of the Meissen 
agreement, the document notes, "Many Anglican d i o c e s e s and 
p a r i s h e s are l i n k i n g up with churches and church d i s t r i c t s i n 
Germany. When i n t e r - c h u r c h v i s i t s take p l a c e i t would be good 
to seek p a r t i c i p a t i o n and courteously to draw a t t e n t i o n to the 
f a c t t h a t we are i n f u l l communion with the German 
churc h e s . " ( 2 0 ) . Thus i t h i g h l i g h t s the anomaly t h a t both 
denominations are i n communion with the same Churches i n 
c o n t i n e n t a l Europe, but are not i n communion with each other i n 
England. C r e a t i v e l y , the report a l s o suggests t h a t i f a l o c a l 
United Reformed congregation was planning ecumenical l i n k s with 
Meissen churches, they should consider c o n t a c t i n g the l o c a l 
p a r i s h h i g h l i g h t i n g the long-standing l i n k s between the URC and 
the EKD (EvangeIische Kirche in Deutsch1 and), and perhaps 
suggesting ecumenical l i n k s i n the f u t u r e . 
I r o n i c a l l y , The United Reformed Church: A 
European Church seems to suggest t h a t l o c a l churches should 
d i r e c t t h e i r a t t e n t i o n s to forging l i n k s with l o c a l churches i n 
Europe, whereas the bulk of the report examines Europe's 
p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s as w e l l as the main p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l 
i s s u e s faced by Europe today. Despite these weakness, the 
report i s a u s e f u l document. 
I t s u c c e s s f u l l y r a i s e s key ecumenical and 
p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s . I t i s u s e f u l f o r o u t l i n i n g the ecumenical and 
p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s i n Europe. The United Reformed Church: A 
European Church i s a l s o important f o r s t r e s s i n g l o c a l and 
personal ways of b u i l d i n g up a new Europe, e s p e c i a l l y through 
church and r e g i o n a l twinning arrangements, which I s h a l l 
explore i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l i n my next chapter when c o n s i d e r i n g 
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the e f f e c t of personal engagement with Europe. C r u c i a l l y , the 
report a l s o p o i n t s out, as I have observed, t h a t many of the 
i s s u e s f a c i n g B r i t a i n a l s o face the r e s t of Europe. I n t h a t way 
i t helps to remind the reader t h a t B r i t a i n i s an i n t e g r a l p a r t 
of Europe. 
Close on the h e e l s of the united Reformed 
Church's report came the Church of England's report to the 
General Synod, Europe. Of the r e p o r t s produced by 1994 Europe 
i s the most comprehensive and " s e r i o u s " . Rather than attempting 
to provide a simple sketch to the Church of England and Europe, 
i t i s , as I s h a l l show, a document seeking to inform and 
question Europe at q u i t e a deep l e v e l . 
Prepared i n response to the General Synod 
debate about Europe i n J u l y 1990, Europe s t a t e s i t s aim as 
being to question whether the Church of England can be a 
"European" church, and indeed "should the Church of England 
seek to play i t s own r61e i n Europe, or should i t work with 
(and i f necessary pay f o r ) others to wi t n e s s to C h r i s t i a n 
v a l u e s ? " Within the context of a Europe damaged by the 
t r o u b l e s i n Northern I r e l a n d and the c i v i l war i n Yugoslavia, 
Europe asks a more fundamental question s t i l l : can a r e l i g i o u s 
v o i c e be c r e d i b l e a t a l l i n such an age as t h i s ? (21) 
The report i l l u s t r a t e s how the changes i n 
Europe have a f f e c t e d the Church as a whole, br i n g i n g both 
i n c r e a s e d l i b e r t y f o r t r a v e l and exchanges, but e q u a l l y a 
deepening enmity between some P r o t e s t a n t , C a t h o l i c and Orthodox 
communities t h a t has come with i n c r e a s e d r e l i g i o u s l i b e r t y . 
E q u a l l y , the f i n a n c i a l c o n s t r a i n t s of the 1990s a l s o f e a t u r e 
fo r churches i n both e a s t and west. P o s i t i v e l y , the Conference 
of European Churches has been able to play an important r o l e , 
and the Church of England w i t h i n i t . 
Noting the p u b l i c ' s d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t with 
p o l i t i c i a n s and i n s t i t u t i o n s s i n c e the heady days of optimism 
i n the l a t e 1980's, Europe, questions whether p o l i t i c a l 
i n s t i t u t i o n s can be the panacea f o r Europe a t a l l . However, 
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Europe d e s c r i b e s ways i n which C h r i s t i a n s may c o n t r i b u t e to 
Europe's future, not l e a s t i n b r i n g i n g f a i t h and d i s c i p l e s h i p , 
and o f f e r i n g a renewed moral v i s i o n , a theology of community, 
and a scope t h a t i s wider than simply regarding Europe as an 
economic e n t i t y . Then, Europe notes, "The i s s u e i s not whether 
a moral v i s i o n i s needed, but how the churches can provide i t 
when there are so many o b s t a c l e s to overcome" (22) such as 
denominational fragmentation, the weakness of the Churches i n 
Europe, and not l e a s t the question of r e l i g i o u s p l u r a l i s m i n a 
m u l t i - c u l t u r a l continent. However, the report hopes t h a t the 
ecumenical experience of B r i t a i n and I r e l a n d may provide a 
model fo r f u t u r e a c t i o n i n Europe. At the very l e a s t , the 
report b e l i e v e s t h a t the Church should seek to i n f l u e n c e 
p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e , f o r the "Churches have a mandate to say 
strong t h i n g s about the e t h i c a l v a l u e s which should guide 
p o l i c y formation." 
I n the r e p o r t ' s view, the European union 
needs to address the questions of how the s o c i a l and economic 
aims of the EU can be environmentally s u s t a i n e d ; how m i n o r i t i e s 
are t r e a t e d w i t h i n Europe; how extremism ( p o l i t i c a l , n a t i o n a l 
and r e l i g i o u s ) can be managed; and how the d i s p a r i t i e s w i t h i n 
Europe and between the r i c h and the Two-Thirds world may be 
addressed i n a g l o b a l way. 
A f t e r showing how the Church of England 
r e l a t e s to Europe through i t s Diocese i n Europe, the v a r i o u s 
mission agencies and i t s denominational l i n k s , as w e l l as the 
ecumenical bodies which the Church of England i s p a r t of, or 
which i t has contact with. The paper then concludes by s e t t i n g 
out i t s aims f o r the f u t u r e , and d e t a i l i n g p o l i c y 
recommendations f o r the Church of England to address. Of 
primary importance, i n the r e p o r t ' s judgement, " i s to work with 
other churches i n seeking t o ensure the most e f f e c t i v e 
p r e s e n t a t i o n of the C h r i s t i a n Gospel i n contemporary Europe... 
T h i s i n v o l v e s . . . j o i n i n g a c t i v e l y from a C h r i s t i a n standpoint 
i n the debate about the f u t u r e of Europe" (23) To t h i s end the 
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report b e l i e v e s i t i s important t h a t the Church of England 
works to strengthen l i n k s w ith the Diocese i n Europe, t h a t i t 
should encourage c l o s e r co-operation with b i l a t e r a l and 
ecumenical p a r t n e r s as w e l l as b e t t e r co-ordination of the 
wider Anglican work i n Europe, i n c l u d i n g developing a 
chaplaincy and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e post i n B r u s s e l s along the l i n e s 
of the Strasbourg chaplaincy. Key to a l l of these aims i s the 
strengthening of t i e s to hold the v a r i o u s aspects together i n 
common. 
Throughout the report there are a number of 
r e c u r r i n g themes and problems which are r a i s e d . Although Europe 
repeatedly s t r e s s e s the importance of i t s l i n k s with 
c o n t i n e n t a l European Churches as w e l l as the v a r i o u s ecumenical 
bodies, i t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y n o t i c e a b l e t h a t the report does not 
consider the r e l a t e d question of whether the E n g l i s h 
denominations could work ecumenically together i n order to 
present a common C h r i s t i a n v o i c e . Perhaps t h i s shows a measure 
of j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the c r i t i c i s m s g ently l a i d a t the Anglican 
Churches door by The United Reformed Church: A European Church. 
M i r r o r i n g the f i n a n c i a l concerns t h a t 
troubled the Church of England i n the e a r l y 1990's, another 
r e c u r r i n g theme which runs through the report i s the c o s t of 
Anglican and ecumenical w i t n e s s and work i n Europe. For 
example, i t i s worrying t h a t Annex 1 of the report warns t h a t 
the work of the CEC may have to be c u r t a i l e d and s t a f f l a i d 
o f f , because of the c o s t s of s u b s i d i s i n g the E a s t e r n European 
members of CEC. C l e a r l y c o s t s are a genuine concern, which may 
of course spur the Churches to g r e a t e r ecumenical co-operation, 
but i t i s a l s o a reminder t h a t i f the Churches are to o f f e r an 
e f f e c t i v e witness to Europe (whether ecumenically or n o t ) , i t 
w i l l need s u f f i c i e n t funding. 
S i g n i f i c a n t l y , although the report began 
by asking how the Church of England could be engaged with 
Europe, the Paper does not o f f e r a c l o s e l y defined b l u e - p r i n t . 
Although, as I have shown, the report o u t l i n e s i n some d e t a i l 
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the ways i n which the Church of England has r e l a t i o n s with 
European denominations, ecumenical o r g a n i s a t i o n s and d i r e c t 
contact with the i n s t i t u t i o n s , i n the end i t only o f f e r s a s e t 
of broad aims and p r i n c i p l e s to guide the Church of England i n 
the changing p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y t h a t makes up the continent of 
Europe, and a r t i c u l a t e ways i n which i t might proceed i n the 
immediate f u t u r e , i n t h i s way i t i s arguably both caut i o u s and 
pragmatic. I t thus recognises t h a t resources are f i n i t e , t h a t 
Europe i s f a s t changing, and t h a t , w h i l s t t here are ways i n 
which the Church can immediately respond, the fu t u r e i s not 
p r e c i s e l y mapped. 
There are, i t seems, two important 
weaknesses to the report. F i r s t l y , although i t does, as I have 
i l l u s t r a t e d , r a i s e some of the moral questions t h a t surround 
the EU, i t does not enter i n t o in-depth t h e o l o g i c a l d i s c o u r s e 
about the p o s s i b l e courses of a c t i o n . Secondly, although i t 
explores the ways i n which the Anglican Church engages with 
Europe, i t does not give s i g n i f i c a n t a t t e n t i o n to the p o l i t i c a l 
s t r u c t u r e s which operate w i t h i n Europe. Had the report reviewed 
the European p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s as w e l l as i t s 
e c c l e s i a s t i c a l l i n k s with Europe, i t may w e l l have come nearer 
to answering i t s c e n t r a l question: how to be more e f f e c t i v e l y 
engaged with Europe. I n f a c t i t was to be n e a r l y two more yea r s 
before the next denominational report was to be produced which 
attempted to enter i n t o t h a t debate; t h i s time i t would be the 
Methodist Church's d i s c u s s i o n document, Methodists Looking a t 
Europe, produced f o r i t s 1996 Conference. 
Divided i n t o three s e c t i o n s (of v a s t l y 
unequal l e n g t h ) , Methodists Looking a t Europe s e t s out a 
s e c t i o n on the churches and the fu t u r e of Europe; the Churches 
i n Europe; and Methodism i n Europe. 
S e c t i o n 1, which forms the bulk of the 
Paper, begins by o u t l i n i n g the i s s u e s t h a t i t b e l i e v e s w i l l be 
of major i n t e r e s t a t the 1996/7 Inter-Governmental Conference 
( I G C ) . Methodists Looking a t Europe, goes on to s e t out i n a 
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"more r e f l e c t i v e and t h e o l o g i c a l manner"(Paragraph 9) questions 
about what belonging to Europe means, by o f f e r i n g a sober 
a n a l y s i s of the pl a c e of n a t i o n a l boundaries, r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s 
and values (and t h e i r boundaries), and the problems t h a t 
language makes f o r the process of deeper European u n i t y and 
i d e n t i t y . 
The Paper then proceeds to ask " I s there a 
divergence of b e l i e f and value i n the e x i s t i n g union t h a t 
compounds the problem? Or i s there an underlying, common, 
deposit of f a i t h and value t h a t makes us European?"(24) I t 
seeks to answer the question by ex p l o r i n g the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between f a i t h , a s p i r a t i o n and a c t i o n ; the d i f f e r e n t 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s between Church and S t a t e experienced i n Europe; 
and the plac e of the Church i n C i v i l S o c i e t y . I t concludes t h a t 
"out of the hard experience of contemporary s o c i e t y , a form of 
C h r i s t i a n belonging i s being formed - one which has a d i s t i n c t 
commitment to the t r u t h s r e v e a l e d i n C h r i s t , but which wants to 
proclaim t h a t t r u t h as i n essence c e l e b r a t i n g a common 
humanity,"(25) Moreover, i t a s s e r t s t h a t the a s p i r a t i o n f o r a 
common humanity " i s present so widely i n the pronouncements of 
the mainstream churches i n Europe as to be v i r t u a l l y beyond 
argument."(26) 
S e c t i o n 1 then explores f u r t h e r avenues of 
the Church's t h i n k i n g , c a l l i n g f o r the Church to have a more 
comprehensive understanding of diakonia. I t a l s o s t r e s s e s the 
Church's a b i l i t y , by v i r t u e of i t s world-wide l i n k s , to remind 
Europe of i t s p l a c e i n the world. The D i s c u s s i o n paper then 
proposes a p o l i c y f o r B r i t i s h Methodism, with p r a c t i c a l 
recommendations. I t concludes with two appendices 
ex p l o r i n g C h r i s t i a n s t a t i s t i c s and C h r i s t i a n v a l u e s f o r B r i t a i n 
and Europe. 
S e c t i o n 2 of the Paper o f f e r s a b r i e f 
summary of the major i n t e r - c h u r c h agreements of recen t y e a r s : 
the Leuenberg Agreement; the Meissen Agreement; and the Porvoo 
Agreement. I t ch a l l e n g e s churches to be more European-minded, 
C h a p t e r 4 P a g e 131 
i n s t e a d of the more n a t i o n a l l y - f o c u s e d past. 
S e c t i o n 3 complements t h i s , by b r i e f l y 
o u t l i n i n g Methodism's h i s t o r y i n Europe, together with the 
developments of c l o s e r co-operation between the European 
Methodist Churches s i n c e the Second world War. I t concludes by 
o u t l i n i n g the c o n t r i b u t i o n t h a t the European Methodist Churches 
have made to B r i t i s h Methodist t h i n k i n g about Europe. What, 
then, are the weaknesses and s t r e n g t h s of Methodists Looking a t 
Europe? 
There are, i t seems to me, a number of 
weaknesses i n the document, the f i r s t of which i s the t i t l e . As 
can be seen from the documents reviewed above, a c r i t i c i s m 
which may be l a i d a t the Church's door i s t h a t too o f t e n the 
Church has f a i l e d to engage with Europe beyond the l e v e l of 
d e s c r i p t i o n . The very t i t l e , Methodists Looking a t Europe, 
suggests t h a t Methodism i s looking a t Europe as i n t o a gold-
f i s h bowl. T h i s i s doubly unfortunate, because the Paper does 
seek to engage t h e o l o g i c a l l y with European i s s u e s . A t i t l e t h a t 
suggested t h i s would not only have been more h e l p f u l , but more 
appropriate. Perhaps such a remote t i t l e i s an attempt to 
i n t e r e s t a E u r o - s c e p t i c audience! 
Another weakness of the report i s t h a t i t 
i s e v i d e n t l y w r i t t e n by d i f f e r e n t groups (as the i n i t i a l 
paragraph p o i n t s o u t ) . T h i s seems to be i n d i c a t i v e of a c e r t a i n 
amount of confusion t h a t 'Europe' r a i s e s f o r the Churches. For 
example, the Methodist Church's D i v i s i o n of S o c i a l 
R e s p o n s i b i l i t y has been r e s p o n s i b l e f o r p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l 
developments, and the Methodist Church Overseas D i v i s i o n has 
been r e s p o n s i b l e f o r r e l a t i n g to Methodist Conferences i n 
mainland Europe. However, as the i n i t i a l paragraph notes, "The 
coming months w i l l see a g r e a t e r harmonization between these, 
and other, elements of our European concern." T h i s i s s u r e l y to 
be welcomed as a necessary procedure f o r f o s t e r i n g a more 
coordinated approach to Europe. 
The report a l s o has, unfortunately, a 
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tendency to make sweeping g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s . For example, when 
con s i d e r i n g European P o l i t i c s and the Inter-Governmental 
Conference, Paragraph 6 s t a t e s t h a t "European v o t e r s have 
al r e a d y equated the s i n g l e currency with deepening 
unemployment, and the proposal has become an e l e c t o r a l 
quagmire." Although i t would c e r t a i n l y be a f a i r comment about 
E u r o - s c e p t i c a l p o l i t i c i a n s , i t would have been h e l p f u l f o r a 
footnote on the evidence f o r t h i s c o n c l usion about the European 
population as a whole (opinion p o l l s , e t c . ) to j u s t i f y t h i s 
c l aim. Moreover, as i n B r i t a i n ' s case, economic and monetary 
union ( a s I have shown on pp. 43-46) r a i s e s f a r wider i s s u e s 
than unemployment alone. 
Paragraph 7 f a l l s i n t o a s i m i l a r t r a p by 
suggesting t h a t because B r i t a i n has, i n the Paper's judgement, 
f a i l e d to break i n t o the Franco-German hegemony i n Europe, 
"This f a i l u r e , r a t h e r than the c u r r e n t o f f i c i a l a t t i t u d e s to 
Europe, might be seen as the main f o r c e t h a t has shaped the 
B r i t i s h response to Europe over the quarter century s i n c e i t s 
entry." As I have shown i n chapters 1 and 2 B r i t a i n ' s 
awkwardness towards Europe i s more complex than the suggestion 
t h a t B r i t i s h obduracy i s a f i t of pique. I n f a c t , as I have 
explained, when B r i t i s h l e a d e r s h i p i n Europe was th e r e f o r the 
ta k i n g - even, perhaps, u n t i l the withdrawal from the Messina 
n e g o t i a t i o n s i n the mid-1950's - B r i t a i n ' s o b j e c t i v e s were 
d i f f e r e n t to those of the i n t e g r a t i o n a l i s t s . The Paper would, 
i n my view, have been b e t t e r served by r a i s i n g i s s u e s i n more 
temperate language, r a t h e r than with such sweeping 
g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s which i t f a i l s to t e s t out i n a s u b s t a n t i a l 
way. 
A f u r t h e r weakness of Methodists Looking a t 
Europe i s S e c t i o n 2, concerned with the Churches i n Europe. 
Although noting the recent developments i n i n t e r - c h u r c h 
cooperation and dialogue, i t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y weak a t 
explanation and a n a l y s i s . Moreover, i t l a r g e l y f a i l s to explore 
any i m p l i c a t i o n s t h a t any such agreements might have f o r 
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engaging with European i s s u e s , or even what i m p l i c a t i o n s such 
agreements might have f o r the Methodist Church. Although 
S e c t i o n 3 (Methodism i n Europe) i s a l s o b r i e f , i t i s 
n e v e r t h e l e s s more s u c c e s s f u l a t r a i s i n g the i s s u e s and 
i m p l i c a t i o n s , both f o r B r i t i s h and European Methodism as a 
whole, by having denominational l i n k s which s t r e t c h a c r o s s 
Europe ( 2 7 ) . Despite such weaknesses, Methodists Looking a t 
Europe. i s a v a l u a b l e document f o r a number of reasons. 
F i r s t l y , i t i s u s e f u l i n o u t l i n i n g the key 
i s s u e s which are under review a t the c u r r e n t Inter-governmental 
Conference. The Paper i s a l s o h e l p f u l i n t a k i n g forward 
C h r i s t i a n t h i n k i n g by o f f e r i n g t h e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n on such 
concepts as the boundaries and b e l i e f s w i t h i n Europe. As I 
s h a l l argue i n chapter 5, i t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y n e c e s s a r y t h a t the 
Churches do engage w i t h i s s u e s and concepts i n a t h e o l o g i c a l 
way, r a t h e r than j u s t a l l o w i n g i s s u e s to be owned by 
p o l i t i c i a n s , and Methodists Looking a t Europe makes a h e l p f u l 
c o n t r i b u t i o n i n t h i s way. 
The d i s c u s s i o n document a l s o c o n t r i b u t e s by 
ex p l o r i n g the concept of C i v i l S o c i e t y , and asking where the 
Church can c o n t r i b u t e ( i f a t a l l ) to i t . I t seems to me t h a t , 
i n the l i g h t of Edwards' challenge i n C h r i s t i a n s i n a New 
Europe (see above), t h i s e x p l o r a t i o n i s p a r t i c u l a r l y p e r t i n e n t 
as the Churches t r y to r e i n t e r p r e t t h e i r p l a c e and r61e i n an 
i n c r e a s i n g l y s e c u l a r and m u l t i - c u l t u r a l s o c i e t y , w h i l s t 
maintaining the Church's r i g h t to speak as w e l l as a f f i r m i n g 
the r i g h t of others to do l i k e w i s e . 
Methodists Looking a t Europe i s 
p a r t i c u l a r l y good a t s e t t i n g out ways i n which mission and 
s e r v i c e can be developed, and i n p a r t i c u l a r , how ecumenism can 
impact both the Churches as a body and as i t w i t n e s s e s i n 
contemporary s o c i e t y . As I s h a l l show i n chapter 5 i t i s , I 
b e l i e v e , v i t a l l y important t h a t the Church seeks to work and 
t h i n k i n comprehensive ways and avoid s e l e c t i v i t y i n i t s 
approach to Europe. T h i s Paper h i n t s a t the broader canvas upon 
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which to work and r e f l e c t . Importantly, though, i t a l s o seeks 
to remind the Church t h a t Europe must be seen i n the context of 
the wider world, and not i n a vacuum. 
Methodists Looking a t Europe i s a l s o 
important f o r showing the ways i n which the Methodist Church 
sees i t s e l f as working i n the f u t u r e , i n t h a t i t o f f e r s 4 
p r i n c i p l e s of p o l i c y and p r a c t i c a l arrangements to f a c i l i t a t e 
t h e i r implementation. I t i s worthwhile quoting the p r i n c i p l e s 
i n f u l l , which seek: 
"a- To develop our understanding of the p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l and 
economic dimensions of the European Union, and to communicate 
t h i s e f f e c t i v e l y to B r i t i s h Methodists; 
b- To b u i l d e f f e c t i v e working r e l a t i o n s w ith major European 
P r o t e s t a n t churches and the Roman C a t h o l i c Church, and to play 
an appropriate p a r t i n ecumenical European bodies; 
c- To f o s t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s with Methodist churches throughout 
Europe; 
d- To work with ecumenical p a r t n e r s i n responding to c r i s e s i n 
Europe, such as t h a t i n Bosnia a t p r e s e n t . " ( 2 8 ) . 
I t i s worth noting t h e i r p r a c t i c a l , ecumenical, and wide-
ranging scope, which i s often missing from Church t h i n k i n g when 
i t c o n s i d e r s how to engage with Europe, as I s h a l l e x p l a i n i n 
my next chapter. 
On the whole I b e l i e v e t h a t Methodists 
Looking a t Europe i s a very important document, which commends 
i t s e l f w e l l to d i s c u s s i o n and, s i g n i f i c a n t l y , t h e o l o g i c a l 
r e f l e c t i o n upon questions about Europe, and how the Church 
r e l a t e s to European i s s u e s . 
As I have explained i n chapter 2 (see 
p.59), one of the c e n t r a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l concepts introduced a t 
the behest of the B r i t i s h Government i n the Maastricht Treaty 
was t h a t of s u b s i d i a r i t y . Although i t i s now known for i t s 
p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e , i t s o r i g i n s l a y i n c l a s s i c a l C a t h o l i c 
s o c i a l teaching. P o l i t i c a l l y , s u b s i d i a r i t y "supports a 
d i s p e r s a l of a u t h o r i t y as c l o s e to the g r a s s roots as good 
government allows,and i t p r e f e r s l o c a l over c e n t r a l d e c i s i o n -
making. "(29) 
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A l l i e d to the concept of s u b s i d i a r i t y i s 
th a t of s o l i d a r i t y . The recen t r e p o r t , The Common Good, 
b e l i e v e s t h a t " S o l i d a r i t y expresses the moral t r u t h t h a t 'no 
man i s an i s l a n d , e n t i r e of i t s e l f ; every man i s a p i e c e of the 
continent, a p a r t of the main'(John Donne). "(30) I t i s these 
two p r i n c i p l e s of C a t h o l i c s o c i a l t e a c h ing which run through 
The Common Good, published by the C a t h o l i c Bishops' Conference 
of England and Wales i n the run up to the 1997 B r i t i s h General 
E l e c t i o n f o r thought and r e f l e c t i o n . When i t b r i e f l y addresses 
the i s s u e of Europe i t reminds the reader t h a t C a t h o l i c 
teaching has an i n t e r n a t i o n a l and g l o b a l dimension. Fu r t h e r , 
The Common Good (r e m i n i s c e n t of Edwards' b e l i e f s ) a s s e r t s t h a t 
"Although a l l European s t a t e s a r e p l u r a l i s t s o c i e t i e s , the 
churches s t i l l have a c r u c i a l r o l e i n safe-guarding and 
promoting the moral and s p i r i t u a l v a l u e s which gave Europe i t s 
so u l . " ( 3 1 ) Consequently, the twin p r i n c i p l e s should guide 
C a t h o l i c t h i n k i n g about Europe. Hence, The Common Good b e l i e v e s 
t h a t " l o c a l l o y a l t i e s and commitments are important and should 
be f o s t e r e d , but they should not be i n opposition to these 
wider expressions of s o l i d a r i t y . I t i s p o s s i b l e to be both 
B r i t i s h and European."(32) 
Although Europe i s not the main focus of 
The Common Good, i t i s important i n the sense t h a t i t s e t s out 
the broad spectrum of C a t h o l i c s o c i a l teaching. Moreover, the 
Bishops' r e p o r t c o r r e c t l y recognised t h a t Europe would be a 
major i s s u e i n the B r i t i s h General E l e c t i o n , and consequently 
i t seeks to show the reader how t h a t s o c i a l teaching may be 
applied to t h i n k i n g about Europe (amongst other i s s u e s ) . 
As I have shown, then, the major C h r i s t i a n 
denominations (Anglican, Roman C a t h o l i c , Methodist and United 
Reformed) have, i n the l a s t 3 y e a r s been r e f l e c t i n g on the 
i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r both Church and S o c i e t y of the changes i n 
Europe during the l a s t 20 y e a r s . Although the re p o r t s which I 
have j u s t o u t l i n e d may be seen as the ' o f f i c i a l ' 
pronouncements, many of the Churches have a l s o been addressing 
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European i s s u e s i n other ways as w e l l . I t i s to these t h a t I 
s h a l l now t u r n . 
P a r t i c u l a r l y notable has been the v a r i e t y 
of p u b l i c a t i o n s t h a t the Methodist Church has produced i n 
recent y e a r s . A 'popular 1 s t y l e of p u b l i c a t i o n i s E u r o b u l l e t i n , 
published bimonthly o r i g i n a l l y on the i n i t i a t i v e of the 
Methodist Church's D i v i s i o n of S o c i a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y . 
E u r o b u l l e t i n covers a broad spectrum of i s s u e s t h a t have a 
European dimension to them. T h i s ranges from book reviews to 
a n a l y s i s of events and trends i n European p o l i t i c s , r e l i g i o n 
and c u l t u r e . As broad as i t s scope of s u b j e c t s i s i t s v a r i e t y 
of c o n t r i b u t o r s . I n recent i s s u e s , a r t i c l e s and p i e c e s have 
been contributed by C h r i s t i a n MEP's, EECCS, Methodists, other 
European denominations and so on. By i t s very nature - i t i s a 
b u l l e t i n r a t h e r than a j o u r n a l - i t cannot produce in-depth 
a n a l y s i s of a l l t h a t i s happening i n Europe. Nevertheless, 
E u r o b u l l e t i n i s a u s e f u l p u b l i c a t i o n f o r h i g h l i g h t i n g i s s u e s 
which would normally be ignored by the s e c u l a r p r e s s . Moreover, 
i t s e r v e s to remind i t s readers, t h a t Europe i s f a r r i c h e r and 
more d i v e r s e than j u s t whether the Maastricht c r i t e r i a f o r EMU 
w i l l be reached! 
Also a t the more 'popular' end of the 
market i s The Methodist Recorder. Although producing only 
o c c a s i o n a l s e r i e s ' of a r t i c l e s concerning Europe, i t does 
attempt from time to time to h i g h l i g h t European i s s u e s . For 
example, i n the run up t o the 1994 European e l e c t i o n s a s e r i e s 
of a r t i c l e s by John Kennedy, the then S o c i a l and Economic 
p o l i c y s e c r e t a r y of the Methodist D i v i s i o n of S o c i a l 
R e s p o n s i b i l i t y were published. They provided sketches about 
modern p o l i t i c a l Europe, examining the i s s u e s such as 
enlargement, the European Parliament, and, i n t e r e s t i n g l y , an 
a r t i c l e examining Europe from a S c o t t i s h p e r s p e c t i v e , which 
contrasted with the 'English' perception of Europe. Kennedy 
a s s e r t e d t h a t " t h i s i s a European country, i n a way t h a t 
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England i s not."(33) The s e r i e s a l s o included an a r t i c l e by 
German Methodist Minster, Dr. S i e g f r i e d L6dewigs, examining 
Germany's p o s i t i o n on Europe. The s e r i e s concluded on 23rd June 
1994 with a review of the B r i t i s h e l e c t i o n campaign, noting i t s 
negative tone, but a l s o s e t t i n g out i s s u e s t h a t would be on 
Europe and i t s Parliament's agenda f o r the f u t u r e . Since then, 
The Methodist Recorder has produced o c c a s i o n a l a r t i c l e s which 
look p r i m a r i l y a t European Methodism, but a l s o a t European 
p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s . 
I n a d d i t i o n to The Methodist Recorder's 
1994 European e l e c t i o n s e r i e s , the 1994 Methodist Conference 
devoted i t s annual Beckly S o c i a l S e r v i c e L e c t u r e to the theme 
of The Churches i n The European Union. Given by P h i l i p Ludlow, 
d i r e c t o r of the Bru s s e l s - b a s e d Centre f o r European P o l i c y 
S t u d i e s , the l e c t u r e again h i g h l i g h t e d the Methodist Church's 
i n t e r e s t i n Europe both as a t h e o l o g i c a l and p o l i t i c a l i s s u e . 
I n the l e c t u r e Ludlow s e t out i n d e t a i l the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of 
the EU as a h i s t o r i c a l process and governmental system, as w e l l 
as f o c u s s i n g on where EU i n s t i t u t i o n s are (and are not) 
r e l e v a n t to p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l problems. Ludlow then 
concluded the l e c t u r e by o u t l i n i n g ways i n which the Churches 
i n B r i t a i n could and should engage w i t h the European Union. 
The major emphasis of the l e c t u r e , as 
Ludlow concedes, i s a d e s c r i p t i o n of how the European Union 
works, "on the grounds t h a t an understanding of how i t works i s 
a precondition of any attempt by the churches or i n d i v i d u a l 
C h r i s t i a n s to work with or through i t . "(34) I t i s a point he 
repeatedly makes throughout h i s l e c t u r e ( 3 5 ) , and f a r from 
complimenting the p e r s p i c a c i t y of the B r i t i s h Churches' 
i n t e r e s t i n Europe, Ludlow c r i t i c i s e s them f o r not 
understanding how Europe works, and t h e r e f o r e , how the Churches 
may c o n t r i b u t e to Europe's future development. 
I n e x p l a i n i n g how the 'system' works, 
Ludlow i l l u s t r a t e d h i s l e c t u r e by u s i n g a s e l e c t i o n of s o c i a l 
i s s u e s as case s t u d i e s on the o p p o r t u n i t i e s and l i m i t a t i o n s of 
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the EU. i n the case of unemployment fo r example, Europe can 
only operate as a partner with member s t a t e s who have the bulk 
of the work to do i n seeking out methods to a l l e v i a t e 
unemployment; however, i n the case of asylum and refugee 
p o l i c y (which i s l a r g e l y determined through inter-governmental 
co-operation r a t h e r than through the i n s t i t u t i o n s of the EU) 
there would be advantages i n c l o s e r European co-operation. 
Thus he argues t h a t the European union i s n e i t h e r n e c e s s a r i l y a 
panacea f o r a l l European improvement, nor a l s o the a n t i t h e s i s 
of n a t i o n a l s e l f - i n t e r e s t . 
Ludlow i s a l s o keen to point out t h a t i t i s 
the Churches' r i g h t and duty to speak, f o r European i s s u e s 
"should... engage us as i n d i v i d u a l s , as p r i e s t l y prophets or 
prophetic p r i e s t s , and, by no means l e a s t , as denominations." 
Thus i t i s v i t a l f o r the Churches to understand how Europe 
works, indeed, "Whether we are i n d i v i d u a l C h r i s t i a n s or 
churches, we ignore the European l e v e l of government a t our 
p e r i l . " ( P a g e 24) 
One way i n which the Churches have 
attempted to respond has been through such o r g a n i s a t i o n s as the 
European Ecumenical Commission f o r Church and S o c i e t y . However, 
Ludlow notes with r e g r e t t h a t "They a r e . . . l o n e l y outposts 
l a c k i n g f o r the most p a r t p r e c i s e l y t h a t i n g r e d i e n t which makes 
the Union so strong, namely organic, l i v i n g l i n k s with n a t i o n a l 
communities who acknowledge t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y - and t h e i r 
need - to operate e f f e c t i v e l y a t a European l e v e l . Unless and 
u n t i l n a t i o n a l churches take the European dimension s e r i o u s l y , 
the ecumenical Euro-experts w i l l be condemned to be a h a l f -
e f f e c t i v e s u b - c u l t u r e . . . " ( 3 6 ) E q u a l l y problematic, i n h i s view, 
i s the n a t i o n a l o r i e n t a t i o n of many European denominations, 
which, when " l a c k i n g a n a t u r a l European dimension, n a t i o n a l 
communions can s u f f e r from inadequate information and 
p e r s p e c t i v e . " As a consequence, the Churches need to work 
c l o s e l y together, f o r " I cannot imagine t h a t there i s a 
s p e c i f i c 'Anglican' as opposed to a 'Methodist' p o s i t i o n on 
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most i f not a l l the more important i s s u e s a c t u a l l y or 
p r o s p e c t i v e l y under c o n s i d e r a t i o n a t European l e v e l . " ( 3 7 ) . 
I n my judgement, the Beckly S o c i a l S e r v i c e s 
Lecture i s one of the most important c o n t r i b u t i o n s to the 
Churches-and-Europe debate, because i t was given by an E n g l i s h 
C h r i s t i a n who i s engaged d a i l y w ith the i n s t i t u t i o n s of Europe. 
Therefore h i s c r i t i c i s m s ( i m p l i c i t and e x p l i c i t ) of the B r i t i s h 
Churches need to be taken a l l the more s e r i o u s l y . The Churches 
i n the European Union fun c t i o n s as a s e r i o u s indictment f o r 
past f a i l u r e s and f o r l e t t i n g Europe be marginal to the 
Church's t h i n k i n g i n the present, y e t i t a l s o s e r v e s as a 
challenge to renewed e x p l o r a t i o n and energy, f o r as Ludlow 
notes i n h i s f i n a l remarks, " I n d i v i d u a l C h r i s t i a n s and 
C h r i s t i a n communities have... a heavy r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to make 
t h e i r witness i n word and i n a c t i o n w i t h i n a European as w e l l 
as a n a t i o n a l framework."(38) 
Continuing i n t e r e s t i n Europe, can a l s o be 
found i n the Methodist t h e o l o g i c a l j o u r n a l , Epworth Review, 
which i s c u r r e n t l y p u b l i s h i n g a major s e r i e s of e s s a y s 
e x p l o r i n g some of the many i s s u e s surrounding Europe. 
Commencing i n May 1995 with a "Data-Sheet on Europe", o u t l i n i n g 
the population, economy and i n s t i t u t i o n s of Europe, as w e l l as 
sign-posting i s s u e s f a c i n g the f u t u r e of the EU; the s e r i e s has 
to date explored a broad range of i s s u e s . T h i s has included an 
essay e x p l o r i n g the i s s u e s surrounding the cur r e n t i n t e r -
governmental conference (September 1995), as w e l l as asking 
whether B r i t a i n can ever r e a l l y care f o r Europe ( J a n u a r y ) . Thus 
have made the s e r i e s r i c h i n d i f f e r e n t p e r s p e c t i v e s . 
I n e v i t a b l y , such a v a r i e t y of w r i t e r s make 
i t d i f f i c u l t adequately to summarize t h e i r e s s a y s . There are, 
however, f e a t u r e s of the s e r i e s which are worthy of note. 
F i r s t l y , the s e r i e s i s being published a t a l l ! I t i s t a n g i b l e 
evidence of i n t e r e s t i n the present and f u t u r e of Europe. By 
producing a s e r i e s , i t enables a more rounded and d e t a i l e d 
t h e o l o g i c a l debate on European i s s u e s to take p l a c e . By v i r t u e 
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of the n a t i o n a l and denominational d i v e r s i t y of the authors, i t 
i s a l s o a l l o w i n g n o n - B r i t i s h , European C h r i s t i a n s to address 
Europe as an i s s u e , and confront us here i n B r i t a i n w ith an 
a l t e r n a t i v e p e r s p e c t i v e to those we might normally hear. 
T h e o l o g i c a l l y and p o l i t i c a l l y , the s e r i e s 
so f a r has been broadly pro-European. However, although i t may 
be pro-European, i t i s n e i t h e r sycophantic or u n c r i t i c a l . Thus 
the a r t i c l e s repeatedly p r a i s e the peace and economic b e n e f i t s 
of the EU, w h i l s t a l s o c h a l l e n g i n g Europe's weaknesses. The 
a r t i c l e s a l s o seek to address some of the i s s u e s t h a t w i l l 
f ace Europe i n the f u t u r e , such as the f u t u r e enlargement of 
the EU to the E a s t . Therefore Hermann Barth's avowedly pro-
European essay i s a l s o the essay which a s s e r t s t h a t high 
unemployment, growing poverty and r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n "points 
to an unsolved task of the r e a l i s a t i o n of a t r u e 
community."(39) 
The c o l l e c t i o n of essays i n the Epworth 
Review a l s o serve to challenge the readers and the Church to 
think f u r t h e r about i t s own r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to think and a c t . 
For example, John Nurser, the d i r e c t o r of CAFE ( C h r i s t i a n i t y 
and the Future of Europe), notes i n a way reminiscent of 
Ludlow's Beckly Lecture, t h a t , "So f a r as I can t e l l , t h e r e i s 
almost no wide-spread or h i g h - p r o f i l e commitment f o r the 
Churches to taking the Europe p r o j e c t s e r i o u s l y . " ( 4 0 ) 
C u r i o u s l y , the s e r i e s of e s s a y s have not explored any v i s i o n 
f o r the f u t u r e of Europe beyond the i s s u e s t h a t f a c e Europe i n 
the short and medium term. U n l i k e such w r i t e r s as B e l l , Temple 
and Beales, who were not only able to address t h e i r 
contemporary Europe but able to c o n t r i b u t e to t h i n k i n g about 
the long-term future of Europe a f t e r the war, the Epworth 
Review has not as yet made the jump i n t o the d i s t a n t f u t u r e . I 
hope t h a t i n due course i t w i l l do j u s t t h a t 
As I have shown, t h e r e f o r e , the Methodist 
Church has begun to address the question of Europe a t many 
d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s , from the o f f i c i a l l e v e l of r e p o r t s to the 
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Methodist Conference; the t h e o l o g i c a l l e v e l of the Epworth 
Review; as w e l l as the more popular l e v e l through such 
p u b l i c a t i o n s as E u r o b u l l e t i n and The Methodist Recorder. At the 
r i s k of e x h i b i t i n g a Methodist b i a s , i t i s , I b e l i e v e , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y important t h a t the Churches address Europe i n a 
comprehensive way a t v a r i o u s l e v e l s , and the Methodist Church 
has begun to do t h a t . However, other denominations have a l s o 
been a c t i v e l y engaged i n e x p l o r i n g the question of Europe, not 
l e a s t of which has been the E n g l i s h Roman C a t h o l i c Church. 
As I have a l r e a d y suggested, both i n t h i s 
and my previous chapter, The T a b l e t has been c o n s i s t e n t l y 
i n t e r e s t e d i n the f u t u r e of Europe, and how the u n i t e d Kingdom 
co n t r i b u t e s to i t . T h i s has continued i n the 1990's. 
The T a b l e t has continued to o f f e r only 
c r i t i c a l support f o r the EU, h i g h l i g h t i n g the short-comings of 
the EU, such as the 'democratic d e f i c i t ' , which i t saw as being 
creat e d on the one hand by "the b r i l l i a n t work of European 
bureaucrats i n B r u s s e l s " , and on the other hand by the 
" s e c r e t i v e decision-making of the Council of M i n i s t e r s , which 
i s not properly accountable to the European Parliament..."(41) 
I n i t s judgement, the l i n k s between n a t i o n a l parliaments and 
Europe's needed to be strengthened. 
I n 1995 a s h o r t s e r i e s of a r t i c l e s 
examining i s s u e s f a c i n g contemporary i s s u e s was published by 
The T a b l e t . At the h e a r t of these a r t i c l e s was the r e c u r r i n g 
question of n a t i o n a l sovereignty. I n the f i r s t essay Damian 
Howard argued t h a t , f o r B r i t a i n , the question "comes down... 
to our never having faced the concrete question involved i n 
p o l i t i c a l union. Reading the words of E u r o - s c e p t i c s one gets 
the impression t h a t n a t i o n a l sovereignty i s an end i n i t s e l f , 
not something to be used i n order to guarantee the w e l l - b e i n g 
of the nation's c i t i z e n s . " ( 4 2 ) Howard f u r t h e r argues t h a t f a r 
from f e a r i n g the f u t u r e t r a n s f e r of powers to B r u s s e l s , Euro-
s c e p t i c s have "missed the point. The power i s a l r e a d y there, 
but i t i s being e x e r c i s e d c l u m s i l y and without proper 
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democratic c o n t r o l . " Thus Howard argues t h a t B r i t a i n must 
s e r i o u s l y debate the questions of sovereignty and f e d e r a l i s m , 
r a t h e r than allowing the i s s u e s "to be obscured by t a b l o i d 
p r e j u d i c e and p o l i t i c a l manipulation." Damian Howard's a r t i c l e 
was then followed by two e s s a y s given by Owen Hickey, formerly 
of The Times and The T a b l e t , and Edward Mortimer, the f o r e i g n 
a f f a i r s e d i t o r of The F i n a n c i a l Times. 
Hickey began by s t r e s s i n g the c r u c i a l 
importance of the European debate by s t a t i n g t h a t , "... the 
i s s u e i s the nature of the B r i t i s h s t a t e . " Hickey then proceeds 
to o u t l i n e what he sees as the r i s k s of the EMU, not l e a s t f o r 
i t s undermining of n a t i o n a l ( i . e . B r i t i s h ) sovereignty. Hickey 
argues, i n f a c t , f o r a ' t r a d i t i o n a l ' B r i t i s h view of a semi-
detached approach to Europe: "For many generations, educated 
B r i t o n s have made themselves f a m i l i a r with European c u l t u r e and 
b e l i e v e d themselves to be p a r t of i t . Yet he [ i . e . the B r i t i s h ] 
f e l t no n e c e s s i t y to cement the r e l a t i o n s h i p by marriage of 
convenience." 
Edward Mortimer's essay o u t l i n e s a more 
p o s i t i v e view of c l o s e r European i n t e g r a t i o n , b e l i e v i n g t h a t 
f a r from undermining B r i t i s h sovereignty, i t could p o s i t i v e l y 
enhance i t , f o r a t the moment B r i t a i n has an " ' e l e c t i v e 
d i c t a t o r s h i p ' " . Consequently, i n h i s opinion, "The only checks 
on Parliament's otherwise absolute power a r e the t h r e a t of 
i n s u r r e c t i o n , the f e a r of l o s i n g the next general e l e c t i o n , and 
the United Kingdom's membership of two s u p r a n a t i o n a l bodies 
which have t h e i r own lawi the Council of Europe and the 
European Community." Thus Mortimer b e l i e v e s t h a t Europe needs 
to become "more genuinely f e d e r a l and more f u l l y democratic." 
T h i s would r e q u i r e the f u r t h e r development of the EU, by 
granting g r e a t e r law-making powers to the European parliament, 
the granting of s t a t u t o r y powers t o l o c a l and r e g i o n a l 
assemblies by European law, and the enshrinement of the powers 
of n a t i o n a l parliaments i n EU Law so t h a t they could challenge 
the Union i f i t exceeded i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l powers. Responding 
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t o Mortimer's a r t i c l e , Hickey r i g h t l y noted t h a t "Mortimer's 
embrace f o r European f e d e r a l i s m , d i s c e r n i n g as i t i s , comes 
down to a... transmanche rescue plan f o r B r i t a i n . " (43) I t i s , 
i n other words, as much an essay o u t l i n i n g the d e f i c i e n c i e s of 
B r i t a i n ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n , as a paean of p r a i s e f o r the EU. 
Wh i l s t The Ta b l e t continues to promote 
d i s c u s s i o n on B r i t a i n and Europe, and i s l a r g e l y i n favour of 
the European p r o j e c t , t h a t support i s q u a l i f i e d . I t s approach 
i s f a s c i n a t i n g f o r i t s ' s e c u l a r ' approach t o Europe. I t 
w r e s t l e s with Europe as a p o l i t i c a l e n t i t y (and r i g h t l y s o ) , 
but a l s o seems t o suggest by omission, t h a t Europe has gone 
beyond the t h e o l o g i c a l debate which c h a r a c t e r i z e d The T a b l e t ' s 
a r t i c l e s i n the 1960's and 1970's. Returning Europe to the 
t h e o l o g i c a l arena, however, i s C a r d i n a l Hume's book, Remaking 
Europe: The Gospel i n a Divided Continent, which I s h a l l now 
examine. 
Although Remaking Europe was published i n 
1994, i t i s i n f a c t a c o l l e c t i o n of addresses made by C a r d i n a l 
Hume between 1982-1993, and as such, was intended t o apply to 
the many changes t h a t occurred i n Europe during the decade 
p r i o r to i t s p u b l i c a t i o n . 
The s t a r t i n g point f o r Remaking Europe i s 
the r e a l i s a t i o n t h a t Europe has been s i n c e the c o l l a p s e of 
Communism i n a s t a t e of s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l f l u x . I f Europe i s 
to f i n d a way forward and to remain a p l u r a l i s t but s t a b l e 
s o c i e t y , common val u e s need t o underpin our s o c i e t y . I t i s , i n 
Hume's judgement, the Church's task to show t h a t i n an age of 
s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l m a l a i s e God alone can meet people's 
deepest d e s i r e s . I t i s t h e r e f o r e , the C h r i s t i a n ' s t a s k to l i v e 
i n a C h r i s t i a n way. To help f u l f i l t h i s c a l l i n g , Hume e x p l a i n s 
t h a t "the Church has, e s p e c i a l l y i n t h i s century, fashioned a 
s o c i a l d o c t r i n e which has been c a l l e d one of the Church's best 
kept s e c r e t s " ( 4 4 ) . The purpose of Remaking Europe, t h e r e f o r e , 
may be viewed as an attempt to r e l a t e C a t h o l i c s o c i a l t h i n k i n g 
t o the contemporary Europe. For Hume, the main p r i n c i p l e s of 
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C a t h o l i c s o c i a l t h i n k i n g can be summed up i n four words: 
d i g n i t y , development, s o l i d a r i t y and s u b s i d i a r i t y ( 4 5 ) . 
The Church, a s s e r t s Hume, i s committed to 
the d i g n i t y of each i n d i v i d u a l person, and t o t h e i r r i g h t s as a 
human being, because of the fundamental b e l i e f t h a t a l l people 
are created i n the image of God. That e s s e n t i a l humanity must 
be r e f l e c t e d p r a c t i c a l l y i n p o l i t i c s and i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s . 
At the macro-level, t h i s i s seen i n a commitment t o world 
development and i n the quest f o r j u s t i c e ; a t the i n d i v i d u a l 
l e v e l , i t i s seen i n the development of the human s p i r i t and i n 
each person's p o t e n t i a l . 
I n C a t h o l i c s o c i a l t h i n k i n g - whose 
language has been widely employed by the European Union - two 
f u r t h e r concepts e x p l a i n the i m p l i c a t i o n s of human d i g n i t y . 
F i r s t l y , t h e re i s the p r i n c i p l e of s o l i d a r i t y which recognises 
t h a t because of each i n d i v i d u a l ' s d i g n i t y , one must stand 
alongside a l l human beings as equals and p a r t n e r s . The second 
p r i n c i p l e i s s u b s i d i a r i t y . Hume de f i n e s the p r i n c i p l e of 
s u b s i d i a r i t y as "a r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t people, because of who and 
what they are, should be empowered to take d e c i s i o n s f o r t h e i r 
own l i v e s with due regard f o r the i n t e r e s t s of the wider 
community. I t i s c l e a r l y opposed t o e x c e s s i v e bureaucracy, t o 
paternalism, to the imposition of p o l i c i e s and s t r a t e g i e s by 
the strong on the weak. I t emphasises the need to develop human 
p o t e n t i a l as God-given and as the g r e a t e s t resource possessed 
by the p l a n e t . " ( 4 6 ) As a consequence, i n h i s view, "we a l l need 
to r e f l e c t on our human s o l i d a r i t y w i t h i n Europe and out s i d e . 
We need to see the unbreakable connection between love of God 
and love of our neighbour."(47) So then, how does Hume suggest 
these p r i n c i p l e s may be employed i n order t o remake Europe? 
At the heart of Hume's book i s the 
c l a s s i c a l Thomist view t h a t "the d e f i n i n g f e a t u r e s of human 
nature do not change, and they generate c e r t a i n u n i v e r s a l and 
permanent requirements of human well-being and f u l f i l m e n t which 
moral v a l u e s seek t o express."(48) The problem, as he sees i t , 
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i s t h a t Europe has l o s t confidence i n these moral norms which 
he b e l i e v e s are e s s e n t i a l f o r human well-being, u n i v e r s a l 
s o l i d a r i t y , however, has i t s moral content: i t acknowledges the 
worth of each i n d i v i d u a l , and t h e r e f o r e i s a t odds which such 
phenomena as racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism. " I n f a c t " , 
argues Hume, "the acceptance of God's unconditional love f o r 
each person leads us to see t h a t human s o l i d a r i t y has to be 
u n i v e r s a l . " ( 4 9 ) So what content to moral a c t i o n does t h i s 
b e l i e f give? 
On the one hand, i t has i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r 
Europe. The l i b e r a l i z a t i o n of trade with c o u n t r i e s outside the 
EU i s imperative. Emergency a i d i s not s u f f i c i e n t . S i m i l a r l y , 
i n the face of so great an i n c r e a s e i n the number of refugees 
and other immigrants i n t o Europe, i t i s important t h a t Europe 
does not simply r e a c t to the problem by p u t t i n g up b a r r i e r s , 
but by addressing the root causes of the problem. 
On the other hand, the moral content of the 
b e l i e f i n human s o l i d a r i t y has i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the Church. "We 
have to advocate an i n c l u s i v e and open s o l i d a r i t y formed on 
love and r e s p e c t f o r the stranger, and oppose an e x c l u s i v e and 
clos e d s o l i d a r i t y founded on i n d i f f e r e n c e or even f e a r of the 
str a n g e r . " ( 5 0 ) But i f t h a t moral v o i c e i s t o have for c e , the 
Church must a l s o address i t s own brokenness, and recognise t h a t 
a d i v i d e d Church i s a stumbling block to i t s own i n t e g r i t y . 
Furthermore, the Church must r e d i s c o v e r i t s own b e l i e f s , and 
begin t o engage i n mission and s e r v i c e . Therefore the Church 
must r e c a l l t h a t i t s h e a r t i s God and not human wisdom; i t must 
r e d i s c o v e r i t s understanding of the a l i e n a t i n g e f f e c t of s i n , 
which r e s u l t s i n brokenness and d i v i s i o n , and, i n s t e a d of i d l y 
s i t t i n g back and w a i t i n g f o r the Kingdom, "we have to pray f o r 
i t c e a s e l e s s l y and work f o r i t t i r e l e s s l y and recognize i t s 
every m a n i f e s t a t i o n i n the a f f a i r s of humanity."(51) i n s h o r t , 
C h r i s t i a n s are c a l l e d to the r e - e v a n g e l i z a t i o n of Europe and t o 
the renewal of the Church. Thus, through each C h r i s t i a n 
engaging i n the s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t i n j u s t i c e , i n the reverence 
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f o r the despised of our s o c i e t y , and i n the good stewardship of 
the world's resources, "The C h r i s t i a n can provide contemporary 
Europe with a r a d i c a l a l t e r n a t i v e t o the p u r s u i t of power; i t 
inv o l v e s t r u s t i n the presence and power of God and unswerving 
commitment to the gospel of love."(52) 
Hume concludes w i t h the bold a s s e r t i o n t h a t 
"The f u t u r e w i l l not be secured by p o l i t i c a l t i n k e r i n g or 
s o c i a l engineering and improved technology. What i s needed i s 
response to the c e n t u r i e s - o l d c a l l of C h r i s t t o tr u e conversion 
of h e a r t and mind. There w i l l be no b e t t e r world without b e t t e r 
people. And no b e t t e r people without growth i n genuine love. 
And there can be no growth i n genuine love without f a i t h i n God 
and a tr u e and l a s t i n g love of him."(53) So then, what i s the 
importance of C a r d i n a l Hume's book? 
Remaking Europe: The Gospel i n a Divided 
Continent i s i n t e r e s t i n g because i t l u c i d l y r e s t a t e s c a t h o l i c 
s o c i a l teaching i n r e l a t i o n to contemporary Church and S o c i e t y 
i n Europe. I t has a p a r t i c u l a r l y strong emphasis upon the 
d i g n i t y of the i n d i v i d u a l person as made i n the image of God, 
w h i l s t a t the same time reminding the reader of the corporate 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of humanity. 
I n many ways Remaking Europe stands w i t h i n 
the t r a d i t i o n a l Thomist understanding of a common humanity and 
a n a t u r a l moral law t h a t underpins the world order. The book 
th e r e f o r e a l s o stands w i t h i n the t r a d i t i o n espoused i n the 
1940's by B e l l , Temple and Beales ( see chapter 3 ) . As wi t h 
B e l l ' s concept of the Church as Una Sane ta, Hume s t r e s s e s the 
importance of the Church as the p o t e n t i a l model and v e h i c l e f o r 
the renewal of s o c i e t y . As with Temple, Hume s t r e s s e s the 
importance of human d i g n i t y and worth, w h i l s t holding the 
ten s i o n between personal freedom and an ordered s o c i e t y 
together. Again, l i k e Temple, Hume attempts to f i n d appropriate 
moral p r i n c i p l e s to guide Europe i n t o the fu t u r e . As with 
Beales, Hume c a s t s h i s work w i t h i n the main stream of C a t h o l i c 
s o c i a l t h i n k i n g (though without the overt ultramontanism which 
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c h a r a c t e r i s e d B e a l e s ' book). S i m i l a r l y though, as with the 
1940's p u b l i c a t i o n s , the question f o r us today remains as to 
how c r e d i b l e a hope i t i s , i n a m u l t i - c u l t u r a l and m u l t i - f a i t h 
Europe, f o r there to ever be a common corpus of val u e s to 
underpin European s o c i e t y . Perhaps Hume i s too s w i f t to suggest 
t h a t Europe has merely l o s t confidence i n t r a d i t i o n a l C h r i s t i a n 
moral v a l u e s (Hume, p.26), and too slow t o w r e s t l e with the 
genuine question of r e c o n c i l i n g d i f f e r e n t v a l u e s i n t o a common 
corpus f o r a s t a b l e Europe. 
Hume's book i s a l s o s i g n i f i c a n t i n t h a t 
once again i t throws out a double ch a l l e n g e : t o Europe as a 
whole and to the Churches. Remaking Europe i s f o r t h r i g h t i n 
s t r e s s i n g the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of Europe and European C h r i s t i a n s 
to stand alongside the disadvantaged, t o a c t f o r j u s t i c e , t o 
work towards a r a i s i n g of standards f o r the developing world, 
and for the need f o r Europe to remember t h a t i t i s pa r t of a 
global community. Hume i s a l s o candid i n re c o g n i s i n g t h a t the 
Church's message to Europe i s s e v e r e l y diminished by the 
d i v i s i o n s w i t h i n the Churches i n Europe. Both need to be 
addressed to gi v e an au t h e n t i c v o i c e t o the gospel. 
Perhaps most s i g n i f i c a n t of a l l , i s the 
f a c t t h a t i t i s a d i s t i n c t l y C h r i s t i a n v i s i o n of how Europe may 
be r e b u i l t . As with B e l l i n 1940, Hume sees t h a t u l t i m a t e l y , 
Europe can only be r e b u i l t through a C h r i s t i a n renewal 
throughout Europe. J u s t to address the p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s alone 
would be " t i n k e r i n g " as he puts i t (Hume, p. 103). Perhaps the 
book's weakness a t t h i s point may be the l i n g e r i n g question of 
whether Hume i s , i n e f f e c t , hoping f o r a r e t u r n t o the 
"romantic dream"(54) of a new Christendom-Europe. 
i n my judgement, Remaking Europe: The 
Gospel i n a Divided Continent i s a p a r t i c u l a r l y h e l p f u l book, 
p r e c i s e l y because i t does t r y to r e l a t e C a t h o l i c s o c i a l 
t h i n k i n g to contemporary Europe. I t s e f f e c t must s u r e l y be f o r 
the reader to w r e s t l e with the apparent d i a l e c t i c between 
seeking the renewal of a C h r i s t i a n Europe and Church, with the 
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r e a l i t y t h a t Europe i s more m u l t i - c u l t u r a l than i t has ever 
been. What Hume achieves i s to s e t out h i s framework, based on 
the d i g n i t y of each person and the corporate nature of 
humanity, so t h a t Europe might be remade, and t h a t the Gospel 
might have a word to say i n a divided Continent. 
During the 1990's, then, we have seen a 
number o f f i c i a l r e p o r t s from the main E n g l i s h denominations. We 
have a l s o seen an emerging range of m a t e r i a l s from some 
denominations aimed at r a i s i n g i s s u e s and awareness about 
Europe, most p a r t i c u l a r l y from the Methodist and Roman C a t h o l i c 
Churches. What i s perhaps j u s t as noteworthy, i s the r e l a t i v e l y 
small amount of m a t e r i a l produced by the Church of England. 
Although Strasbourg B r i e f i n g i s produced by the Anglican 
Chaplaincy there, r e l a t i n g both to the European Parliament and 
the Council of Europe, and o c c a s i o n a l a r t i c l e s are produced i n 
both the Church Times and C r u c i b l e (the Board of S o c i a l 
R e s p o n s i b i l i t y ' s j o u r n a l ) , t h ere i s r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e 
s p e c i f i c a l l y Anglican p r i n t e d input to the debate. However, i t 
i s e q u a l l y noteworthy t h a t the Church of England i s making a 
s i g n i f i c a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n to pan-European work, through such 
i n d i v i d u a l people as John Arnold, the Dean of Durham and 
Chairman of the Conference of European Churches, and David 
Edwards (whose 1990 book I have explored above). I t i s to be 
hoped t h a t as the Church of England opens up to other European 
Churches as a r e s u l t of the Meissen and Porvoo agreements, as 
w e l l as through i t s support of such ecumenical groups as EECCS, 
i t w i l l a l s o f i n d a g r e a t e r v o i c e to b r i n g i t s own i n s i g h t s and 
experience to bear on the f u t u r e of Europe. 
To conclude then. i n these l a s t two 
chapters, as with chapters 1 and 2, we have seen a v a r i a b l e 
response from the E n g l i s h churches towards Europe. As with 
s e c u l a r p o l i t i c i a n s , so i n the war y e a r s the Church l e a d e r s 
were i n the f o r e f r o n t of t h i n k i n g about what shape post-war 
B r i t a i n and Europe might take. A case can be made for saying 
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t h a t the Church l e a d e r s i n England, such as Archbishop Temple 
and Bishop B e l l , and indeed A.C.F. Beales together with Sword 
of the S p i r i t were ahead of t h e i r s e c u l a r counterparts i n 
con s i d e r i n g the f u t u r e . With the c l o s e of the war, the r e t r e a t 
from t h i n k i n g about Europe, w h i l s t m i r r o r i n g t h e i r p o l i t i c a l 
counterparts was more dramatic. With the exception of the 1967 
B r i t i s h Council of Churches' report, t h e r e was no E n g l i s h 
P r o t e s t a n t v o i c e r a i s e d a t a l l concerning Europe f o r n e a r l y 30 
y e a r s . Only the Roman C a t h o l i c Church has kept an i n t e r e s t i n 
Europe a l i v e . 
I n t h i s chapter concerned with B r i t i s h 
Church engagement with Europe s i n c e the United Kingdom j o i n e d 
the European Communities i n 1973, we have seen a v a r y i n g 
p i c t u r e of how the Churches have engaged with Europe. I n i t i a l l y 
t h e r e was some i n t e r e s t (mainly Roman C a t h o l i c ) a t the time of 
the 1975 Referendum campaign, but u n t i l the l a t e 1980's s i l e n c e 
reigned once more. However, from the l a t e 1980's u n t i l the 
present day, as I have shown i n chapter 2, Europe became a 
v i t a l domestic and f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e f o r the government. As 
a consequence of the c o l l a p s e of Communism i n C e n t r a l and 
E a s t e r n , i n s p i r e d i n many c o u n t r i e s by the Churches, Europe 
became impossible f o r the E n g l i s h Churches to ignore. 
I t i s not s u r p r i s i n g , then, t h a t i t was a t 
the end of the 1980's t h a t the Churches began to look s e r i o u s l y 
a t Europe, as the recent f l u r r y of denominational r e p o r t s 
i n d i c a t e s . But t h i s renewed i n t e r e s t i s noteworthy f o r i t s 
d e s c r i p t i v e work, r a t h e r than deep t h e o l o g i c a l engagement w i t h 
Europe. The Churches were, i n e f f e c t , attempting to c a t c h up 
with where Europe alr e a d y was. They were not, i t seems, i n a 
p o s i t i o n to ask where Europe might go i n the f u t u r e . 
I n the l a s t 3 or 4 y e a r s we have, however, 
begun to see s i g n s t h a t B r i t i s h Churches a r e beginning t o 
engage i n p o l i t i c a l and t h e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n and a n a l y s i s 
over the question of Europe, e s p e c i a l l y i n the Roman C a t h o l i c 
and Methodist Churches. What i s s u r e l y to be r e g r e t t e d i s t h a t 
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i t has taken n e a r l y 20 y e a r s s i n c e B r i t a i n entered the EC f o r 
the Churches t o wake up t o Europe again. I f Hastings was 
c o r r e c t i n suggesting t h a t B r i t i s h C h r i s t i a n s have been more 
outspoken i n the 1970s and 1980s on s o c i a l i s s u e s s i n c e the e r a 
of Temple and B e l l , Europe was conspicuous by i t s absence from 
the Churches v o i c e . So can the E n g l i s h Churches e f f e c t i v e l y 
engage with Europe? I t i s t o t h i s c r u c i a l question t h a t I s h a l l 
now t u r n t o i n my next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE ENGLISH CHURCHES 
AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPE 
" I am c e r t a i n t h a t the C h r i s t i a n f a i t h has 
a word of i n c a l c u l a b l e value f o r these times... I am c e r t a i n 
t h a t i t i s the t r u t h about human l i f e , p e r s o n a l , s o c i a l , 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l . " ( 1 ) So began Bishop B e l l ' s Forward to h i s 1940 
paperback, C h r i s t i a n i t y and World Order. B e l l , of course, wrote 
h i s book a t a time of deep c r i s i s f o r both B r i t a i n and Europe. 
C l e a r l y Europe does not face such a c r i s i s today, even i f one 
accepts the p r o p o s i t i o n supported by many of the authors and 
r e p o r t s reviewed i n chapter 4, t h a t Europe i s i n the midst of 
moral, s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l malaise, i n t h i s chapter I s h a l l 
ask whether B e l l ' s confident b e l i e f i s j u s t i f i a b l e . Do the 
E n g l i s h Churches have a word of i n c a l c u l a b l e value f o r Europe 
today? Furthermore, i f one b e l i e v e s t h a t the Church does have a 
word to speak, what i s i t s message, and how may i t r a i s e i t s 
vo i c e and engage e f f e c t i v e l y i n such a complex, p l u r a l i s t 
s o c i e t y , which makes up Europe today? 
i n t h i s chapter, I s h a l l be arguing t h a t 
the Church can have a word f o r our times; indeed, i f i t does 
not, then the Church cannot r e a l l y c l a i m to have a u n i v e r s a l 
gospel, nor c l a i m to speak to the oikoumene - the whole 
inhabited e a r t h . However, I s h a l l a l s o suggest i n t h i s chapter, 
t h a t i f the E n g l i s h Churches are e f f e c t i v e l y to engage i n and 
be engaged by Europe, t h a t engagement must be thorough, 
comprehensive and competent i n what i t says and does. I n s h o r t , 
I s h a l l o f f e r i n t h i s chapter a 'Diamond model' f o r the B r i t i s h 
Churches' engagement with Europe. 
A diamond has a remarkable s e t of 
p r o p e r t i e s . I t i s m u l t i - f a c e t e d ; extremely durable; and has a 
tremendous c u t t i n g edge. The model of the diamond I s h a l l be 
d e s c r i b i n g suggests t h a t the Church's approach should s i m i l a r l y 
be m u l t i - f a c e t e d i f i t s v o i c e i s to be durable and have a 
c u t t i n g edge, to speak e f f e c t i v e l y to our times. What, then, 
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are the i m p l i c a t i o n s of the 'diamond model' for the Church? 
F i r s t l y , the model suggests t h a t the Church 
needs a m u l t i - f a c e t e d , comprehensive approach to Europe. I n h i s 
a n a l y s i s of the Church's response to poverty i n B r i t a i n i n the 
e a r l y 1980's John Atherton charged the Church with f a i l i n g 
e f f e c t i v e l y to respond to the many l e v e l s i n which poverty had 
to be combatted. C i t i n g the three l e v e l s of response as being 
the i n d i v i d u a l response, the area response and the s t r u c t u r e s -
o f - s o c i e t y response, Atherton b e l i e v e d t h a t the Church l a r g e l y 
responds i n the f i r s t two a r e a s . However, he argues t h a t " i f 
adequate responses to poverty are about i n d i v i d u a l i s t and area 
p o l i c i e s , and yet about more than t h a t , then what does the 
'more than t h a t ' r e q u i r e of u s ? " ( 2 ) He argues t h a t the Church 
"must engage the very ordering of s o c i e t y . "(3) As I have made 
c l e a r i n chapter 4, Ludlow has r i g h t l y c r i t i c i s e d the Churches' 
l a c k of knowledge and understanding about how the European 
Union works ( 4 ) . Does the Church have a word to say about the 
s t r u c t u r e s of Europe, which a f f e c t our l i v e s as profoundly as 
the Westminster parliament? I t i s my contention i n t h i s chapter 
t h a t the Churches must understand how the p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e s 
work, and then adopt a comprehensive approach to i t s work when 
engaging with Europe. 
As the Church of England's repor t , Europe, 
suggests, the churches must ask themselves how t h a t v o i c e may 
e f f e c t i v e l y be spoken. Europe implied t h a t the Church of 
England p r e f e r r e d the most c o s t - e f f e c t i v e approach to 
engagement. I t seems to me, however, t h a t i f the Church i s to 
have a m u l t i - f a c e t e d approach to Europe, i t must recognise t h a t 
i t s v o i c e must a l s o speak on d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s too. T h i s v o i c e 
may come from the i n s t i t u t i o n a l Churches - as i n s t i t u t i o n s 
speaking to i n s t i t u t i o n s . I t may a l s o come from C h r i s t i a n 
theologians and s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s , w r e s t l i n g w i t h what i t means 
to be European. I t may a l s o be t h a t the Church speaks most 
eloquently through i n d i v i d u a l C h r i s t i a n s a c t i n g i n t h e i r c i v i c 
c a p a c i t y - a concept which I s h a l l explore i n d e t a i l below -
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whether as o f f i c i a l s , p o l i t i c i a n s , j u r i s t s or c i t i z e n s . I s h a l l 
argue below t h a t the Church must a c t and speak at each of these 
l e v e l s . 
One c r i t i c i s m which can be j u s t l y l e v e l l e d 
a t the Church's door has been i t s tendency to be s e l e c t i v e i n 
i t s approach to European p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s . The Church i s often 
g u i l t y of only responding to i s s u e s with an o v e r t l y moral or 
r e l i g i o u s dimension. For example, the Churches have often 
( r i g h t l y ) challenged i n s t a n c e s of racism and xenophobia, and 
have championed the cause of j u s t i c e and human r i g h t s . However, 
very few pronouncements have been made on economic and monetary 
union. I n f a c t i f the churches have such a narrow scope, they 
reduce themselves to the r o l e of a pressure group on the i s s u e s 
which i n t e r e s t them most. I n f a c t , i f the Church b e l i e v e s i n 
the oikoumene, then i t must spurn such a l i m i t e d approach. 
I n s t e a d I s h a l l be arguing t h a t C h r i s t i a n s need to be involved 
where power l i e s , and t h a t means a c t i v e engagement i n p o l i t i c s . 
Moreover, i f C h r i s t i a n s remove themselves from the p o l i t i c a l 
process, the l i k e l y c o r o l l a r y seems to be t h a t p o l i t i c a l 
t h i n k i n g could become more remote and amoral. The Church needs 
to r e j e c t the l i m i t e d p r e s s u r e - g r o u p / s e l e c t i v e model, i n favour 
of the comprehensive, m u l t i - f a c e t e d approach to Europe, which I 
s h a l l advocate i n t h i s chapter. 
The second c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a diamond i s 
i t s d u r a b i l i t y and s t r e n g t h , which g i v e s the diamond i t s 
remarkable c u t t i n g edge. T h i s too has i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the 
Church, i n order f o r the Church's v o i c e to be durable, as 
Atherton suggests, i t needs to acquire both competence and 
e x p e r t i s e , and recognise t h a t which a l r e a d y e x i s t s i n the 
Churches' l i f e . I f the Church i s to be heard, a minimal 
requirement i s a competent understanding of how Europe works! 
I t must, moreover, be methodical and s u s t a i n e d i n i t s 
e x p l o r a t i o n and a n a l y s i s of contemporary Europe. 
E q u a l l y , i f the Church i s to have a c u t t i n g 
edge, as Edwards pointed out (see chapter 4, p. 121) i t a l s o 
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needs h u m i l i t y , r a t h e r than a b r a s i v e n e s s . Thus, w h i l s t the 
Church's a n a l y s i s of Europe must be competent, and r e s o l u t e i n 
r e l a t i n g i t s f a i t h to the p o s s i b i l i t i e s for the future, i t must 
s t i l l avoid any arrogance which can undermine c o n t r i b u t i o n s 
from other f a i t h communities or academic i n t e r e s t s . T h i s i s i n 
pa r t because the Church can no longer c l a i m to have a pre-
eminent p l a c e i n Europe's t h i n k i n g . Respect f o r our 
co n t r i b u t i o n has to be earned not expected. I t i s a l s o , i n 
pa r t , because the Church now e x i s t s i n a m u l t i - f a i t h Europe. 
C h r i s t i a n s cannot expect C h r i s t i a n v a l u e s to be uniformly 
adhered to. The Church must t h e r e f o r e avoid the abr a s i v e n e s s 
and arrogance which o f t e n points to a blunt edge i n s t e a d of a 
c u t t i n g edge. Moreover, i n a p l u r a l i s t s o c i e t y , the Church must 
be open to t e s t i n g and c r i t i c i s m by others outside i n order f o r 
the worth of i t s words to be accepted. 
What, then, are the p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n s 
of t h i s model of a m u l t i - f a c e t e d , tough and endurable diamond 
with i t s c u t t i n g edge for the Church's engagement and 
co n t r i b u t i o n to Europe? How may they speak a word of 
" i n c a l c u l a b l e value" f o r today? 
I n the fo l l o w i n g pages I s h a l l use three 
" f a c e t s " through which I b e l i e v e the Churches can and should be 
engaging with Europe. The f i r s t f a c e t i s t h a t of personal 
engagement w i t h Europe; the second i s t h a t of i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
engagement with Europe; and the t h i r d i s a t the l e v e l of 
t h e o r e t i c a l engagement. By engaging i n each of these l e v e l s , I 
b e l i e v e t h a t the Church's competence may be demonstrated, and 
thus give the Church's v o i c e a c u t t i n g edge f o r our times. 
F A C E T 1: PERSONAL ENGAGEMENT. 
One of the d e f i c i e n c i e s of many of the 
church r e p o r t s described i n chapter 4, i s t h a t they are c l e a r l y 
aimed a t the l e a d e r s h i p of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e denominations. T h i s 
i s not to devalue t h e i r worth, but i t perhaps does r e f l e c t a 
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problem which the Churches - as w e l l as s e c u l a r p o l i t i c i a n s -
have: namely engaging the 'average' person i n the s t r e e t or i n 
the pew. As E r n e s t W i s t r i c h has b l e a k l y observed, "People have 
become i n c r e a s i n g l y a l i e n a t e d from t h e i r governments. 
Democratic a c c o u n t a b i l i t y of n a t i o n a l governments to t h e i r 
c i t i z e n s through e l e c t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s has become tenuous... 
Representative democracy, meant to give ordinary c i t i z e n s a say 
i n t h e i r l i v e s , i s becoming d i s c r e d i t e d through growing 
cyn i c i s m about p o l i t i c i a n s . A sense of community has been 
replaced by a general f e e l i n g of 'them and us' as the gap 
between government and governed has alarmingly widened."(5) I f 
t h i s i s the case f o r n a t i o n a l parliaments, how much more i t i s 
for the European Parliament! I t may a l s o be the case t h a t such 
a gap a l s o e x i s t s between the Church l e a d e r s and the 'average' 
church member. A recent statement on C h r i s t i a n p o l i t i c a l 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , appealed "to a l l members of the church to play 
a p a r t i n p o l i t i c a l controversy. None should f e e l i n advance 
th a t t h e i r views cannot i n f l u e n c e debate, or t h a t t h e i r 
c o n v i c t i o n s are unworthy of a hea r i n g . " ( 6 ) How, though, may 
i n d i v i d u a l s , or small groups (the 'personal f a c e t ' ) engage with 
the Europe of today i n the fac e of so much cynicism, 
d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t and d i s i n t e r e s t i n p o l i t i c s ? 
( i ) S c r u t i n y and A c c o u n t a b i l i t y 
One important element of the personal f a c e t 
of C h r i s t i a n engagement with the European Union i s t h a t of 
s c r u t i n i z i n g c a r e f u l l y what goes on i n the EU, and holding 
accountable those who make and enforce i t s d e c i s i o n s . I n many 
ways circumstances tend to m i l i t a t e a g a i n s t members of the 
p u b l i c doing t h i s ! 
As I explained i n chapter 2 (see pp.50-53) 
one of c e n t r a l c r i t i c i s m s of the European Union i s i t s 
'democratic d e f i c i t ' . T h i s c r i t i c i s m b e l i e v e s t h a t the 
i n s t i t u t i o n s and policy-making processes of the EU are not 
t r a n s p a r e n t l y democratic i n e i t h e r operation or a c c o u n t a b i l i t y . 
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Together with the complexity of the EU s t r u c t u r e s ; the problems 
of a c c e s s ; as w e l l as the often d i s t o r t e d media p o r t r a y a l of 
the EU so t h a t i t i s often d i f f i c u l t to d i s c e r n the t r u t h from 
the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , the net r e s u l t being t h a t people often 
switch o f f from European i s s u e s . As W i s t r i c h pointed out, t h i s 
i n t u r n leads to deeper cy n i c i s m and a l i e n a t i o n from the 
i n s t i t u t i o n s and from the democratic process i t s e l f . 
At a b a s i c l e v e l , i t i s important f o r a l l 
c i t i z e n s to become f a m i l i a r with how Europe works. J u s t as the 
Churches cannot engage e f f e c t i v e l y w i t h Europe u n l e s s they know 
how Europe 'works', so i t i s e q u a l l y important f o r i n d i v i d u a l s 
to understand how Europe works, not l e a s t because the European 
Union a f f e c t s our d a i l y l i v e s as much as Westminster or County 
H a l l . 
I t i s a l s o important to l i s t e n and watch 
c a r e f u l l y and c r i t i c a l l y f o r what i s going on i n Europe. Thus, 
as the 1995 Methodist Statement on P o l i t i c a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
observes, "we a f f i r m t h e i r s t r e n g t h s and expose t h e i r 
weaknesses, seeking c l e a r e r p i c t u r e s of the v a r i o u s vested 
i n t e r e s t s which we f i n d a t work."(7) C h r i s t i a n s , then, may 
contribute to c i v i l s o c i e t y by using t h e i r c r i t i c a l f a c u l t i e s , 
indeed, i f C h r i s t i a n s do not use t h e i r c r i t i c a l f a c u l t i e s when 
considering Europe, t h e r e i s the genuine danger t h a t Europe 
w i l l not be e f f e c t i v e l y d e m o c r a t i c a l l y accountable, to the 
detriment both of Europe and the c i t i z e n - though of course 
p o l i t i c a l apathy may not ipso facto lead to a u t h o r i t a r i a n r u l e , 
as the p o l i t i c a l e t h i c i s t , J.P. wogaman has argued ( 8 ) . I n t h a t 
way, by holding the EU to account, and thus by standing f o r 
C h r i s t i a n v a l u e s , the message of the gospel may be proclaimed, 
not j u s t f o r one's own b e n e f i t , but f o r the b e n e f i t of those 
who a r e on the margins of s o c i e t y , and who have l i t t l e or no 
say i n s o c i e t y ' s s t r u c t u r e s . 
One of the weaknesses of the B r i t i s h 
approach to Europe i s t h a t d i s c u s s i o n i s so often couched i n 
polemical terms. I n wogaman's view, "A democratic s o c i e t y i s 
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w e l l served by a c i t i z e n r y not f a n a t i c a l l y attached to s i n g l e 
i s s u e s or causes but capable of rounded judgements and a 
c a r e f u l weighing of ambiguous a l t e r n a t i v e s . " ( 9 ) A p a r t i c u l a r 
c o n t r i b u t i o n t h a t Wogaman i s c a l l i n g for i s f o r C h r i s t i a n -
p o l i t i c a l dialogue r e j e c t i n g the polemical approach, and 
seeking more rounded judgements- I t would be p a r t i c u l a r l y 
u s e f u l i f l o c a l groups of C h r i s t i a n s ( as opposed to the Synod, 
Assembly or Conference l e v e l of the Church) began to explore 
European i s s u e s , and attempted t o s e t them i n the l i g h t of 
f a i t h , by s e t t i n g a s i d e the polemics so commonly attached to 
Europe, i n d i v i d u a l C h r i s t i a n s , then, can engage with Europe, 
through f a m i l i a r i t y and understanding, c r i t i c a l e x p l o r a t i o n of 
Europe, and a d e s i r e to defend human, c i v i l and democratic 
r i g h t s . 
( i i ) Personal involvement i n European p o l i t i c s and European 
i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
Another key element of the personal f a c e t 
of C h r i s t i a n engagement w i t h Europe, may, however, be more 
pr o - a c t i v e , and can mean t h a t more C h r i s t i a n s ought to become 
a c t i v e l y engaged i n p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y ( i n c l u d i n g p a rty 
p o l i t i c s ) , not l e a s t i n Europe. 
When C h r i s t i a n s become involved i n the 
European p o l i t i c a l process, whether as p o l i t i c i a n s or as 
o f f i c i a l s , i n some sense, by v i r t u e of t h e i r C h r i s t i a n f a i t h , 
they c a r r y w ith them the standard of the Church. Archbishop 
Temple contended t h a t "The Church must announce C h r i s t i a n 
p r i n c i p l e s and point out where the e x i s t i n g s o c i a l order a t any 
time i s i n c o n f l i c t with them. I t must then pass on t o 
C h r i s t i a n s , a c t i n g i n t h e i r c i v i c c a p a c i t y , the t a s k of r e -
shaping the e x i s t i n g order i n c l o s e r conformity to those 
p r i n c i p l e s . " ( 1 0 ) I have alr e a d y evaluated Temple's p r i n c i p l e s 
i n chapter 3, but what i s s i g n i f i c a n t here, though, i s the 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of r o l e s : The Church may announce 
p r i n c i p l e s ; i n d i v i d u a l C h r i s t i a n s a c t i n g i n t h e i r c i v i c 
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c a p a c i t y must put them i n t o p r a c t i c e . Acting i n t h e i r " c i v i c 
c a p a c i t y " f o r Temple means th a t C h r i s t i a n men and women should 
a c t i n a C h r i s t i a n way i n t h e i r d a i l y l i v e s , e s p e c i a l l y when 
they have power to formulate or execute p u b l i c p o l i c y . Although 
Temple, l i k e h i s contemporary, A.C.F. Beales (see chapter 3, 
p.84), does not cl a i m t h a t any form of government i s 
' C h r i s t i a n ' per se, Temple s t r o n g l y b e l i e v e d t h a t i n d i v i d u a l 
C h r i s t i a n s had a great c o n t r i b u t i o n to make i n reforming 
s o c i e t y under the guidance of C h r i s t i a n p r i n c i p l e s . I n t h a t 
sense, C h r i s t i a n p o l i t i c a l p r a c t i t i o n e r s were the p r o v e r b i a l 
leaven i n the lump. Perhaps the g r e a t e s t o b s t a c l e to Temple's 
b e l i e f s being r e a l i s e d i s the general contempt f o r European 
p o l i t i c i a n s and bureaucrats. I t seems to me, however, t h a t i n 
the face of so much p u b l i c cynicism, i t i s of paramount 
importance t h a t C h r i s t i a n s become a c t i v e l y engaged i n the 
European p o l i t i c a l process, e i t h e r as p o l i t i c i a n s or as 
o f f i c i a l s (below I s h a l l group them together as ' p o l i t i c a l 
p r a c t i t i o n e r s because, i n some sense, they are mutually 
dependent f o r t h e i r r o l e s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ) . How then may 
these European p o l i t i c a l p r a c t i t i o n e r s be r e h a b i l i t a t e d , and 
how may more C h r i s t i a n s be encouraged to get p e r s o n a l l y 
involved i n reshaping Europe according to C h r i s t i a n v a l u e s 
w h i l s t a c t i n g i n t h e i r " c i v i c c a p a c i t y " ? 
One of the much used images of the 
C h r i s t i a n Church has been based on 1 Peter 2.5, 9-10, which 
s t a t e s t h a t a l l C h r i s t i a n people are "a chosen people, a r o y a l 
priesthood, a holy n a t i o n , a people belonging to God." I t seems 
to me th a t t here are a number of ideas a t t r i b u t e d to the 
" p r i e s t " , which can f i n d a p a r a l l e l i n the p o l i t i c a l 
p r a c t i t i o n e r s . 
One important element i n the t r a d i t i o n a l 
image of the priesthood i s the sense of vocation. A common (and 
u n s o l i c i t e d ) comment from the C h r i s t i a n Euro-MP's I spoke to 
during my r e s e a r c h v i s i t to the European Parliament was the 
profound sense t h a t God had s i m i l a r l y c a l l e d them t o serve as 
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p o l i t i c i a n s . For many, th a t was a t great personal c o s t to 
themselves and t h e i r f a m i l i e s , not l e a s t because of the 3 or 4-
way s p l i t of the month between Strasbourg, B r u s s e l s , 
constituency and home. Although there i s no r i t e of o r d i n a t i o n 
fo r them ( u n l e s s v i c t o r y a t the b a l l o t box i s equi v a l e n t to the 
congregation's cry, "They are worthy!"[11]), the Church should, 
I b e l i e v e , not only recognise t h e i r genuine vocation to serve, 
but should a c t i v e l y a f f i r m them i n t h e i r m i n i s t r y . According to 
a recent report, "The commitment of i n d i v i d u a l C h r i s t i a n s to 
work f o r s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l change should a l s o be recognised 
as a f u l l y l e g i t i m a t e form of d i s c i p l e s h i p . " (12) To t h i s end, 
the Churches could and should be a c t i v e l y c o n s i d e r i n g the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of s e t t i n g up p a s t o r a l l y - f o c u s e d c h a p l a i n c i e s t o 
the European i n s t i t u t i o n s , f o r p r e s e n t l y , there are no 
chap l a i n s to the i n s t i t u t i o n s ( 1 3 ) . I f C h r i s t i a n o f f i c i a l s and 
p o l i t i c i a n s were perceived as being l e g i t i m a t e l y c a l l e d by God 
as the c l e r g y u s u a l l y are by the Church, i t would, I b e l i e v e , 
a s s i s t i n the r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of the worth of p o l i t i c a l 
p r a c t i t i o n e r s i n Europe today. 
Another t r a d i t i o n a l understanding of the 
p r i e s t l y r o l e has been the p r i e s t as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e and 
mediator. As such the p r i e s t r e p r e s e n t s C h r i s t to the Church 
and the Church to C h r i s t , and through prayer becomes a mediator 
between the two. As Frances Young comments, "the Church 
i n h e r i t s through C h r i s t not j u s t the promises to I s r a e l , but 
the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , to be a p r i e s t l y people, r e p r e s e n t i n g God 
to the world, a go-between, a 'pontifex' or bridge 
b u i l d e r . " ( 1 4 ) I f the C h r i s t i a n p o l i t i c a l p r a c t i t i o n e r has 
s i m i l a r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s then the ta s k and the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s 
take on new s i g n i f i c a n c e . By v i r t u e of t h e i r C h r i s t i a n f a i t h , 
when a c t i n g i n t h e i r " c i v i c c a p a c i t y " the C h r i s t i a n p o l i t i c a l 
p r a c t i t i o n e r w i l l a l s o be a c t i n g i n a " p r i e s t l y " way, 
repr e s e n t i n g God and the Church i n the o f f i c i a l arena through 
t h e i r v a l u e s , a t t i t u d e s and conduct; and a l s o r e p r e s e n t i n g the 
c i v i l s t r u c t u r e s to God and to the Church. The p o l i t i c a l 
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p r a c t i t i o n e r , thus f u n c t i o n s not only as a mediator but a l s o , 
to use Young's phrase, as a "bridge b u i l d e r " . 
A key element i n the Methodist 
understanding of the priesthood of a l l b e l i e v e r s i s t h a t the 
p r e s b y t e r a t e shares i n priesthood with the whole Church of 
C h r i s t . The Methodist Church's 1960 statement on o r d i n a t i o n 
held t h a t " m i n i s t e r s . . . are c a l l e d and ordained to t h i s s o l e 
occupation... but they hold no priesthood d i f f e r i n g i n kind 
from t h a t which i s common to the Lord's people..."(15) I t i s 
important for C h r i s t i a n s to remember t h a t C h r i s t i a n o f f i c i a l s 
and p o l i t i c i a n s a t work i n Europe are not only there on behalf 
of the e l e c t o r a t e ; they are a l s o a t work as p a r t of the 
community of f a i t h . Moreover, as C h r i s t i a n p r a c t i t i o n e r s i n 
Europe are j o i n e d i n the priesthood of a l l b e l i e v e r s , so i t 
must be e q u a l l y t r u e , t h a t a l l C h r i s t i a n s must, i n some way, 
share the priesthood of the p o l i t i c a l p r a c t i t i o n e r . To quote 
Frances Young again, "The whole community of b e l i e v e r s i s b u i l t 
i n t o a s p i r i t u a l temple, and the whole community has a p r i e s t l y 
o f f i c e , l i k e o l d I s r a e l , to be a l i g h t to the n a t i o n s . " Not a l l 
C h r i s t i a n s may be c a l l e d to p o l i t i c s , or to the European C i v i l 
S e r v i c e , but a l l C h r i s t i a n s are c a l l e d t o r e f l e c t C h r i s t i a n 
v a l ues i n a l l t h a t they do as they a c t i n t h e i r own " c i v i c 
c a p a c i t y " . Consequently, i t seems to me, t h a t C h r i s t i a n s have a 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to take European p o l i t i c s s e r i o u s l y , and those 
who are engaged i n working with Europe day by day. C h r i s t i a n 
p r a c t i t i o n e r s i n Europe should not be the excuse of the Church 
to ignore Europe, nor the butt of jokes e i t h e r . At the very 
l e a s t , C h r i s t i a n s need to grasp something of the p o l i t i c a l 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y which i n d i v i d u a l s have as "a chosen race, a 
r o y a l priesthood, a holy n a t i o n , God's own people, t h a t you may 
d e c l a r e the wonderful deeds of him who c a l l e d you out of 
darkness i n t o h i s marvellous l i g h t " . 
Unfortunately, for many, the world of 
p r a c t i c a l p o l i t i c s i s p e r c e i v e d as o b j e c t i o n a b l e because of the 
ambiguity and compromise needed to keep the p o l i t i c a l wheels 
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moving. T h i s , i n some sense, appears to c o n t r a d i c t the c a l l f o r 
the employment of C h r i s t i a n p r i n c i p l e s . However, as Temple a l s o 
pointed out, "The p o l i t i c a l problem i s concerned with men as 
they are, not with men as they ought to be. Pa r t of the t a s k i s 
so to order l i f e as to lead them nearer to what they ought to 
be..."(16) Wogaman goes f u r t h e r by arguing t h a t even i n the 
midst of ambiguity and compromise the C h r i s t i a n p r a c t i t i o n e r 
can make a p o s i t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the debate and execution of 
p o l i c y , because C h r i s t i a n f a i t h "leads one to re s p e c t the 
humanity of one's p o l i t i c a l a d v e r s a r i e s . . . " ( 1 7 ) When European 
i s s u e s are oft e n dominated by polemics i n B r i t a i n , i t i s 
important to remember t h a t there are C h r i s t i a n s i n each 
p o l i t i c a l p arty, as w e l l as i n the European Commission, and 
th a t r e s p e c t f o r a d v e r s a r i e s i s an important c o n t r i b u t i o n which 
C h r i s t i a n p r a c t i t i o n e r s can make i n the cu r r e n t c l i m a t e . 
Wogaman a l s o b e l i e v e s t h a t C h r i s t i a n 
p r a c t i t i o n e r s have a p e r s p e c t i v e on h i s t o r y which should 
profoundly a f f e c t t h e i r judgements. "Because the hope of 
C h r i s t i a n s i s s e t beyond h i s t o r y , they are not prone to 
a b s o l u t i z e p a r t i c u l a r goals. And they are more prepared to 
enter i n t o the give-and-take of p o l i t i c a l process with i t s 
necessary compromise. On the other hand, because the hope of 
C h r i s t i a n s i s a l s o w i t h i n h i s t o r y they are able to work 
vi g o r o u s l y f o r a t t a i n a b l e h i s t o r i c a l goals - and even to 
e n t e r t a i n hopes long abandoned by the d i s i l l u s i o n e d and 
c y n i c a l . " ( 1 8 ) When European p o l i t i c s can e a s i l y stagnate 
through the i n t r i c a c i e s of the p o l i t i c a l c u r r e n t s and 
processes, such a long view may indeed encourage those who are 
involved i n the processes. Thus, i t seems to me, t h a t a mixture 
of Temple's C h r i s t i a n i d e a l i s m and Wogaman's p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s m 
needs to take p l a c e , which can inform each other, and thus l e a d 
the p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y forward. I t may w e l l be th a t the approach 
of some c o n t i n e n t a l European s t a t e s towards consensus-seeking 
p o l i t i c s (see chapter 2, p. 48) may be more ak i n t o t h i s 
approach. 
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( i i i ) Personal encounters with other Europeans. 
I n a d d i t i o n to the p o l i t i c a l connotations 
of personal involvement with Europe, there are a l s o i n c r e a s i n g 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r people to engage with Europe through work, 
education and even the l o c a l church, both as B r i t o n s go to 
other p a r t s of Europe, and as c i t i z e n s of other EU and non-EU 
s t a t e s come to the United Kingdom. Such informal personal 
contacts a r e l i k e l y to grow. 
A method of personal contact with other 
Europeans s t r o n g l y advocated by the 1994 report, The United 
Reformed Church: A European Church i s church twinning. I n 
s e t t i n g down i t s g u i d e l i n e s f o r such arrangements, the r e p o r t 
s t r e s s e s the need for l o c a l support f o r the i n i t i a t i v e , and 
t h a t a commitment to the p r o j e c t i n prayer and i n s e n s i t i v i t y 
for the partner c h u r c h ( e s ) i s e s s e n t i a l . The report a l s o p o i n t s 
out t h a t with the i n c r e a s i n g p r a c t i c e of towns twinning w i t h i n 
Europe, t h a t l o c a l help and p o s s i b l y even some funding, might 
be a v a i l a b l e i f a twin was sought i n a partner town. Why though 
should the churches consider twinning arrangements a t a l l ? 
At one l e v e l , i t has i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the 
churches involved. "Entering i n t o a twinning r e l a t i o n s h i p i s 
meant to help a church i n B r i t a i n and a church abroad to see 
how each expresses i t s own understanding of the Gospel through 
i t s l i f e and programmes. I t should i n v o l v e an experience of 
l o c a l l i f e and c u l t u r e as w e l l as of n a t i o n a l church t r a d i t i o n s 
and s t r u c t u r e s . ( 1 9 ) At another l e v e l , i t can have i m p l i c a t i o n s 
for Europe as w e l l . 
Two of the main goals of the founders of 
post-war Europe, both from s e c u l a r s o c i e t y and from the 
Churches ( a s I have shown i n chapters 1 and 3) was the b u i l d i n g 
up of peace and r e c o n c i l i a t i o n a f t e r the d e v a s t a t i o n of war. 
Church twinning arrangements o f f e r the opportunity f o r 
C h r i s t i a n s to grow i n understanding of what i t means to l i v e i n 
another p a r t of Europe. For many, i t could be the f i r s t time 
t h a t a church member has had personal contact with people from 
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other c o u n t r i e s , other than through the remote experiences of 
package h o l i d a y s where genuine encounter with the l o c a l c u l t u r e 
and i t s people i s s t r i c t l y managed. I n a d d i t i o n , i t may, f o r 
some, o f f e r an opportunity to work through p r e j u d i c e s and h u r t s 
b u i l t up over a l i f e t i m e . Perhaps when the modern p o l i t i c a l 
s t r u c t u r e s of Europe appear to be monolithic and remote, and 
p o l i t i c a l language (and s p o r t i n g , as the coverage of the Euro 
96 f o o t b a l l championship showed) i s often couched i n 
n a t i o n a l i s t i c terms, i t i s even more e s s e n t i a l t h a t the 
b a r r i e r s of p r e j u d i c e are challenged by personal contact and 
human r e l a t i o n s . I n f a c t , i t may w e l l be t h a t i t i s through 
such personal c o n t a c t s t h a t the goals of the founders of post-
war Europe may best have t h e i r dreams r e a l i s e d . As the URC 
report comments, " i t i s from such s m a l l - s c a l e informal 
f r i e n d s h i p s t h a t g r e a t e r l i n k s o ften develop, with s i g n i f i c a n t 
r e s u l t s f o r European co-operation and understanding."(20) 
Wherever p o s s i b l e , churches would do w e l l to give time to 
c o n s i d e r i n g church twinning arrangements. 
( i v ) Prayer. 
An e q u a l l y important element i n personal 
engagement with Europe i s through prayer f o r Europe as a 
continent, and f o r those who are involved i n shaping Europe's 
l i f e through n a t i o n a l parliaments, the Council of Europe, and 
through the instruments of the European Union. I n many 
denominational s e r v i c e books, p r a y e r s are included f o r the 
s t a t e and a l l members of parliament. There are, however, no 
e q u i v a l e n t p r a y e r s included f o r the European Union. Moreover, 
prayer c y c l e s o f t e n r e f e r to ecumenical l i n k s with other 
European churches but not the p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e s . I f i t i s 
r i g h t to pray f o r the s t a t e and those involved i n government, 
i t must a l s o be r i g h t to pray f o r the governmental s t r u c t u r e s 
of the European Union; indeed a l l C h r i s t i a n s can and should 
p a r t i c i p a t e i n the process of prayer, without being experts on 
European i s s u e s . 
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There are, then, many ways i n which 
i n d i v i d u a l s or groups of C h r i s t i a n s can become more p e r s o n a l l y 
engaged with Europe. I t i s not my i n t e n t i o n to advocate t h a t 
each person must do i t a l l , but i t i s my hope t h a t i n the l o c a l 
churches each element w i l l be taken s e r i o u s l y , and th a t 
i n d i v i d u a l C h r i s t i a n s be enabled to f e e l t h a t they have a p a r t 
to p l a y i n the up-building of Europe. 
I f the Churches are e f f e c t i v e l y to engage 
with Europe, the personal f a c e t of our diamond i s v i t a l l y 
important. E q u a l l y so, the f a c e t of the i n s t i t u t i o n a l Churches' 
engagement with Europe must a l s o be taken s e r i o u s l y , and i t i s 
t h i s second f a c e t , I s h a l l now explore. 
FACET 2: INSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT WITH EUROPE 
( i ) With whom? 
The primary question which the Churches 
must ask of themselves when seeking to engage e f f e c t i v e l y with 
Europe i s , with whom should we engage? At present there are two 
main European bodies with which the Church could engage: The 
European union and the Council of Europe (NB. T h i s i s not the 
European C o u n c i l , which i s the EU heads of governments' 
summit). 
As I have explained i n chapter 1, both 
i n s t i t u t i o n s have t h e i r o r i g i n s i n the debate about the fu t u r e 
of Europe which took p l a c e i n the e a r l y years a f t e r the Second 
World War. Both i n s t i t u t i o n s can s i m i l a r l y t r a c e t h e i r o r i g i n s 
to the epoch-making Congress of Europe of 1948 (see pp. 12-14). 
At f i r s t , as Bainbridge and Teasdale have noted, "the Council 
of Europe was... the main forum f o r debate over the f u t u r e of 
Europe... "(21) With the inauguration of the European Coal and 
S t e e l Community i n 1951, however, the Council of Europe became 
overshadowed by i t s i n c r e a s i n g l y prominent pa r t n e r . Both 
i n s t i t u t i o n s have d i f f e r i n g r o l e s , however. 
I f the European union can be c a r i c a t u r e d as 
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the dominant p o l i t i c a l power i n Europe, the Council of Europe 
may w e l l be s i m i l a r l y c a r i c a t u r e d as the dominant moral and 
e t h i c a l forum i n Europe. Unlike the EU's 15 members, the 
Council of Europe has 34 member s t a t e s . S i nce the Cou n c i l ' s 
i n c e p t i o n i n 1949, i t has been committed to "the spreading of 
democratic s e c u r i t y through a common a l l e g i a n c e to human 
r i g h t s , p o l i t i c a l p l u r a l i s m and r e s p e c t f o r the r u l e of 
law."(22) Each member-state must be democratic and committed to 
these goals . 
Perhaps the most famous c o n t r i b u t i o n to 
post-war Europe has been the Convention f o r the P r o t e c t i o n of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and i t s 1965 supplement, 
the European S o c i a l Charter. The importance of t h i s 
c o n t r i b u t i o n i s widely acknowledged, indeed, i n h i s recent 
book, Race f o r the Millenium, David Haslam notes t h a t w h i l s t 
the EU i s "more s t r u c t u r e d , and of course economically 
powerful, ... the l a t t e r [ i . e . the Council of Europe] i s a l s o 
important, e s p e c i a l l y where matters of human r i g h t s are 
concerned."(23) The Council of Europe i s , however, a l s o 
concerned today with c u l t u r e , environmental p r o t e c t i o n , medical 
e t h i c s , the f i g h t a g a i n s t crime, and a l s o supporting the 
co u n t r i e s of c e n t r a l and e a s t e r n Europe i n the process of 
democratization. Despite the Cou n c i l ' s important c o n t r i b u t i o n , 
i t s fundamental weakness i s t h a t i t s conventions do not 
au t o m a t i c a l l y have the f o r c e of law i n member c o u n t r i e s . I t i s 
e n t i r e l y a t the d i s c r e t i o n of member s t a t e s as to whether they 
are r a t i f i e d i n n a t i o n a l law. However, i n recen t y e a r s , 
s i g n i f i c a n t areas of agreement and overlap between the Council 
of Europe and the European Union have emerged. For example, 
although there i s v i r t u a l l y no mention of human r i g h t s i n the 
Treaty of Rome, " A r t i c l e F2 of the Maas t r i c h t Treaty r e q u i r e s 
the European Union to r e s p e c t the r i g h t s s e t out i n the 
Convention and i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n of member s t a t e s 'as general 
p r i n c i p l e s of Community law'."(24) Teasdale and Bainbridge 
f u r t h e r note t h a t the European Commission and Parliament are i n 
C h a p t e r 5 Pa g e 167 
favour of the Union i t s e l f becoming p a r t y to the Convention, 
with the e f f e c t t h a t the Convention would become EU law. 
Further to the i s s u e of human r i g h t s , the EU i s a l s o now 
engaged i n promoting environmental p r o t e c t i o n ; the M a a s t r i c h t 
Treaty a l s o grants the EU i n c r e a s i n g powers i n the f i g h t 
a g a i n s t organised crime. Thus, the argument f o l l o w s : i f 
p o l i t i c a l power (and t h e r e f o r e the power to change things v i a 
l e g i s l a t i o n ) r e s i d e s i n B r u s s e l s and not with the Council of 
Europe, then the Churches should i n f a c t r e a l l y be 
concentrating on engaging the instruments of the European Union 
i f they want to i n f l u e n c e Europe f o r the b e t t e r , r a t h e r than 
with a body t h a t has no power to enforce i t s d e c i s i o n s , however 
worthy they may be. 
I t i s my contention i n t h i s chapter t h a t 
the Churches' engagement with Europe should be m u l t i - f a c e t e d 
and comprehensive. I do not b e l i e v e , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t i t need be 
a case of the churches only engaging with e i t h e r the European 
Union or the Council of Europe. I n f a c t , there are, I b e l i e v e , 
compelling reasons f o r the churches i n England to a c t i v e l y 
engage with both the EU and the Council of Europe, as I s h a l l 
now e x p l a i n . 
F i r s t l y , the C o u n c i l of Europe i s more 
t r u l y pan-European than the European Union i s , or i s l i k e l y to 
be i n the f o r e s e e a b l e f u t u r e . Therefore any i n f l u e n c e t h a t the 
churches may b r i n g to bear i n Europe can arguably be f a r more 
widespread than simply by working with the EU. indeed, as Diana 
Pinto noted, i n an implied c r i t i c i s m of the EU, "with the f a l l 
of the B e r l i n Wall, the Council of Europe was f i n a l l y f r e e to 
a t t a i n i t s ' n a t u r a l ' pan-European scope. I t i s thus not an 
overstatement to say t h a t the r e v o l u t i o n s of 1989 did not throw 
the Council of Europe i n t o an e x i s t e n t i a l c r i s i s but i n s t e a d 
brought i t back to f u l l l i f e . " ( 2 5 ) C e r t a i n l y the Council became 
more genuinely pan-European than i t had ever been. E q u a l l y , 
because the Amsterdam Treaty f a i l e d adequately to address the 
question of i n t e r n a l reform, the process of enlargement has 
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been made s i g n i f i c a n t l y more d i f f i c u l t because " a p p l i c a n t s 
[ f a c e ] the u n s e t t l i n g prospect of e i t h e r n e g o t i a t i n g entry 
terms without knowing what i n f l u e n c e they w i l l w i e l d as members 
i n the EU's two key i n s t i t u t i o n s , or r i s k i n g a delay i n 
completing the t a l k s u n t i l the union has agreed i t s own 
i n t e r n a l i n s t i t u t i o n a l reforms."(26) Because the Church i n 
Europe transcends n a t i o n a l b a r r i e r s , they can hold the claims 
of the EU and non-EU s t a t e s together, as they remind the EU 
t h a t Europe i s made up of many more nations than the 15 s t a t e s 
of the EU. 
Secondly, i t i s c l e a r t h a t , d e s p i t e the 
Council of Europe's r e l a t i v e o b s c u r i t y when compared with the 
European Union, i t has, n e v e r t h e l e s s , been an important f o r c e 
i n Europe f o r moral and e t h i c a l r e f l e c t i o n , and the challenge 
to European s t a t e s to enshrine i t s e t h i c a l conventions i n t h e i r 
own n a t i o n a l laws. However, i t s l i m i t e d a u t h o r i t y c l e a r l y means 
th a t such moral and e t h i c a l r e f l e c t i o n must a l s o take p l a c e 
w i t h i n the p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e s of the EU as w e l l . By engaging 
with both i n s t i t u t i o n s the churches can a c t as a bridge, 
b r i n g i n g moral and e t h i c a l r e f l e c t i o n and challenge t o the EU, 
and a l s o b r i n g i n g p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s m i n t o the work of the 
Cou n c i l of Europe. 
T h i r d l y , w h i l s t i t i s c e r t a i n l y t r u e t h a t 
the European union w i e l d s g r e a t p o l i t i c a l power whereas the 
Council of Europe can only operate as a m o r a l / e t h i c a l p r e s s u r e 
group through intergovernmental co-operation, i t i s not t r u e to 
say t h a t the Churches should only be engaged with the Council 
of Europe simply because on the s u r f a c e i t s raison d'etre seems 
more a k i n t o the churches' agenda. That would simply re-enforce 
the d u a l i s t tendency t h a t wants to keep the churches t a l k i n g 
about morality, w h i l s t l e a v i n g the s t r u c t u r e s of p o l i t i c a l 
s o c i e t y w e l l alone. As one C h r i s t i a n MEP impressed upon me, he 
b e l i e v e d t h a t Europe was where power would i n c r e a s i n g l y r e s i d e ; 
indeed he f e l t he could achieve f a r more for h i s c o n s t i t u e n c y 
as an MEP than he could even as a government back-bencher at 
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Westminster ( 2 7 ) . Thus, by engaging with both s t r u c t u r e s , the 
Churches can c l a i m t h a t both e t h i c s and s t r u c t u r e s are w i t h i n 
the churches purview as i t works w i t h i n s o c i e t y . How then, 
should the E n g l i s h churches e f f e c t i v e l y engage with Europe? 
( i i ) Understanding, S c r u t i n y and R e f l e c t i o n . 
One of the v i t a l l y important steps f o r the 
Churches as i n s t i t u t i o n s to take, i s the seemingly obvious one, 
of becoming f a m i l i a r w ith how the European i n s t i t u t i o n s work. 
Ludlow and Nurser's admonishment f o r the Church's l a c k of 
understanding ( d e s c r i b e d i n chapter 4) should be take 
s e r i o u s l y . However, as the recent spate of denominational 
r e p o r t s exploring the s t r u c t u r e s of Europe has shown, the 
E n g l i s h Churches are becoming more i n t e r e s t e d i n the question 
of Europe, however b e l a t e d l y t h a t might be. As such, i t 
provides the beginning of the process of engagement. What seems 
to be needed j u s t as much, however, i s to engage the 
congregations of the Church with the i s s u e of Europe, so t h a t 
they can share i n the Church's r e f l e c t i o n . Under One Roof i s a 
s t a r t i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n . 
Secondly, as with i n d i v i d u a l s , the Churches 
need to give c a r e f u l a t t e n t i o n to what i s happening i n the 
European i n s t i t u t i o n s and i n European s o c i e t y as a whole. To 
some extent E u r o b u l l e t i n o u t l i n e s what i s happening; Methodists 
Looking at Europe takes the process f u r t h e r by exploring not 
only some of the i s s u e s a f f e c t i n g the EU, but a l s o the v a l u e s 
of i t s peoples. The T a b l e t continues to analyse the p o l i t i c s of 
Europe. C r u c i a l to t h i s , though, w i l l be a c r i t i c a l examination 
of the media which, as I have commented, often appears to have 
an a priori b i a s a g a i n s t anything European, i r r e s p e c t i v e of the 
r e l a t i v e m e rits of the t o p i c . However, i f the Church i s to 
e f f e c t i v e l y understand the i m p l i c a t i o n s of what i s happening i n 
and to Europe, i t needs to give p r i o r i t y to l i s t e n i n g . 
E q u a l l y , the Churches must begin to l i s t e n 
to the v o i c e of f a i t h and teaching. Temple's argument t h a t the 
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Churches may l e g i t i m a t e l y be involved i n the p o l i t i c a l process 
was based on h i s b e l i e f t h a t C h r i s t i a n s have a c o n t r i b u t i o n to 
make which comes from the corpus of C h r i s t i a n teaching. I f the 
Churches are to engage c r i t i c a l l y w i th Europe, they must be 
a c t i v e l y involved i n t h e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n upon European 
s o c i e t y . What has been notably d e f i c i e n t i n the Churches' 
r e p o r t s i s t h e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n . The Churches must l i s t e n to 
f a i t h and the c a l l of God i n a d d i t i o n to the v o i c e s of the 
marginalised, the nations and C h r i s t i a n communities i n order t o 
have a deep understanding of what i s happening i n Europe both 
p o l i t i c a l l y and to the people w i t h i n and o u t s i d e Europe's 
borders. 
( i i i ) L i s t e n i n g . 
As I explained i n chapter 3 (see p . 7 8 f ) , 
one of Bishop B e l l ' s great i n s p i r a t i o n s during World War Two 
was h i s b e l i e f i n the Church as Una Sane t a - the C h r i s t i a n 
f e l l o w s h i p which transcended a l l n a t i o n a l b a r r i e r s . I t i s no 
l e s s important f o r the churches i n England to remember t h a t i t 
i s p a r t of Una Sane ta too, f o r a v i t a l p a r t of the E n g l i s h 
Churches' c o n t r i b u t i o n i s t h a t of l i s t e n i n g t o C h r i s t i a n s i n 
other p a r t s of Europe and the wider world. T h i s i s e s s e n t i a l 
because some p o l i c i e s may seem to be b e n e f i c i a l to B r i t i s h or 
European c i t i z e n s , but may be a c t i v e l y harmful to other people. 
I f the E n g l i s h churches are to guard a g a i n s t n a t i o n a l 
parochialism, and thus to speak with the g l o b a l view i n mind, 
they must l i s t e n to what i s being s a i d by C h r i s t i a n s around the 
world. Two obvious examples of a r e a s of concern which 
i l l u s t r a t e the point are the d i s p u t e s over the reduction of 
f i s h i n g i n order t o conserve s t o c k s ; and trade from developing 
nations with the EU. What might b e n e f i t B r i t i s h fishermen might 
deplete f i s h i n g s t o c k s ; EU p r o t e c t i o n i s m could e a s i l y hamper 
the economic growth of developing n a t i o n s . To explore where 
j u s t i c e i s t o be found, w i l l mean c a r e f u l l i s t e n i n g . Only as a 
r e s u l t of c a r e f u l l i s t e n i n g can the E n g l i s h churches hope to 
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speak with the a u t h o r i t y of the Una Sancta. 
Another important group of people to l i s t e n 
to are those i n European s o c i e t y who are e f f e c t i v e l y 
d i s f r a n c h i s e d from the p o l i t i c a l process, and on the margins of 
s o c i e t y , such as migrant workers and r a c i a l m i n o r i t i e s . I f the 
Church i s e f f e c t i v e l y to hold to account the s t r u c t u r e s and 
process of European s o c i e t y , i t must l i s t e n t o those who are 
a f f e c t e d by those s t r u c t u r e s , and indeed to the widest p o s s i b l e 
c r o s s - s e c t i o n of s o c i e t y . 
( i v ) Speaking out. 
The Church's engagement with Europe must go 
beyond l i s t e n i n g , i t must a l s o be prepared to speak out when 
necessary, f o r , i n Bishop B e l l ' s memorable phrase, " i t i s not 
the Church's f u n c t i o n to say d i t t o to the S t a t e . " ( 2 8 ) 
I n h i s essay, Hints and Guesses: Changes i n 
Europe as a Challenge to Congregations, A l a s t a i r Hulbert 
( E x e c u t i v e S e c r e t a r y of EECCS), e x p l a i n s t h a t " i n B r u s s e l s and 
Strasbourg the churches are developing a 'theology of 
i n s i s t e n c e ' v i s - a - v i s the European i n s t i t u t i o n s . I t c o n s t i t u t e s 
an ongoing missionary programme: advocacy on i s s u e s of j u s t i c e 
and e t h i c s and c r i t i c a l dialogue about the economics and 
c u l t u r a l paradigm."(29) I t i s worth c o n s i d e r i n g the 
i m p l i c a t i o n s of Hulbert's programme. 
The f i r s t point t o note i s t h a t Hulbert i s 
c a l l i n g f o r a "theology of i n s i s t e n c e " r a t h e r than a "theology 
of r e s i s t a n c e " . I t i s a theology which agrees with Temple and 
B e l l ' s view t h a t the Church has a r i g h t and duty to speak out 
on s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s . Moreover, i t i s a challenge to 
the churches not to t r e a t Europe with p a s s i v i t y ; the churches 
should s t a t e t h e i r case p o s i t i v e l y , r a t h e r than merely 
r e s i s t i n g what i s happening i n Europe. 
The second element i n Hulbert's programme 
i s the advocacy of j u s t i c e and e t h i c s . I f the Church i s to have 
any c r e d i b i l i t y with the ma r g i n a l i s e d i n European s o c i e t y ; and 
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i f the Church i s to l i s t e n t o what people are saying beyond the 
EU's borders, then the Church must, as a world-wide 
i n s t i t u t i o n , s e r v e as a v o i c e f o r the v o i c e l e s s i n the advocacy 
of a j u s t g l o b a l s o c i e t y . However, as the p e r s i s t e n t 
controversy over the merits of l i b e r a t i o n theology has shown, 
i t i s by no means c l e a r t h a t t h i s i s p o s s i b l e y e t . Furthermore, 
the Church should be c a l l i n g f o r the h i g h e s t e t h i c a l standards 
i n Europe's l i f e . T h i s , however, does not simply mean high 
standards of p r o b i t y from o f f i c i a l s . I t means t h a t Europe must 
act e t h i c a l l y i n a l l t h i n g s . As such, the Church must a c t as a 
guardian f o r such high standards, and speak out where such 
standards are v i o l a t e d . 
The t h i r d element i n Hulbert's programme of 
a c t i o n i s a c r i t i c a l dialogue about the economic and c u l t u r a l 
paradigm. According to a recent statement of p o l i t i c a l 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , "The Church... needs to become an arena f o r 
moral r e f l e c t i o n on the way the corporate s t a t e operates -
a f f i r m i n g and c r i t i c i s i n g what goes on. And i t needs to recover 
i t s confidence i n being able to a f f e c t the way s o c i e t y i s run 
by l a r g e i n s t i t u t i o n s and f a c e l e s s b u r e a u c r a c i e s . " ( 3 0 ) T h i s 
seems to me to be what Hulbert i s p r i n c i p a l l y c a l l i n g f o r . T h i s 
means t h a t the churches cannot give an e c c l e s i a s t i c a l 
monologue. They must be prepared to l i s t e n and t o exchange 
ideas with the European i n s t i t u t i o n s . E q u a l l y importantly, i n 
Hulbert's view, " i n s p i r e d by the prophetic v i s i o n of the B i b l e , 
C h r i s t i a n s must j o i n f o r c e s with others o u t s i d e the church to 
open up new f i e l d s of s o c i a l d i s c o u r s e as Western c i v i l i z a t i o n 
advances deeper and deeper i n t o a c u l - d e - s a c . " ( 3 1 ) Thus, 
others may j o i n the dialogue, not l e a s t of whom may be other 
f a i t h communities i n Europe. Through genuine dialogue what i s 
good about the economic and c u l t u r a l paradigm may be affirmed; 
what i s o b j e c t i o n a b l e has the chance to be reformed. 
The f o u r t h f a c t o r i n Hulbert's statement i s 
h i s a s s e r t i o n t h a t the whole process i s an i n t e g r a l p a r t of the 
Church's missionary programme. T h i s too i s important f o r the 
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Churches to remember, for i t r e a s s e r t s the c l a i m t h a t the 
Churches have a l e g i t i m a t e mission to the s t r u c t u r e s of s o c i e t y 
as w e l l as to i n d i v i d u a l s . I t a f f i r m s t h a t the Church should, 
as p a r t of i t s t o t a l mission, b r i n g the challenge of i t s 
teaching and p r i n c i p l e s to bear when c o n s i d e r i n g the present 
and f u t u r e d i r e c t i o n of Europe i n j u s t as s e r i o u s a way as i f 
i t were c o n s i d e r i n g mission and s e r v i c e i n a l o c a l housing 
e s t a t e . So v i t a l i s the Church's mission to Europe, t h a t K e i t h 
Jenkins observes i n h i s provocative comment, " I f the European 
union i s to evolve i n t o a s e l f - c e n t r e d , s e l f - p r o t e c t i v e f r e e 
trade area seeking to i s o l a t e i t s e l f from other p a r t s of Europe 
and other c o n t i n e n t s , l e t the churches remain s i l e n t . I f , 
however, they recognise t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o c o n t r i b u t e to 
the debate about goals and methods... they must recognise t h a t 
now i s the time to make t h e i r a n a l y s e s , s t i m u l a t e debate i n 
church and s o c i e t y and make t h e i r v o i c e s heard."(32) I t i s , 
l i k e Bishop B e l l before him, K e i t h Jenkins' view t h a t the 
Church must have a word for the times. 
Together i n s i s t e n c e , advocacy, c r i t i c a l 
dialogue, when seen as p a r t of the Church's mission form the 
framework f o r a p o t e n t i a l l y f r u i t f u l engagement with the 
s t r u c t u r e s of European s o c i e t y . " I n the wake of the c o l l a p s e of 
Communism and the consequent u n c e r t a i n t y , there seems to be a 
g r e a t e r openness t o d i s c u s s i n g i s s u e s of mutual concern among 
p o l i t i c i a n s and c i v i l s e r v a n t s a t the European l e v e l . " ( 3 3 ) 
Moreover, Jacques Delors c a l l e d f o r the d i s c o v e r y of a soul f o r 
Europe. As Jenkins noted (see above), the door appears to be 
open f o r the Churches to take p a r t i n the dialogue. One 
question remains, however, how may the Church's work with the 
i n s t i t u t i o n s ? 
( v ) The p r a c t i c a l i t i e s . 
One p o s s i b i l i t y would be f o r each 
denomination to s e t up an o f f i c e i n B r u s s e l s i n order to 
represent t h e i r church's i n t e r e s t s and concerns. The Quaker 
C h a p t e r 5 Page 174 
Council f o r European A f f a i r s and the o f f i c e of the EKD are 
examples of t h i s . However, with the m u l t i p l i c i t y of 
denominations i n England, l e t alone the u n i t e d Kingdom, t h i s 
option seems p r o b l e m a t i c a l . I t would be an i n e f f i c i e n t use of 
the Churches' f i n a n c i a l and human res o u r c e s . I r o n i c a l l y , i t 
would a l s o serve to d i m i n i s h the Church's v o i c e r a t h e r than 
enhance i t . For example, i t i s f a r more l i k e l y t h a t the 
European Commission would l i s t e n to a united v o i c e r e p r e s e n t i n g 
4-5 m i l l i o n people, r a t h e r than v o i c e s i n d i v i d u a l l y 
r e p r e s e n t i n g ( i n the case of Methodism) around 500,000 people. 
Another a l t e r n a t i v e would be to use the 
e x i s t i n g European ecumenical bodies as a means of e n t e r i n g i n t o 
dialogue with the European i n s t i t u t i o n s . How committed are the 
churches to such bodies, though? One problem, i n Hermann 
Barth's view, i s t h a t w h i l s t the main focus of the Church's 
mission i s r i g h t l y i n the l o c a l community ( c f Atherton, pp.68-
82), " i t i s a l s o obvious t h a t the Churches i n t h e i r work cannot 
s t i c k to the s t r u c t u r e s of the past when p o l i t i c a l and economic 
s t r u c t u r e s change."(34) I n other words, Europe must no longer 
be p e r i p h e r a l to C h r i s t i a n t h i n k i n g as i t i s a t present, but 
c e n t r a l to i t . 
The Church of England's report, Europe, 
asks whether the E n g l i s h Churches are prepared to pay the 
p r i c e for engaging with Europe. A l l the evidence has h i t h e r t o 
suggested t h a t they are not, f o r , although the western European 
churches have h i t h e r t o paid the 'fees' of the e a s t e r n European 
churches t a k i n g a f u l l p a r t i n the CEC, the report a l s o notes 
t h a t the Churches' Council f o r B r i t a i n and I r e l a n d have f a i l e d 
to a l l o c a t e funding f o r EECCS, u n l i k e i t s predecessor, the 
B r i t i s h Council of Churches. Only the Church of England and the 
Church of Scotland from the UK have s u b s t a n t i a l l y contributed 
to the funding of EECCS ( 3 5 ) . At the b a r e s t minimum, the 
churches need to adequately fund the European ecumenical 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s t h a t a l r e a d y e x i s t . I n the case of EECCS, which 
u s u a l l y has C o u n c i l s of Churches r a t h e r than i n d i v i d u a l 
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denominations a f f i l i a t e d to i t , the CCBI needs to address the 
i s s u e c a r e f u l l y . 
I f , however, the churches a r e e f f e c t i v e l y 
and e f f i c i e n t l y to engage with Europe on an ecumenical b a s i s , 
then a number of i m p l i c a t i o n s follow. The E n g l i s h churches need 
not only to co-operate ecumenically i n the l o c a l community, 
they need to be deeply committed to working together when 
exploring the i s s u e of Europe too. Otherwise, as i s so often 
the case, the v i s i o n and the work load w i l l continue to r e s t 
on a few dedicated people. Secondly, the Churches need to work 
towards f i n d i n g common ground on European i s s u e s wherever 
p o s s i b l e , f o r , as P h i l i p Ludlow has remarked, " I cannot imagine 
t h a t there i s a s p e c i f i c 'Anglican' as opposed to a 'Methodist' 
p o s i t i o n on most i f not a l l the more important i s s u e s a c t i v e l y 
or p r o s p e c t i v e l y under c o n s i d e r a t i o n a t a European l e v e l . " ( 3 6 ) 
I f t h a t i s t o be the case, then the churches need a l s o to be 
prepared to a l l o c a t e personnel, academic, t h e o l o g i c a l and 
f i n a n c i a l r e s o u r c e s to the p r o j e c t . T h i r d l y , i f t h i s i s i n 
place, then i t would be worth the E n g l i s h Churches e i t h e r 
s e t t i n g up an o f f i c e i n B r u s s e l s , or a f f i l i a t i n g themselves 
with EECCS i n a formal way (or both), so t h a t the f r u i t s of the 
Church's commitment can be worked out i n dialogue with the 
Commission. Barth i s undoubtedly c o r r e c t i n p o i n t i n g out t h a t 
even with the present ecumenical s t r u c t u r e s i n Europe, " I n 
terms of the c a p a c i t y to a c t , the Churches l a g f a r behind 
p o l i t i c a l and economic i n s t i t u t i o n s " . Perhaps i t i s only when 
these questions are answered t h a t the Churches w i l l be ready to 
engage e f f e c t i v e l y w ith Europe. 
The Churches, then, must engage with 
Europe, not only through the f a c e t of personal engagement, they 
must a l s o engage a t an i n s t i t u t i o n a l l e v e l as w e l l . But as I 
s h a l l now argue, alongside the personal and i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
f a c e t s of the diamond, must a l s o be the t h e o l o g i c a l f a c e t - the 
p r i n c i p l e s t h a t underpin the Churches' engagement. 
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F A C E T 3: THEOLOGICAL ENGAGEMENT 
As I explained i n chapter 1, there were 
four main aims of the founding a r c h i t e c t s of post-war Europe: 
the s e c u r i n g of a j u s t and l a s t i n g peace i n Europe; 
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n between former enemies - c r u c i a l to t h i s was a 
Franco-German rapprochemen t; the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a devastated 
continent; and the r e b u i l d i n g of m a t e r i a l p r o s p e r i t y f o r 
Europe's people. As I have argued i n my f i r s t two chapters, I 
b e l i e v e t h a t these goals have, i n the main, been achieved by 
the EC/EU. i r o n i c a l l y , with the passing of the years , and 
because of the achievement of Europe's post-war a s p i r a t i o n s -
i t i s , f o r example, in c o n c e i v a b l e to my generation t h a t B r i t a i n 
should ever go to war with Germany - Europe i s now i n a time of 
deep u n c e r t a i n t y about i t s present v a l u e s and goals f o r the 
fu t u r e . I would go so f a r as to suggest t h a t Europe now needs a 
new v i s i o n to guide i t i n t o the next century. 
During the past 50 year s the name of the 
European e n t e r p r i s e has undergone a number of changes. The 
European Union was i n i t i a l l y the European Coal and S t e e l 
Community; t h i s developed i n t o the European Economic Community 
(the Common Market); t h i s then metamorphosed i n t o the European 
Communities ( E C ) ; and l a t t e r l y , i n t o the European Union. To 
some extent, i t r e f l e c t s a s h i f t i n emphasis from s o l e l y 
economic i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o a more f u l l y i n t e g r a t e d Europe 
('Union'). What i s perhaps to be re g r e t t e d , i n these days of 
the EU's unpopularity with the p u b l i c , i s t h a t the idea of 
community has been dropped from Europe's i n s t i t u t i o n a l ' t i t l e ' , 
and from common parlance. I n s t e a d , K e i t h Jenkins' nightmare 
v i s i o n of Europe's e v o l u t i o n i n t o a " s e l f - c e n t r e d , s e l f -
p r o t e c t i v e f r e e trade area", where governments operate s o l e l y 
on the b a s i s of n a t i o n a l s e l f - i n t e r e s t , l e t alone European 
s e l f - i n t e r e s t , seems to be j u s t as l i k e l y as an open Union. 
Consequently, i t i s my b e l i e f , t h a t one of the g r e a t e s t 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s t h a t the Church can make to the fu t u r e 
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development of Europe f o r the next century, i s to r e h a b i l i t a t e 
a deep-rooted theology of community, indeed, i t i s , I b e l i e v e , 
the p r i n c i p l e of community, worked out i n p r a c t i c e , which i s , I 
b e l i e v e , the be s t hope f o r Europe's development. 
One of the most profound New Testament 
images of the Church i s S a i n t Paul's d e s c r i p t i o n of the Church 
i n 1 C o r i n t h i a n s 12 as the "Body of C h r i s t " . Written to a 
community faced with j e a l o u s i e s and d i v i s i o n s over what were 
the g r e a t e r s p i r i t u a l g i f t s , the image has become paradigmatic 
of what i t i s to be the Church, and a l s o , what the i m p l i c a t i o n s 
are f o r l i f e i n community, i t i s not my i n t e n t i o n to argue t h a t 
Europe i s or must be synonymous with the Church as a new 
Christendom. However, many of the problems i m p l i c i t i n 1 
Co r i n t h i a n s 12 and many of the i m p l i c a t i o n s of community l i v i n g 
which Paul draws from the C o r i n t h i a n church's problems can, i n 
my judgement, f i n d p a r a l l e l s i n the present community of Europe 
as w e l l . Thus, I s h a l l argue, t h a t four of the ideas i n Paul's 
image of the Body i n 1 C o r i n t h i a n s 12, can p r o f i t a b l y teach a 
s e c u l a r s o c i e t y p r a c t i c a l l e s s o n s about l i v i n g i n a d i v e r s e 
community. 
( i ) I n d i v i d u a l i t y . 
The f i r s t p r i n c i p l e which Paul's image 
suggests i s the p r i n c i p l e of God-given i n d i v i d u a l i t y . For Paul, 
one of the abiding t r u t h s of the C o r i n t h i a n community was t h a t 
God had given many d i f f e r e n t s p i r i t u a l g i f t s to i n d i v i d u a l s . 
For any community, the b a s i c u n i t i s the i n d i v i d u a l . William 
Temple argued, moreover, t h a t "The primary p r i n c i p l e of 
C h r i s t i a n E t h i c s and C h r i s t i a n P o l i t i c s must be r e s p e c t f o r 
every person simply as a person... The person i s primary, not 
the s o c i e t y . . . " ( 3 7 ) As C a r d i n a l Hume poi n t s out, because "The 
theme of human d i g n i t y i s fundamental to the Church's 
teaching..."(38) the Church i s t h e r e f o r e committed to the 
defence of human d i g n i t y and human r i g h t s . I t i s e q u a l l y the 
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duty of the Church to speak out where the r i g h t s of the 
i n d i v i d u a l or s o c i a l groups a r e i n f r i n g e d and the d i g n i t y of 
each person i s undermined. 
T h i s b e l i e f c h a l l e n g e s B r i t a i n to ask 
again, what i t sees Europe's purpose to be. As I have argued i n 
my f i r s t two chapters, p a r t of the problem of B r i t a i n ' s 
p e r c e i ved awkwardness i n r e l a t i o n to Europe has been because i t 
has tended to see Europe as a f r e e - t r a d e area, and has r e s i s t e d 
f i e r c e l y any idea of a s o c i a l Europe. "There i s no such thing 
as s o c i e t y " as one former Prime M i n i s t e r famously put i t . 
However, i f the European Union i s more than a complex t r a d i n g 
area, and thus has a s o c i a l f u n c t i o n too, then B r i t a i n must 
a l t e r i t s a t t i t u d e s , i t must recognise t h a t European s o c i e t y 
i s made up of i n d i v i d u a l human beings made i n the image of God, 
f i r s t and foremost. Thus, su c c e s s of the EU should not simply 
be judged by t r a d i n g balance sheets, but a l s o how the EU 
f l o u r i s h e s as a s o c i e t y , and thus how i t enables i t s c i t i z e n s 
to f l o u r i s h as p a r t of t h a t s o c i e t y . 
( i i ) D i v e r s i t y . 
The c o r o l l a r y of the p r i n c i p l e of 
r e s p e c t i n g God-given i n d i v i d u a l i t y i s the p r i n c i p l e of 
a f f i r m i n g God-given d i v e r s i t y , i n Paul's image of the body such 
d i v e r s i t y of s p i r i t u a l g i f t s had been given to i n d i v i d u a l s " for 
the common good"(39) and not j u s t f o r the s e l f - e d i f i c a t i o n of 
the i n d i v i d u a l . I t seems to me th a t i n t h i s way, Paul's image 
of the body a f f i r m s both human i n d i v i d u a l i t y and d i v e r s i t y as 
being g i f t s from God. 
I f , as Temple suggests, a s i n g l e n a t i o n -
s t a t e i s a community of communities ( 4 0 ) , then the EU (which i s 
a group of n a t i o n - s t a t e s ) needs to remember t h a t , as Beales 
pointed out with the p e r t i n e n t example of Swi t z e r l a n d , many 
d i f f e r i n g communities and n a t i o n - s t a t e s make up modern Europe. 
I t must t h e r e f o r e a c t i v e l y avoid excluding i n d i v i d u a l s and 
communities from the l i f e of Europe, e s p e c i a l l y r e l i g i o u s , 
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e t h n i c and c u l t u r a l groups which are on Europe's f r i n g e s , such 
as p o s t - c o l o n i a l immigrants, refugees and T r a v e l l e r s . 
Such God-given d i v e r s i t y can, however, be 
extremely t h r e a t e n i n g to people. I t should not be forgotten 
that the present-day Europe arose a f t e r i t s v i r t u a l d e s t r u c t i o n 
caused by a regime committed to the e l i m i n a t i o n of a l l r a c i a l 
and c u l t u r a l d i v e r s i t y . There are however, I b e l i e v e , a number 
of important i m p l i c a t i o n s t h a t Paul's c e l e b r a t i o n of d i v e r s i t y 
poses f o r the modern-day Europe. 
Europe must guard a g a i n s t the tendency 
towards uniformity. Of course common standards on s a f e t y , 
s e r v i c e , q u a l i t y of goods and so on should be welcomed i n a 
community, but they must not be allowed to be a precursor f o r a 
European mono-culture. Rather, the European union needs to 
recognise t h a t i t i s a "Community of Communities" ( s t a t e s ) 
which are themselves "Communities of Communities", and support 
and s u s t a i n such d i v e r s i t y i n n a t i o n a l , h i s t o r i c a l and c u l t u r a l 
l i f e . T h i s i s e s p e c i a l l y important i f the r i g h t s and t r a d i t i o n s 
of e t h n i c and r e l i g i o u s m i n o r i t i e s are to be safeguarded i n the 
face of "The juggernaut of western c u l t u r e . . . " ( 4 1 ) which can 
e a s i l y swallow up opposition and c u l t u r a l d i v e r s i t y . 
R e f l e c t i n g on the problem of language i n 
Europe, Methodists Looking a t Europe b e l i e v e s t h a t "The l i m i t s 
of Europe's u n i t y are c l o s e l y connected to i t s m u l t i - l i n g u a l 
nature. I t seems improbable t h a t i t could ever become a p o l i t y 
able to meet a c r i s i s with a common v o i c e . "(42) Thus i t i s of 
concern t h a t , because of the huge c o s t s i n c u r r e d by the EU 
through providing t r a n s l a t i o n s e r v i c e s t h a t there i s the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of language f a c i l i t i e s being r e s t r i c t e d . As A.C.F. 
Beales noted i n The C a t h o l i c Church and I n t e r n a t i o n a l Order, i t 
i s incumbent upon a l l s t a t e s (and t h e r e f o r e the European union) 
to preserve and defend the r i g h t s of a l l m i n o r i t i e s w i t h i n 
them. P r e s e r v i n g a c c e s s to information through the p r e s e r v a t i o n 
and a f f i r m a t i o n of language can play an important; r o l e , indeed, 
i t i s not only important f o r c u l t u r a l r i c h n e s s , but f o r 
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democratic a c c o u n t a b i l i t y t h a t o f f i c i a l m a t e r i a l must be 
a v a i l a b l e f o r a l l of the EU's o f f i c i a l n a t i o n a l languages, and 
tha t t r a n s l a t i o n s are not excluded f o r the more minority 
n a t i o n a l languages such as Danish or Swedish. 
The p r i n c i p l e or t r u t h of human d i v e r s i t y 
must a l s o be a challenge to the Churches (as indeed the 
m u l t i p l i c i t y of s p i r i t u a l g i f t s were to the C o r i n t h i a n Church). 
As Suzanne Gee notes, "As i n t o l e r a n c e and r e l i g i o u s 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n are of t e n found w i t h i n r e l i g i o u s groups, such 
communities can and should inform and educate people about 
r e l i g i o u s communities other than t h e i r own." Furthermore, Gee 
a l s o b e l i e v e s t h a t "Churches should take advantage of t h e i r 
t r a n s n a t i o n a l l i n k s and, through c o n t a c t s with partner 
churches, i d e n t i f y themselves with the task of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n 
between m a j o r i t i e s and m i n o r i t i e s . They should help to promote 
peaceful c o - e x i s t e n c e and mutual r e c o g n i t i o n . . . ( 4 3 ) 
( i i i ) Mutuality. 
The next p r i n c i p l e which Paul's image of 
the body s t r e s s e s i s the p r i n c i p l e of mutual worth: " I f a l l 
were a s i n g l e organ, where would the body b e ? " ( l C o r i n t h i a n s 
12.19) As Pr o f e s s o r B a r r e t t put i t , "The members of a human 
body are v a r i o u s and i n t e r - r e l a t e d ; they are d i v e r s e , but form 
a u n i t y . " ( 4 4 ) I n essence, t h i s means t h a t , because a l l 
i n d i v i d u a l s are creat e d i n the image of God, and because God 
has w i l l e d human d i v e r s i t y , no i n d i v i d u a l person i s more 
important than another; no e t h n i c group or c u l t u r e i s more 
worthwhile than another; no s t a t e i s s u p e r i o r to another, nor 
does i t have absolute sovereignty. As Beales put i t , "only a 
s o c i e t y of persons can make up f o r t h i s inadequacy of the 
i n d i v i d u a l person."(45) E q u a l l y , each component p a r t , necessary 
for the b u i l d i n g up of the whole, has great worth, f o r "each 
person has a func t i o n , a vocation, i n r e l a t i o n t o the whole 
community."(46) 
For W i l l i a m Temple, the corporate nature of 
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human s o c i e t y was summed up i n the word, ' f e l l o w s h i p 1 . "For the 
completeness of p e r s o n a l i t y , there i s needed the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
to both God and neighbours. The r i c h e r h i s personal r e l a t i o n s , 
the more f u l l y personal he w i l l be."(47) For him, f e l l o w s h i p 
and community were the a n t i t h e s i s of e x c l u s i v e i n d i v i d u a l i t y , 
and y e t i t was p r e c i s e l y i n f e l l o w s h i p t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l 
p e r s o n a l i t y could f l o u r i s h and mature. 
Temple's understanding of f e l l o w s h i p means 
th a t , on the one hand, i n Europe today, we should warn t h a t no 
i n d i v i d u a l , group, c u l t u r e or na t i o n has the r i g h t to dominate 
another, p r e c i s e l y because each component p a r t i s v a l u a b l e . 
E q u a l l y , we must a l s o a f f i r m t h a t each i n d i v i d u a l component of 
European s o c i e t y s e r v e s to b u i l d up the whole and e n r i c h us 
a l l . Therein l i e s Europe's p o t e n t i a l r i c h n e s s , because i t i s 
made up of i n d i v i d u a l p a r t s . P a r a d o x i c a l l y , then, i t i s by 
being o u r s e l v e s i n community, t h a t we f i n d expressed our t r u e 
worth. However, f o r many, t h i s means r a d i c a l l y a l t e r i n g t h e i r 
view of Europe, f o r i f Europe i s to develop i n t o a genuine 
community which a f f i r m s the mutuality of worth of a l l i t s 
pa r t n e r s , then our use of language needs to change. Commonly, 
European n e g o t i a t i o n s are c a s t as being conducted between 'them 
and us'. Thus, i f something happens 'we' don't l i k e , i t i s 
because 'Europe has forced us to do t h i s ' , i n s t e a d , we need to 
move to the language of co-operation and honesty, so t h a t we 
might hear i n s t e a d t h a t 'As p a r t of the Community of Europe, we 
have agreed t o do t h i s , because being p a r t of a community 
in v o l v e s give-and-take, because we are committed to each 
other.' As I have shown i n my f i r s t two chapters, B r i t a i n has 
been f a r more c e n t r a l t o Europe when i t i s happy to negotiate 
openly and honestly as an equal partner, i n s t e a d of adopting a 
c h i l d i s h i n s i s t e n c e of always g e t t i n g i t s own way even i n the 
minutiae of d e t a i l . 
The b e l i e f i n the mutuality of worth a l s o 
has, I b e l i e v e , c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i m p l i c a t i o n s as w e l l . One of the 
most s i g n i f i c a n t c a t h o l i c s o c i a l d o c t r i n e s , as I observed i n 
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chapter 4, i s the p r i n c i p l e of s u b s i d i a r i t y . Enshrined i n the 
1931 papal e n c y c l i c a l , Quadrages imo Anno, and "elaborated i n 
response to f e a r of a growing c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of s t a t e 
a u t h o r i t y . I t was intended to defend intermediary bodies -
f a m i l i e s , e n t e r p r i s e s , a s s o c i a t i o n s - c o n s t i t u t e d on the b a s i s 
of c i v i l s o c i e t y . " ( 4 8 ) i t was, thus intended, to a f f i r m the 
worth of each order of s o c i e t y , and to defend t h e i r freedom and 
r i g h t s . C a r d i n a l Hume d e f i n e s the p r i n c i p l e of s u b s i d i a r i t y 
thus, " i t i s a r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t people, because of who and what 
they are, should be empowered to take d e c i s i o n s f o r t h e i r own 
l i v e s with due regard for the i n t e r e s t s of the wider 
community." He adds, " I t i s c l e a r l y opposed to e x c e s s i v e 
bureaucracy, to paternalism, to the imposition of p o l i c i e s and 
s t r a t e g i e s by the strong on the weak. I t emphasizes the need to 
develop human p o t e n t i a l as God-given and as the g r e a t e s t 
resource possessed by t h i s p l a n e t . " ( 4 9 ) As I have explained i n 
chapters 2 and 4, the p r i n c i p l e of s u b s i d i a r i t y has been 
'adopted' by the European Union, i n e f f e c t the p r i n c i p l e i s 
appl i e d to determine which ' l e v e l ' of government should be 
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r which aspect of community l i f e . H i t h e r t o , i t 
has been p r i m a r i l y used to define the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the 
powers of s t a t e and EU. C l e a r l y , however, i f the p r i n c i p l e of 
the mutuality of worth i s to be taken s e r i o u s l y ; i f each person 
i s to be as f r e e - indeed Temple claimed t h a t freedom was the 
r e a l goal of p o l i t i c s (50) - then d e c i s i o n s a f f e c t i n g peoples' 
l i v e s need to be taken as near to each person as p o s s i b l e . To 
quote voye once more, the p r i n c i p l e of s u b s i d i a r i t y " a f f i r m s 
the r i g h t s and d u t i e s of people, and s i m i l a r l y of each l e v e l of 
the s o c i a l order to define t h e i r ends, and to be helped by the 
higher l e v e l i n seeking these ends without i n t e r f e r e n c e . . . 
n e g a t i v e l y , the p r i n c i p l e of s u b s i d i a r i t y denies any higher 
l e v e l group the r i g h t to deprive any lower group, and more 
fundamentally s t i l l , the person of t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of 
i n i t i a t i v e . " ( 5 1 ) 
I f the European Union i s to take the 
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p r i n c i p l e of s u b s i d i a r i t y , then i n f a c t , i t has f a r wider 
i m p l i c a t i o n s than j u s t the d i s t r i b u t i o n of powers between 
n a t i o n a l governments and the EU. i t i m p l i e s t h a t i f lower 
l e v e l s can deal with i s s u e s - r e g i o n a l , l o c a l and community 
governments, for example, then they are the l e v e l s a t which 
d e c i s i o n s should be taken, so t h a t people can have as much 
d i r e c t a c c e s s t o d e c i s i o n making as p o s s i b l e . C l e a r l y i n 
B r i t a i n , however, the trend of the l a s t 20 y e a r s has been the 
movement of power upwards - from l o c a l to c e n t r a l government 
and from Westminster a l s o to B r u s s e l s , undoubtedly there i s a 
r d l e f o r these t i e r s of government. There seems to be, i n my 
judgement, merit i n Edward Mortimer's b e l i e f (52) i n the need 
to move (dare one say i t ? ) to a more genuinely f e d e r a l Europe. 
T h i s i s not to be m i s i n t e r p r e t e d as an argument for 
c e n t r a l i s i n g power with the EU. A genuine f e d e r a l s t r u c t u r e , 
such as those of the United S t a t e s or Germany, a c t u a l l y d e f i n e s 
a u t h o r i t y and power a t p a r t i c u l a r l e v e l s . Moreover, i t has a 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l court f o r a p p e l l a n t s to approach i f the 
appropriate a u t h o r i t y i s abused. I f we are s e r i o u s i n a f f i r m i n g 
the mutuality of worth of people, groups, s t a t e s , then the 
organs of power need to be as c l o s e to them as p o s s i b l e - as 
does defence a g a i n s t e x c e s s i v e bureaucracy. A f e d e r a l s t r u c t u r e 
applying the concept of s u b s i d i a r i t y and a f f i r m i n g the 
mutuality of worth w i t h i n European s o c i e t y , which responds to 
the needs of people and defends t h e i r freedoms, needs to be 
s e r i o u s l y examined by the Churches and by c i v i l s o c i e t y as a 
whole, with polemics s e t a s i d e . 
( i v ) R e s p o n s i b i l i t y . 
As the p r i n c i p l e of s u b s i d i a r i t y i m p l i e s , 
the attendant p r i n c i p l e to a mutuality of worth i s a mutuality 
of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , f o r , as Temple argued, "the combination of 
freedom and Fellowship as p r i n c i p l e s of s o c i a l l i f e i s s u e s i n 
the o b l i g a t i o n of s e r v i c e . " ( 5 3 ) To r e t u r n to the Pauline image, 
"... t h a t the members may have the same ca r e f o r one another. 
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I f one member s u f f e r s , a l l s u f f e r together; i f one member i s 
honoured, a l l r e j o i c e together."(1 C o r i n t h i a n s 12.25b-26) 
For S t . Paul, the bestowal of s p i r i t u a l 
g i f t s was f o r the b u i l d i n g up of the community. I t was the duty 
of the g i f t e d person to share the g i f t with the church. For 
Temple, i t was the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of f r e e c i t i z e n s a l s o to 
serve, whether t h a t be i n voluntary work or work for the s t a t e . 
Thus, the i m p l i c a t i o n i s , t h a t i f some f a i l e d to serve, the 
whole community s u f f e r e d . 
R e l a t i n g to t h i s b e l i e f i n the mutuality of 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of s e r v i c e i s the C a t h o l i c s o c i a l d o c t r i n e of 
s o l i d a r i t y , which The Common Good d e f i n e s as "the w i l l i n g n e s s 
to see others as another ' s e l f , and so to regard i n j u s t i c e 
committed a g a i n s t another as no l e s s a s e r i o u s i n j u s t i c e 
a g a i n s t oneself."(paragraph 23) So what are the i m p l i c a t i o n s of 
a d o c t r i n e of s o l i d a r i t y as mutual r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ? 
F i r s t l y , i t a f f i r m s t h a t by v i r t u e of our 
common God-created humanity, we have s o l i d a r i t y with a l l 
people, i r r e s p e c t i v e of t h e i r race, colour, creed, n a t i o n a l i t y 
or language, and moreover, i r r e s p e c t i v e of whether people are 
c i t i z e n s of the European Union or not. T h i s p r i v i l e g e b r ings 
with i t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . We have a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to a l l the 
people of the world, and e s p e c i a l l y those i n the developing 
two-thirds world. One such way i s to ensure t h a t a l l c o u n t r i e s 
have the a b i l i t y to trade honestly and openly with the EU. That 
means that i n the i n t e r e s t of g l o b a l j u s t i c e , the EU's 
p r o t e c t i o n i s t and s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d t r a d i n g p a t t e r n s need to 
phased out. As Europeans we cannot stand i n our f o r t r e s s and 
yet c l a i m to stand i n s o l i d a r i t y with those who wait outside, 
without doing something to l i f t the p o r t c u l l i s . 
As w e l l as ' n a t i o n a l ' s o l i d a r i t y as t h a t 
might be described, Europeans have a duty of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to 
those who come from t h i r d c o u n t r i e s , so t h a t they do not remain 
margi n a l i s e d . The book of Exodus s t a t e s the duty of concern 
c l e a r l y : "You s h a l l not wrong a stra n g e r or oppress him, f o r 
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you were s t r a n g e r s i n the land of Egypt. You s h a l l not a f f l i c t 
any widow or orphan. I f you do a f f l i c t them, and they c r y out 
to me, I w i l l s u r e l y hear t h e i r c r y . " ( 5 4 ) There a r e p a r a l l e l s 
today. 
There are many 'strangers' i n Europe today 
- refugees who came to the EU seeking a haven from per s e c u t i o n , 
yet f o r whom 'freedom 1 has meant the journey from the a i r p o r t 
to the p r i s o n c e l l without the ' d i s t r a c t i o n 1 of a court. Europe 
needs a common, j u s t and humane refugee p o l i c y , i f we are to 
c l a i m we take our s o l i d a r i t y with those who are seeking 
sanctuary with us s e r i o u s l y . There are a l s o many migrant 
workers i n Europe today, who, as the many v i c i o u s arson a t t a c k s 
i n Germany i n 1991 showed, can e a s i l y become the scape-goat fo r 
s o c i e t y ' s i l l s . There i s a duty of h o s p i t a l i t y and p r o t e c t i o n 
to a l l whom we i n v i t e here. Yet the underlying problem remains: 
i n a j u s t g l o b a l s o c i e t y the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of economic refugees 
or migrant workers may w e l l be reduced and e r a d i c a t e d , but 
u n t i l t h a t i s the case, we must work f o r j u s t i c e i n the world, 
and w i t h i n Europe. 
E q u a l l y there are p a r a l l e l s w ith the 
"widows and orphans" - those who are c i t i z e n s , and y e t who are 
made to f e e l t h a t they do not belong. For there are many i n our 
s o c i e t y who f e e l d i s e n f r a n c h i s e d : r a c i a l and r e l i g i o u s 
m i n o r i t i e s , the poor, the long-term unemployed. They are w i t h i n 
s o c i e t y ; they are c i t i z e n s of the EU, and y e t are v a r i o u s l y 
ignored, c r i t i c i z e d , and o s t r a c i s e d . C h r i s t i a n s , however, have 
the duty to stand alongside those of our own s o c i e t y , who f e e l 
they have no p l a c e . And i f Europe's p o l i c i e s do not address 
those who are marginalised, then t h e i r p o l i c i e s need to be 
challenged v i g o r o u s l y . Indeed, we need to take Paul's comment 
s e r i o u s l y , when one p a r t of the body s u f f e r s , the whole of the 
body s u f f e r s . I t i s no l e s s t r u e of g l o b a l or European s o c i e t y , 
than of the C o r i n t h i a n church. 
S o l i d a r i t y , though, a l s o has another, and 
a l t o g e t h e r more p o s i t i v e dimension because " i f one member i s 
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honoured, a l l r e j o i c e together"(1 Cor.12.26b) For the Church, 
the s h a r i n g of g i f t s enriched the whole. As European 
C h r i s t i a n s , by v i r t u e of our common humanity, we a l s o stand i n 
s o l i d a r i t y with a l l people i n Europe i r r e s p e c t i v e of t h e i r 
r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s , because we share a common European home. We 
l i v e i n a s o c i e t y which i s indeed m u l t i - c u l t u r a l and m u l t i -
f a i t h . I t i s important for C h r i s t i a n s to acknowledge our own 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to work f o r renewal i n Europe, by humbly 
r e s t a t i n g p r i n c i p l e s , through which the Churches can engage 
with Europe a t i n s t i t u t i o n a l and a t the personal l e v e l . But 
equally, we have a duty to work with a l l people who a r e s i n c e r e 
about e x p l o r i n g the fu t u r e of Europe. Perhaps i n t h a t way, as 
we acknowledge our s o l i d a r i t y with a l l people, we w i l l have the 
opportunity through dialogue - and a l s o through being open to 
c r i t i c i s m and challenge - to s t a t e our C h r i s t i a n b e l i e f s and to 
l i s t e n to the val u e s of others, and thus to d i s c o v e r what i t i s 
to be a common humanity, and to b u i l d up a common European 
home. 
S t . Paul's image does, then, have much to 
commend i t as a model of p r i n c i p l e s f o r the Church to explore, 
and from which the Church can examine what i s happening i n 
European s o c i e t y . Do we acknowledge and c e l e b r a t e our 
i n d i v i d u a l i t y ? Does Europe r e j o i c e i n i t s d i v e r s i t y ? Do our 
p o l i c i e s a f f i r m the mutuality of our worth, without demeaning 
the c o n t r i b u t i o n s of the marg i n a l i s e d and oppressed? Do we a l s o 
acknowledge our r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s as an i n t e r n a t i o n a l community 
both to the world outside i t and the world w i t h i n ? The r e a l 
challenge of S t . Paul, though, was more profound than t h a t . I t 
was to challenge the C o r i n t h i a n church to r e o r i e n t a t e i t s e l f 
towards the outworking of love and s e r v i c e , t h a t was the 
g r e a t e s t challenge of a l l . 
Do the E n g l i s h churches, then, have 
anything from t h e i r own experience and example to o f f e r to the 
future of Europe? 
As I h i g h l i g h t e d a t the beginning of 
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chapter 3, one of the d i s t i n c t i v e features of English 
ec c l e s i a s t i c a l l i f e has been i t s 3-part composition of 
Anglican, Roman Catholic and Free Churches. I t i s a structure 
not found anywhere outside of the B r i t i s h i s l e s . Over the 
centuries since the Reformation the relations between the three 
have changed; from the quest f o r uniformity and persecution f o r 
non-conformity, to grudging acceptance, to tolerance, and, i n 
many instances today, of deeply committed co-operation and 
partnership. In some places the co-operation has had dramatic 
effe c t s , as as been seen i n Liverpool (55). In other places, i t 
has been less dramatic, but no less important, as churches have 
come together i n partnerships, sharing agreements and so on. 
Another remarkable feature of the war 
years, shown i n chapter 3, was the growing ecumenical movement, 
characterised by the s p i r i t of the S t o l l Theatre meetings and 
formalised by the creation of the B r i t i s h Council of Churches 
i n 1942. In recent years ecumenical commitment has been re-
affirmed, most s t r i k i n g l y i n the Swanwick Declaration of 
September 1987 (56). Since then, the B r i t i s h Council of 
Churches has been replaced by the Churches' Council of B r i t a i n 
and Ireland, and by national bodies, such as Churches Together 
i n England. Such developments have much to o f f e r to Europe. 
The most s t r i k i n g feature has been the way 
i n which the Churches have moved from intolerance to acceptance 
and co-operation. In some ways, t h i s mirrors what has been 
happening i n Europe during the l a s t 50 years. What i s equally 
true, however, i s that the Church i s not yet one, and such 
brokenness i s , i n Cardinal Hume's view, a scandal (57). 
However, what has been remarkable has been the renewal of the 
quest f o r u n i t y amidst d i v e r s i t y . As the Swanwick Declaration 
put i t , " i n the unity we seek we recognise that there w i l l not 
be uniformity but legitimate diversity."(58) Although there i s 
no common understanding as to what form u n i t y may take (again 
perhaps mirroring the EU), i t i s nevertheless a clear 
commitment to recognition of the richness and importance of 
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d i v e r s i t y , w h i l s t recognising that the underlying u n i t y of 
f a i t h i s more important than the divi s i o n s . I t i s , I believe, 
an important concept for the EU to grasp: a European unity and 
p o l i t y which respects d i v e r s i t y of national, c u l t u r a l , 
r e l i g i o u s and l i n g u i s t i c backgrounds, and yet which can 
celebrate a l l that we have i n common. I t equally recognises 
that d i v e r s i t y cannot be compressed i n t o uniformity. As the EU 
works out what that means i n practice, so the Churches must 
also share i n that journey as they learn what i t means to be 
united i n d i v e r s i t y . 
Secondly, "The Church understands i t s e l f t o 
be the place where the S p i r i t sustains a profound u n i t y i n the 
midst of a l l the d i v e r s i t y as a sign and instrument of 
re c o n c i l i a t i o n i n the world. Mission and unity belong 
together."(59) I n other words, the quest for unity i s not f o r 
i t s own sake, however important that may be i n i t s e l f . I t i s 
unity f or service. As post-war European structures achieved 
t h e i r aims i n the west, perhaps now the quest f o r European 
unit y needs to recognise i t s own c a l l to service afresh: 
service towards Central and Eastern Europe; service towards the 
two-thirds world. As the Churches are in t e r p r e t i n g the c a l l t o 
be one as a c a l l to serve, the EU needs to adopt a simila r 
understanding, i f i t i s to avoid a narrowness which may be 
injuri o u s t o the rest of the world. 
In no way can the English Churches' 
experience be said t o be perfect. Manifestly the Church i s not 
united, and often hesitant i n i t s service. I t i s , though, 
equally true t o say that a t t i t u d e s have profoundly changed fo r 
the better since the beginning of World war I I . I t i s my hope 
that the ecumenical pilgrimage w i l l continue, and i n so doing, 
by celebrating i t s r i c h d i v e r s i t y and c a l l t o serve. This can 
be a journey which Europe and the Churches can share together, 
as they wrestle with many of same issues: unity, d i v e r s i t y and 
re s p o n s i b i l i t y . 
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CONCLUSIONS 
From the outset of the Second world war, as 
I i l l u s t r a t e d i n chapter l , a c r i t i c a l question emerged fo r 
many people, both i n the Church and outside i t : what kind of 
Europe should emerge a f t e r the war was over? I t became clear 
that i f war was to be avoided, four aims needed to be realised: 
the maintenance of peace; r e c o n c i l i a t i o n ; reconstruction; and 
material prosperity. Many concluded that the pre-war structures 
and old inter-governmental alliances had f a i l e d these aims; the 
pooling of national sovereignty became, for many, the means t o 
achieve these aims- Such desires appeared to reach t h e i r 
apotheosis with the formation of the European Economic 
Community i n 1958. I t seemed t o real i s e the v i s i o n of the war-
time p o l i t i c a l and eccl e s i a s t i c a l leaders. That other member 
states wanted t o j o i n , and continue t o want t o j o i n f o r t h e i r 
own security and economic well-being i s testimony to i t s 
success. 
As I have shown i n chapters 1 and 2, the 
developments since the war have been organic, rather than 
expressly planned. Powers and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s have moved 
between national governments and the European i n s t i t u t i o n s 
since 1958. Clearly what we have i n Europe i s not perfect. 
There are serious questions over the democratic accountability 
of the EU; i t s relations with countries outside i t s borders; 
i t s a b i l i t y even to relate to i t s own ci t i z e n s . I t s aims may 
have been f u l f i l l e d , but Europe i s also i n a time of malaise. 
I t stands, i n f a c t , at a crossroads, wondering which way to 
turn. Whichever way i t turns, as Churchill realised 50 years 
ago, i t must carry the hearts of people with i t . 
As I explained i n chapter 3, English Church 
leaders were equally concerned about the future of Europe as 
the war progressed. Churchmen l i k e Archbishop Temple, Bishop 
Bell and A.C.F. Beales wrestled with the question of how Europe 
might develop. Each i n t h e i r own way pointed t o the l i m i t s of 
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structures. Structures have t h e i r role - though each was 
careful not to advocate a p a r t i c u l a r governmental structure -
but what was more important was that Christian prin c i p l e s 
underpinned the structure. Regrettably, j u s t as B r i t i s h 
p o l i t i c i a n s turned t h e i r thinking away from Europe a f t e r the 
war, so did the Churches'. Although, i n the 1960's there was a 
time when the English Church's thinking was much i n advance of 
i t s secular counterparts, from then u n t i l the l a t e 1980's the 
English Churches generally remained s i l e n t about Europe. 
I t apparently needed the seismic shock of 
the collapse of Communism on the continent, and the eruptions 
i n the B r i t i s h Conservative Party t o reawaken the Churches from 
t h e i r European slumber. Many of t h e i r reports since then have 
been l i m i t e d i n t h e i r scope: some describing the changes i n 
Europe; others h i g h l i g h t issues of concern. Very few have moved 
in t o any deeper theological r e f l e c t i o n and engagement with 
modern day Europe, which i s highly regrettable, considering 
that the UK has been part of the EC for 24 years. Equally 
regrettable has been the Churches' lack of support f o r 
organisations such as EECCS, who are attempting t o wrestle with 
European issues d a i l y . I t i s to be hoped that now that EECCS i s 
to become an agency of the Conference of European Churches, 
that a new prominence w i l l be given to such work. Do the 
English Churches have a word, then, of value t o o f f e r t o 
Europe, i n the l i g h t of such past weakness? 
I t seems to me, i n the l i g h t of chapters 3 
and 4 that i f the Churches are to speak a word of value today, 
then the Churches' at t i t u d e s and practice needs t o change 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y . Thus, I advocate a diamond as a model of the 
Church's po t e n t i a l engagement with Europe, f o r the diamond i s 
multi-faceted, extremely durable, and has a c u t t i n g edge second 
to none. Sadly, the Church's message today towards Europe i s 
blunt, because i t s engagement has been neither comprehensive or 
durable. Thus, I believe that i t i s imperative that the 
Churches must begin t o engage i n a comprehensive way not 
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h i t h e r t o seen. 
The Churches must engage, and be engaged by 
Europe at various levels. I t i s v i t a l that in d i v i d u a l 
Christians f e e l that they have an active part to play i n 
Europe's l i f e , whether i t be through holding the EU t o account; 
working i n the i n s t i t u t i o n s ; personal relationships or prayer. 
I t i s equally important that the Churches as i n s t i t u t i o n s catch 
up, learning how Europe works, engaging i n s c r u t i n i z i n g what i s 
happening. Equally, i t must learn with whom to engage! I t must 
comprehensively engage with the p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s , and not 
ju s t with selective 'moral' issues. 
Underpinning these issues, however, i s the 
level of Christian p r i n c i p l e s which, as Temple and others 
realised, must underpin any p o l i t i c a l structure. I t i s my 
b e l i e f t h a t , i n these times of malaise and uncertainty, and i n 
an age so often characterised by individualism, that the Church 
rediscovers the p r i n c i p l e and richness of Community as a way of 
underpinning the EU. St. Paul's image of the Body of Christ 
illuminates many of the elements of Community l i f e : an 
affirmation of the unique nature and worth of each human being; 
a celebration of God-given d i v e r s i t y ; but equally importantly, 
a r e a l i s a t i o n of the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of each person for the good 
of the whole. In that way the concepts of s u b s i d i a r i t y and 
s o l i d a r i t y both point towards our r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to others, 
including those on the fringes or outside of Europe. Clearly 
though, the Churches cannot teach Europe how to behave, without 
addressing i t s own f a i l u r e t o be the body of Christ. I t s 
disunity i s a severe hindrance t o the effectiveness of the 
message. Thus, i f the Church i s to advocate that Europe must 
change, the Church must, i t s e l f , be prepared t o change, and 
address some of the same questions i t faces. 
Temple and Beales could easily be accused 
of not being able to re l a t e p r i n c i p l e to r e a l i t y . Am I simply 
advocating a Utopian ide a l , then? I hope not! To quote the 
clich6, the Church must not be a l l heavenly minded and no 
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earthly good. I t i s absolutely v i t a l that the Church address 
the p o l i t i c a l and social r e a l i t i e s as they are - and not j u s t 
be a moral or issue-based pressure group. The Churches cannot 
hope to e f f e c t i v e l y engage with Europe, l e t alone change i t , i f 
they are not grounded i n the way things are, and the way people 
are. Equally though, I also believe that i t i s important that 
Christians carry a s u f f i c i e n t amount of idealism with them that 
can enable themselves and the Church t o see beyond the 
immediate, and to see how things could be. Is that not, i n 
fa c t , what such war-time leaders (and post-war European 
architects) l i k e Adenauer, Schumann and de Gasperi, did? Indeed 
the Churches must give a v i s i o n f o r the future, leaving no 
question of j u s t of 'tinkering with the edges'. I want to 
advocate pro-active Christian engagement with Europe which i s 
t r u l y comprehensive i n i t s scope; which i s inspired by 
Christian f a i t h and underpinned by Christian p r i n c i p l e s ; but 
which deals with r e a l i t y i n Europe. Unless the Churches manage 
hold t o these ideals i n tension, and allow them to be exposed 
to one another for i l l u m i n a t i o n and development, the Church's 
message w i l l continue t o lack d u r a b i l i t y or a c u t t i n g edge. 
Thus, i n David Edwards' phrase, "as a new Europe i s born, 
European C h r i s t i a n i t y must be reborn"(60) - and, we might add, 
English C h r i s t i a n i t y too. 
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